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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses Scottish households' tenure choice behaviour by using economic 
approaches. The data set comes from the 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey 
(SHCS). To estimate the household's tenure decision behaviour, two simulation 
models with different structures are developed. The first tenure choice model 
contains a simple one-level choice set. A multinomial logit model is employed to 
estimate three choice alternatives: owner-occupation, social renting and private 
renting. The second tenure choice model contains a two-level choice structure 
assuming that the household firstly decides to move or stay and then chooses a tenure 
alternative. A nested multinomial logit model is employed to estimate the decision 
to move/stay and the choice of three tenure alternatives. The determinants of the two 
tenure choice models not only include household attributes but also include housing 
attributes. The household attributes generally consist of the household's demographic 
and socio-economic variables, while housing attributes include dwelling type, 
location and neighbourhood variables. In addition, this thesis also includes the 
housing subsidy and rationing variables to estimate their impacts on tenure choice. 
The estimation results show that the household long term income, the user cost of 
housing, housing subsidy and rationing variables, as expected, have the most 
significant influences on households' tenure decisions in Scotland. Moreover, three 
policy issues are derived from the results of the tenure choice models. The first issue 
discusses the simulation of the influences of changes in the income tax rate and the 
mortgage rationing ratios on tenure choice. The second issue analyses income 
inequality and tenure polarisation. The third issue examines the distribution of 
housing subsidy between tenures and income levels. The simulation results suggest a 
direction of these changes on the household's tenure choice behaviour, especially the 
choice of owner-occupation. The results of the second and the third issues show that 
low-income households are significantly concentrated in the social rented sector. 
The rigid need-based allocation system and the small private rented sector could 
partly be the result of tenure and income polarisation in the social housing sector. 
On the other hand, some low-income homeowners, primarily elderly and outright 
owners, could not afford to remain in owner-occupation. Finally, the results of the 
three issues would have implications for housing policy reform regarding the reform 
for housing benefit and the allocation system, assisting low-income homeowners, 
and promoting the private rented sector. 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Housing tenure through owning or renting (public or private) implies a range of social 
and economic relations surrounding housing (Barlow and Duncan 1988). The choice 
of housing tenure expresses the household's ability, preferences, expectations and 
relations to different tenures. From a sociological viewpoint, the choice of housing 
tenure implies the housing class and social relations to different tenures (Rex and 
Moore 1967, Gray 1982). From an economic viewpoint, the housing tenure decision 
presents a consumer's choice behaviour by maximising his/her utility on different 
tenures and choosing the tenure that yields the maximum utility (Fallis 1985). This 
thesis analyses the household's tenure choice behaviour by using economic 
approaches. The core method is to employ economic models to estimate the 
household's tenure choice in Scotland. 
In the economic perspective, a household in its demand for housing services has to 
make several choices. An important one is to decide whether to acquire housing 
services through owning or renting. Many studies have been devoted to estimating the 
demand for housing, either ownership or rental (for example see Lee and Trost 1978, 
Rosen 1979, Henderson and Ioannides 1983, Börsch-Supan and Pitkin 1988, and 
Laakso and Loikkanen 1995). In the UK, however, the choice of housing tenure is not 
simply whether to own or to rent. Over the past several decades, the outcomes of 
government policy in the housing market have been shown in a rapidly growing 
owner-occupied market and in a strong social housing sector with limited access 
(King 1980). The private rented sector is relatively small and it is vigorous. It plays 
an important transitional role between owner-occupation and social renting. As a 
result, in the study of tenure choice in the UK, the household's choice for housing 
tenure should at least include three alternatives: owner-occupation, social renting and 
private renting. 
Many studies of tenure choice in the UK have been concentrated in England (see for 
example Doling 1973, King 1980, and Di Salvo and Ermisch 1997). Few studies have 
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been carried out in Scotland. While Scotland is often referred to as a region of the UK, 
it is a quite distinct country with its own administrative, legal and education system. 
In the housing market, the unique housing bidding system and historically strong 
policy on social housing have impacts on Scotland's tenure pattern as well as housing 
market conditions, distinguishing it from the rest of the UK (Murie 1996a). We have 
seen a lower starting point but a rapid increase in the homeownership rate in Scotland 
over the last three decades. In 1971, Scotland's homeownership rate accounted for 
31.2 per cent of the total housing stock while the homeownership rate in England and 
Wales was 52.4 per cent and 55.8 per cent respectively. By 1998, Scotland's 
homeownership rate rose to 61.3 per cent, compared to 68 per cent and 71.5 per cent 
in England and Wales respectively. 
The historical importance of the public housing sector is greater in Scotland than in 
the rest of Britain. In the 1970s, Scotland's public dwellings accounted for half of the 
housing stock, while in both England and Wales public dwellings accounted for less 
than 30 per cent of their housing stock. Since the 1980s, as a result of the Right to 
Buy scheme and the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer scheme, the public housing stock 
in Scotland, as well as in the rest of Britain, has significantly reduced (Murie 1996b). 
By 1998, Scotland's public dwellings only accounted for 26.6 per cent of the total 
housing stock but the figure still remained the highest among the three countries and 
was about 10 percentage points higher than that in England and Wales. In addition, 
Scotland's independent housing association sector remains much smaller and there are 
no equivalents of England's large housing associations (Murie 1996a). In contrast to a 
rapidly growing owner-occupied housing and a strong social rented sector, private 
rented dwellings in Scotland remain the lowest percentage of the total housing stock 
among the three countries. By 1998, Scotland's private rented dwellings accounted 
for only 6.7 per cent of the total housing stock, compared to 11.1 per cent and 8.5 per 
cent in England and Wales respectively. 
To some degree, the long-term tenure pattern reveals the outcomes of the household's 
tenure decision behaviour. We have seen that Scotland's tenure pattern is 
significantly different from the rest of Britain. Hence it implies that the Scottish 
household's tenure choice behaviour would be different from the household in the rest 
of Britain. As a result, there is a need for more studies to analyse the household's 
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tenure choice behaviour in Scotland. To study tenure choice, this thesis attempts to 
clarify the determinants of tenure choice and to analyse the impact of the determinants 
on Scottish households' tenure decision. 
In the tenure choice literature, a household's tenure decision is influenced by a variety 
of factors. These factors can generally be grouped into several key determinants such 
as preferences, the user cost of capital, and non-price constraints (Maclennan 1997). 
A household's preference for owner-occupation or renting can be expressed through 
different household structures, socio-economic backgrounds and household formation. 
The user cost of capital is reflected in the relative prices of owning versus renting. 
Further, non-price constraints are the household's employment, mobility and the 
housing policy. Housing policy through housing subsidy and the taxation system has 
undoubtedly had significant impacts on the household's tenure decision. 
Moreover, the importance of these tenure choice determinants varies between 
countries. For instance, the income tax advantages for owner-occupation have major 
influences on the household's tenure choice in the United States (see Rosen 1979, 
Henderson and Ioannides 1983). In the UK, due to the government's strong 
intervention in the housing market, the housing subsidy system and rationing in the 
admission to owner-occupation and to social housing have significant impacts on the 
household's tenure decision (see Doling 1973, King 1980, and Gallent, Baker and 
Wong 1998). As a result, this thesis contains an analysis of the influences of housing 
subsidy and rationing factors on the household's tenure choice in Scotland. In 
particular, these two factors may have important contributions to a growing owner- 
occupied sector and a strong social housing sector in Scotland. 
To analyse the household's tenure decision behaviour, two simulation models with 
different structures are developed in this thesis. The first model contains a one-level 
choice structure to estimate the household's choice behaviour between three 
alternative tenures. The second model contains a two-level choice structure to 
estimate the household's tenure choice behaviour given its decision to move. These 
two models would provide a robust analysis of Scottish households' tenure choice 
behaviour from different aspects. 
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Furthermore, to estimate these two simulation models, appropriate discrete choice 
models are employed in this thesis. Among the discrete choice models, the 
multinomial logit model and the nested multinomial logit model have been widely 
applied to the tenure choice study, and these two models are employed in this thesis. 
The multinomial logit model contains a simple functional form to estimate the 
influence of the determinants on the household's tenure choice behaviour. The nested 
multinomial logit model contains a hierarchical functional form and is used to 
estimate the household's mobility decision and tenure choice. The empirical data set 
comes from the 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey. This data set is a cross- 
sectional survey data set with a large sample size. The data set is rich in information 
about household socio-economic characteristics and dwelling conditions, which are 
suitable for the tenure choice study. 
It is expected that the results of the two tenure choice models would provide a better 
understanding of Scottish households' tenure decision behaviour. The results would 
indicate that some key determinants such as household income, the user cost of 
housing and some household demographic characteristics would have substantial 
influences on tenure choice. Two determinants - housing subsidy and rationing 
variables emphasised by this thesis - are expected to have important impacts on 
households' tenure choice. This indicates that the household's tenure decision is not 
only affected by household attributes but also affected by housing attributes and 
housing policy. Moreover, the thesis attempts to interpret the model results from the 
housing policy perspective. Some policy issues are derived from the model results. 
The first issue relates to some simulation work regarding the influences of changes in 
some policy or schemes on the household's tenure choice. Two other issues expect to 
discuss the outcome of tenure choice and income distribution, and the distribution of 
housing subsidies between different tenures and income levels. Finally the analysis of 
these issues is expected to have some implications for current housing policy. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The main objectives of this thesis are not to develop the model but rather to clarify the 
determinants of tenure choice and to estimate the influences of these determinants on 
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tenure choice, then to explore policy issues and implications. Based on these 
objectives, three research questions are developed as follows: 
1. What is the nature of tenure choice and its determinants in Scotland? 
A review of literature intends to clarify the nature of tenure choice and the 
determinants of tenure choice. The literature review includes a discussion of the 
definition of housing tenure choice from different perspectives; a discussion of 
theoretical and empirical studies of the tenure choice model; a review of Scottish 
housing tenure structure and housing market conditions (such as long-term tenure 
patterns, house prices, housing transactions, rationing in the housing market); and 
housing subsidy to assist with housing cost. 
2. To what extent do these determinants influence the household's tenure decision in 
Scotland? 
Two simulation models are developed to estimate the influence of the 
determinants on the household's tenure choice. The first model simply estimates 
the impact of the determinants on the household's tenure decision between three 
alternative tenures. The second model estimates the impact of the determinants on 
the household's mobility decision and tenure choice. The data set used in the 
thesis is the 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey, which consists of a household 
survey and a physical inspection of the dwellings covering the whole Scottish 
areas. 
3. What policy issues emerge from the model results and what are the implications 
for current housing policy in Scotland? 
Three policy issues are derived from the results of the tenure choice models. The 
first issue concerns some simulations in terms of the influences of changes in the 
income tax rate and the mortgage rationing criteria on the household's tenure 
choice. The second issue concerns the outcomes of the household's tenure choice 
and income distribution. The third issue relates to an analysis of the distributional 
effect of housing subsidies on households in different tenures and income levels. 
These issues have implications for current housing policy in terms of the policy of 
sustainable homeownership and the reform for housing subsidy and social welfare 
policy. 
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1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is designed to achieve the goal of the thesis and to answer 
the research questions stated above. Chapter Two is a literature review of theoretical 
and empirical studies of tenure choice. This chapter begins with a discussion of the 
nature of housing tenure choice from both sociological and economical perspectives; 
it then defines the scope of this thesis's tenure choice study focusing on economic 
approaches. From an economic viewpoint, the theory of tenure choice is derived from 
consumer choice and housing demand theories. The theory of consumer choice 
applying to housing -commodity and the consumer's housing decision in housing 
demand study are discussed in this chapter. In general, the decision of demand for 
housing services and tenure choice can be seen as a joint choice. On the other hand, 
the choice of housing tenure is one of the important decisions in the housing decision 
package. This chapter emphasises the importance of tenure choice in the housing 
decision process. A variety of tenure choice studies is discussed, which includes a 
review of the cross-sectional and the longitudinal analysis of tenure choice models, 
and a review of tenure choice and some specific determinants such as residential 
mobility, mortgage rationing, social housing rationing and housing subsidy. Through 
a review of these tenure choice studies we can identify the determinants of tenure 
choice chosen for this thesis. 
Chapter Three is an analysis of the housing tenure structure and housing market 
conditions in Scotland. Through a review of the long-term tenure pattern and housing 
market conditions we can identify the unique characteristics of housing tenure and the 
housing market in Scotland, thus helping us to identify the determinants of tenure 
choice suitable for the Scottish housing market. This chapter begins with a discussion 
of Scotland's long-term housing tenure pattern. To a certain extent, tenure pattern 
reflects the household's tenure decision behaviour in the Scottish housing market. 
Housing tenure pattern is also influenced by housing market conditions and housing 
policy. In the housing market, the changes in the number of new house building, 
house prices and the number of housing transactions are discussed in this chapter. In 
addition, the rationing factor and housing subsidy also contributed to the changes in 
tenure pattern as well as the household's tenure decision behaviour. An analysis of 
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the mortgage constraint in the owner-occupied sector and the administrative constraint 
in the social rented sector can lead us to understand the importance of these rationing 
factors on the household's tenure decision. A review of the changes in housing 
subsidies to households across tenures can help to analyse the effect of housing 
subsidies in reducing households' housing costs. Housing subsidies addressed in this 
chapter are the government's expenditures on housing subsidy programmes to 
households and housing suppliers. 
The methodology of this thesis is to model the household's tenure choice. In Chapter 
Four, two simulation models with different structures are developed to estimate the 
household's tenure choice behaviour from different aspects. The first model sets out 
to estimate the household's choice for three alternative tenures: owner-occupation, 
social renting and private renting. Based on this framework, a multinomial logit 
model is chosen to estimate the first tenure choice model. The maximum likelihood 
estimation method is employed to estimate the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. The second model estimates the household's mobility decision and tenure 
choice. This model assumes that the household's mobility decision and tenure choice 
are interdependent. Using a hierarchical choice assumption, this model assumes that a 
household will first decide to move or stay, then to choose a tenure alternative. Based 
on this framework, a nested multinomial logit model is employed to estimate the two- 
stage decision of mobility and tenure choice. The full information maximum 
likelihood estimation method is used to estimate the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. The functional forms of the multinomial logit model and the nested 
multinomial logit model are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapters Five and Six relate to the empirical study of the household's tenure choice in 
Scotland. Chapter Five introduces the data set - the 1996 Scottish House Condition 
Survey (SHCS) - and the variables used in the two tenure choice models. The 1996 
SHCS is a cross-sectional household survey containing a large sample size and rich 
information about household socio-economic characteristics and dwelling conditions, 
which are useful for modelling the household's tenure choice behaviour in Scotland. 
The detailed information and characteristics of this survey are discussed in this 
chapter. The variables of the two tenure choice models are chosen on the basis of the 
discussion in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. The determinants of the two tenure 
7 
choice models not only include the household attributes but also include housing 
attributes. The household attributes consist of household demographic and socio- 
economic variables such as the household head's age, gender, marital and 
employment status, the number of dependent children in the household, household 
head's previous tenure status, likelihood to move, household long-term income and 
the user cost of housing. The housing attributes generally include the dwelling type, 
location and neighbourhood quality. In addition, housing subsidy and rationing 
variables are also included in the two tenure choice models. Housing subsidy reduces 
the housing user cost, therefore the housing subsidy effect can be derived by 
examining the coefficients of the user cost and the net user cost (after subsidy). The 
rationing variables are constructed to examine whether the household is possibly 
constrained from mortgages or from entering the social housing sector. 
In the model of mobility and tenure choice, the mobility decision and tenure choice 
are assumed to be interdependent. In this sense, some variables would influence both 
mobility decision and tenure choice. As a result, the research includes the household 
head's age, gender, marital and employment status, the number of dependent children, 
household long-term income and neighbourhood quality variables into the mobility 
decision level. Inevitably, the 1996 SHCS does not contain all the variables used in 
the two tenure choice models. Therefore, some variables are imputed in this chapter. 
These imputed variables include household long-term income, the user cost of housing, 
housing subsidy and rationing variables. The use of household long-term income is 
assumed that the household's tenure decision is made on the basis of long term, 
multiple periods rather than a current and single period. In this sense, the use of long- 
term income would be better than current income. The user cost of housing presents 
the relative cost of owning, social renting and private renting. Housing subsidy is 
measured in economic terms. The rationing variables are the simulation of 
households who could potentially be constrained by mortgage rationing and social 
housing rationing. The interpretation of variable selection and the expected sign of 
these variables are also discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Moreover, this chapter 
also discusses the properties of the data and variables applied to the two tenure choice 
models including the selection of the explanatory variables and the correlation 
analysis of these explanatory variables. 
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Chapter Six analyses the estimation results of the two tenure choice models. The 
parameter estimates and the sign of explanatory variables are fully interpreted to show 
their influences on tenure choice. To examine the impacts of the rationing and 
housing subsidy factors, a simulation is carried out in the two tenure choice models. 
Each of the two tenure choice models involves three separate simulations (called 
Model One, Model Two and Model Three). Model One examines all the explanatory 
variables without housing subsidy and rationing variables. Model Two examines the 
housing subsidy effect by replacing the user cost variable to the net user cost variable 
in the model. Model Three examines the rationing effect by adding mortgage 
rationing and social housing rationing variables into the model. From the model 
results, some variables such as household long-term income, housing user cost, 
housing subsidy and rationing variables have expected determining influences on the 
household's tenure choice in Scotland. 
Chapter Seven explores policy issues and implications drawn from the results of the 
two tenure choice models. This chapter first discusses two simulations of the tenure 
choice models. The first simulation examines the influence of a change in the income 
tax rate on the user cost of owner-occupiers and on tenure choice. The second 
simulation analyses the influence of a reduction in the mortgage rationing ratios on 
tenure choice. The second issue relates to an analysis of income inequality and tenure 
polarisation. The third issue concerns the distribution of housing subsidies between 
tenures and income levels. The distributional context of tenure, income and housing 
subsidy is not fully addressed in the two tenure choice models. However, these topics 
have been important policy issues in the last two decades. The purpose of the analysis 
of these two issues is twofold. It is not only to address the problem raised from tenure 
and income distributions but also to draw attention to the switch of housing subsidies 
between tenures in the 1990s (say 1996), compared to the 1980s. The three issues are 
expected to have some implications for current housing policy with regard to 
supporting sustainable homeownership, flexible tenure, housing subsidy and welfare 
reform, and the reform for the social housing allocation system. 
The last chapter of the thesis contains the conclusions. I summarise the results of each 
chapter to answer the three main questions stated in the first chapter. Then the 
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contributions of this thesis and some suggestions for future research are also addressed 
in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF HOUSING 
TENURE CHOICE 
This chapter discusses the theory of housing tenure choice and reviews previous 
tenure choice studies. Through a review of theoretical and empirical studies of 
housing tenure choice, this thesis summarises the framework of tenure choice analysis 
used in this thesis. This chapter is organised into four sections. The first section 
discusses the definition of housing tenure choice. The second section discusses the 
theory of housing demand and consumer choice, and analyses the relationship of 
housing demand and tenure choice. The third section reviews previous studies of 
tenure choice and its determinants, and the last section is a summary and derives the 
tenure choice analytical framework. 
2.1 The Definition of Housing Tenure 
Housing tenure has been widely discussed in housing research in the last three 
decades. There is also a variety of explanations of housing tenure. Barlow and 
Duncan (1988) suggest that the term `housing tenure' has a statistical and a conceptual 
interpretation in housing research. Statistically, housing tenure can be seen as a 
taxonomic collective like owner-occupation or social rented housing corresponding 
with other categories such as housing quality or social status. Conceptually, housing 
tenure identifies abstract categories such as housing classes or consumption cleavages 
with specific tenures. Barlow and Duncan also argue that "'tenure' has become more 
widely used as a taxonomic `shorthand' to describe broad categories which very often 
do not have substantive, binding attributes" (p. 229). This means that the use of a 
single and uniform explanation of housing tenure cannot cover its diverse activities 
linking with social, economic and political dimensions, thus leading to a severe loss of 
information and of analytical sensitivity. As a result, the authors suggest that many 
different explanations should be used to describe housing tenure depending upon the 
nature of the problem under investigation. 
In general, all housing professionals define housing tenure for particular purposes. 
For instance, statisticians and economists use tenure in describing housing classes 
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associated with different techniques. Sociologists see housing tenure as a general 
social category related to the household's social-economic status and political 
relations. This gives housing tenure various meanings depending upon the purpose of 
the research. From a broader view, housing tenure is taken to refer to a whole range 
of financial, social, political and economic relations surrounding housing. As a result, 
the choice of housing tenure is not just a simple choice. It is a choice of a complex 
package, and the choice expresses the household's ability, preferences and 
expectations. In this thesis, the definition of housing choice focuses on economic 
interpretation. 
In neo-classical economic theory, housing tenure choice is treated as a special 
example of consumer choice. As Fallis (1985) indicated, housing tenure choice 
differs from conventional consumer choice in several aspects. The choice of tenure is 
discrete rather continuous, that is, whether to own or to rent; the durability of housing 
has to be considered in the household's tenure decision; the intertemporal nature of 
choice allows for developing a multi-period model. 
According to Fallis' interpretation, the discrete choice of housing tenure can be 
analysed by modelling the household's behaviour as solving multiple maximisation 
problems rather than just one. For example, the household maximises utility as a 
renter, choosing the quantity of housing services and other goods to consume, facing 
the rental price of housing and other prices. Then the household maximises utility as 
an owner, choosing the amount of housing services and other goods to consume, 
facing the user cost of housing and other prices. The household ultimately chooses 
the tenure (and consumption bundle) that yields the maximum utility subject to the 
budget constraint. 
Moreover, the model of tenure choice would be extended to multiple periods because 
the transaction costs of owner-occupation are relatively high, compared to other 
tenures and also because a household will consider the value of the housing stock in 
future periods when making a tenure and consumption choice (Fallis 1985). 
Therefore, households are likely to maximise not a one-period utility function but a 
several-period utility function. In other words, today's consumption choices are the 
outcome of intertemporal utility maximisation; that is, households in each time period 
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formulate consumption plans to maximise lifetime utility subject to a lifetime budget 
constraint. The budget constraint is established not only by current prices and 
incomes but also by expected future prices and incomes. 
The intertemporal nature of tenure choice can also be introduced in the life-cycle 
analysis. In the life-cycle model, households in each period pay either the user cost of 
housing if they decide to own or the rental price of housing if they choose to rent. The 
household evaluates all possible tenure and consumption patterns and then chooses the 
package of consumption and tenure that yields the maximum utility over the life cycle. 
However, in equilibrium, the rental price and user cost are equal, implying that tenure 
choice is not significant. As Fallis stated, tenure choice becomes important either in 
disequilibrium or when the assumptions of no taxes, a perfect capital market and no 
transaction costs are removed. In other words, in the existence of income and 
property taxes, mortgage rationing and transaction costs in the housing market, the 
household's price for renting or owning would be affected by these conditions thus it 
shows different utility of renting and owning for the household. 
Another important element of tenure choice analysis considers the investment issue. 
For a householder, owning a house is to place some of his/her savings in the housing 
asset as opposed to other assets, such as government bonds and stocks. These 
different investments have different characteristics. For example, they are different in 
rate of returns, in risks and in liquidity. In this sense, ownership of housing can be 
seen as part of a portfolio decision which allocates saving amongst different possible 
investments. However, it is noted that homeownership is a joint consumption and 
investment decision, which means that housing stock appears both in the budget 
constraint and in the utility function of the household (Fallis 1985). 
In addition to the currently dominant economic theory of tenure choice, some 
economists believe that uncertainty and expectation play an important role in the 
housing and tenure choice process. According to Marsh and Gibb (1997), uncertainty 
and expectation in the housing and tenure choice process are important for several 
reasons. The authors suggest: 
In the owner occupied sector housing decisions relate to what is, for 
most households, their single largest long term investment and item 
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of revenue expenditure. Also, decisions regarding tenure choice or 
residential mobility require assessments of the future path of events 
over extended time horizons (Marsh and Gibb 1997, p. 2) 
Although the neo-classical aspect of consumer choice theory is the dominant 
economic theory of tenure choice, the theory of uncertainty and expectation can 
provide an alternative view to understand housing tenure choice study. As Marsh and 
Gibb suggested, the alternative view must recognise the meaning of genuine 
uncertainty in the housing decision process in that: 
Individuals are more likely to adopt behaviour that is rational in a 
procedural, rather than maximising, sense (e. g. Lavoie, 1992) and to 
employ more or less sophisticated behavioural rules which allow 
them to cope with uncertainty and reach a decision (1997, p. 33) 
In summary, housing tenure choice has a variety of explanations depending upon who 
is using it and the purpose of the research. In a sociological aspect, housing tenure 
choice can be seen as a choice of social relations and housing classes. In an economic 
aspect, housing tenure choice emphasises the measurement of the household's 
preference and economic ability between tenures. As the aim of the thesis is to model 
the household's tenure choice behaviour, the definition of housing tenure choice 
addresses the economic interpretation. The following section will discuss the 
economic theory of tenure choice, focusing on consumer choice and housing demand. 
2.2 Consumer Choice and Housing Demand 
As discussed in the last section, tenure choice is a kind of consumer choice. In the 
housing commodity, the choice of tenure can be seen as one of housing consumption 
decisions. Thus, in the discussion of tenure choice theory, this section focuses upon 
the theories of consumer choice and housing demand. There are three parts in this 
section. The first part reviews the theory of consumer choice applying to the housing 
commodity; the second part discusses the household's housing decisions in the 
housing demand study, and the third part analyses the relationship between housing 
demand and tenure choice. 
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2.2.1 Applying Consumer Choice Theory to Housing Commodity 
In applying consumer choice theory to housing demand analysis, previous neo- 
classical economists have assumed that there is a competitive housing market and, in 
the housing market, the household has a rational and complete preference ordering 
defined over the array of existing commodities (see Muth 1960 and Olsen 1969). The 
quantity of the household's demand for housing under the competitive theory can then 
be expressed by maximising utility subject to the budget constraint equating 
household income with expenditure over the relevant time period (Maclennan 1982). 
In this case, housing is a function of income, the price of housing and the price of all 
other commodities. 
There are, however, several problems in applying the standard consumer choice model 
to housing due to the characteristics of housing commodity and the housing market. 
Firstly, the durability of housing characteristics implies that housing is both a 
consumption and investment good, and it is usually purchased with loan finance. In 
this sense, loan institutions may place rationing on borrowers according to their 
income and expenditures. Further, as the income measure in the housing demand 
analysis is likely to refer to permanent income rather than current income, it often has 
an operational problem when measuring the household's permanent income (see 
Struyk and Marshall 1976, Maclennan 1982). 
Secondly, housing is a complex, multi-dimensional commodity. This implies housing 
"as a composite demand for a flow of services embodying a variable mix of 
characteristics rather than for identifiable units of a commodity" (Maclennan 1982, p. 
41). The neo-classical consumer choice model can be modified to allow for this 
problem by identifying the implicit prices of housing attributes. It is possible to 
derive demand functions for individual attributes which will be functions of income, 
life-cycle characteristics and various prices, amongst which will be the implicit prices 
of attributes (ibid. ). Since the early 1970s, it has become popular to attempt to 
estimate implicit prices by using hedonic techniques in housing demand analysis (see 
for example Rosen 1974, Maclennan 1977, Case 1987, Case and Quigley 1991, and 
Mason and Quigley 1996). 
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However, there are some criticisms of the hedonic price technique. Maclennan (1982) 
argues that hedonic price has a theoretical and empirical drawback because it 
constrains the income elasticity of demand for each attribute to unity. `It is important 
to recognise that in this case the choice of a particular demand model has imposed 
strong a priori notions or constraints, which are built in and will interact with the data 
thus influencing the result yielded' (ibid., p. 46). Further, the estimates of a hedonic 
price regression tell us little about how and over what likely time period equilibrating 
processes take place (ibid. ). The most critical drawback is that the selection of the 
content and the form of the hedonic regression always fail to consider the housing 
time inputs (MacDonald 1979). Another major weakness of hedonic models, given 
their own assumptions, is that they pay no regard to differences in the quality of 
housing attributes (Maclennan 1977). 
The third problem for applying the standard consumer choice model to housing 
demand is that the economic model does not pay attention to the spatial and social 
situational aspects of housing. Maclennan (1982) stresses: 
Once a household has acquired the tenure rights of home-ownership or 
rental housing the jointly supplied neighbourhood and environmental 
attributes supply monetary and psychic costs and benefits which to a 
great extent originate externally to that household (p. 47). 
Thus it is noted that the satisfaction yielded by the purchased tenure rights to 
homeownership or rental housing will not be independent of the jointly supplied 
neighbourhood and physical environment, and thus spatial preferences are important 
determinants of the demand for housing. Moreover, the external attributes such as the 
quality of the environment and socio-economic status of the neighbourhood can be 
directly entered into the household's utility function. However, the role played by 
status in the housing decision is a complex one, which is difficult to measure in the 
housing demand analysis. 
Fourthly, there are market disequilibrium or even frictional factors in a market, and 
these conditions and factors are usually excluded from the consumer choice model. 
For example, the search costs may influence budget constraints and the search 
expectation may influence choices, and these factors are ignored in the model. 
Maclennan identifies several features of the housing market disequilibrium regarding 
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imperfect information, transaction costs and search costs. He indicates that 
individuals infrequently transact in the housing market, which means that consumers 
possess imperfect housing market information when entering the market. It is also 
costly to re-enter into the housing market because imperfect information is likely to 
lead the consumer to engage in a lengthy search process. Furthermore, the house 
purchase process requires households not only to engage in a search for a housing 
vacancy and for loan finance but also to engage in some form of bidding. Finally, the 
fixity of secondhand housing stock and its relatively slow rate of turnover and 
relatively sluggish new supply is likely to be in considerable disequilibrium in 
particular submarkets as a result of changes in demand (Maclennan 1982). 
In contrast to the standard consumer choice model, which treats uncertainty in terms 
of probability and expectation as rational, Maclennan seeks an alternative explanation 
of housing and tenure choice. Maclennan thus develops a behavioural framework of 
housing choice, which recognises the particularities of housing market choice. The 
framework does not make assumptions about choice processes, nor include standard 
assumptions about the existence of equilibrium as a necessary feature. "Me 
framework attempts to incorporate explicitly the linkage between individuals and 
housing market institutions and it introduces the concept of pre-search aspiration 
because it is argued to be more readily identifiable than the more conventional 
concepts of `preference' and `constraint"' (Maclennan 1982, pp. 66-67). Maclennan's 
framework expresses a first step towards an alternative to current choice models. His 
framework is, however, considerably loose and needs to be strengthened and 
elaborated. "It could be strengthened theoretically by drawing explicitly on a rigorous 
conceptualisation of decision making under uncertainty" (Marsh and Gibb 1997, p. 
33). 
Due to these weaknesses for applying consumer choice model to housing demand, 
urban housing economists have attempted to modify the standard model. Many 
studies emphasise the estimation of price and income elasticities of housing demand; 
others focus on the housing choice in the housing market. The latter is the focus of 
this section and will be discussed in the following section. 
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2.2.2 Housing Decision in the Housing Demand Study 
Since the mid-1970s, there has been extensive and substantial research on the 
household's housing decision in the housing demand analysis (see Quigley 1976, 
Boehm 1982, Clark and Onaka 1985, Quigley 1985, Fischer and Aufhauser 1988, Tu 
1994). These studies mainly concern the nature of the housing decision process and 
analyse the household's housing choice behaviour in the housing market. Quigley 
(1985) recognises that the consumer's consumption decision is the choice of one unit 
from a large of set of discrete alternatives. In making these choices, housing 
consumers presumably select samples from a large number of available dwellings. 
They then evaluate the physical characteristics of these sampled dwellings, the 
neighbourhoods in which they are located, and the public services provided to them 
(ibid. ). On the basis of these evaluations and the prices at which dwellings are offered, 
the consumer ultimately chooses one dwelling out of the sampled alternatives. 
In his study, Quigley assumes that there are three distinct features of consumer choice 
for a dwelling. Firstly, a consumer selects one and only one dwelling from a large 
population of alternatives in almost all the cases. Secondly, the bundle of services 
provided by each dwelling alternative is extremely heterogeneous. Thirdly, the 
consumer choice for a dwelling includes a selection of a price as well as of the other 
characteristics associated with the dwelling. Based on these features, Quigley 
considers the household's housing decision within three stages: the choice of dwelling, 
given the neighbourhood and town; the choice of neighbourhood, given the town; and 
the marginal choice of the services and amenities provided in a town. Quigley 
employs a nested logit choice model to estimate the household's housing choice 
behaviour in the Pittsburgh metropolitan housing market. His empirical results 
suggest that the previous studies' assumption of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA)' may be inappropriate and also that housing choice may be more 
sensitive to variations in workplace accessibility than is indicated by the more 
restricted household choice model. 
' The IIA is a consequence of the initial assumption of the discrete choice models, which delineates that 
the probabilities of choosing any two choice alternatives are independent and irrelevant from the 
probabilities of choosing any other alternatives in the choice set. The detailed analysis of the IIA 
assumption will be discussed in chapter four and chapter six. 
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Based on Quigley's concern, an analysis of housing choice should take these different 
relationships between dwelling units into account. Hierarchy is a way of organising 
these differences. Boehm (1982) states that housing choice should include tenure 
choice as well as choices for dwelling size, structural quality, neighbourhood 
conditions, and public services. Thus Boehm constructs a three-level hierarchical 
probability model of housing choice. In Boehm's model, the probability of the 
household's tenure decision is estimated at the first level of a choice hierarchy. Then 
the household's choices over dwelling size and dwelling quality are estimated at the 
second and the third levels, respectively. These conditional choices are combined to 
produce eight joint probabilities of housing choice. 
One of the most significant contributions of Boehm's study is the development of the 
hierarchical housing choice model, which provides better estimation results than the 
conventional housing choice model with regard to the effects of income, relative 
prices of owning or renting and other socio-economic variables on the household's 
housing choice. However, Boehm's hierarchical choice model which classified into 
eight probabilities would be too simple in his assumptions of defining dwelling size 
and quality. This model should be expanded in order to include additional hierarchy 
levels and perhaps incorporate other consumer decisions related to housing choice. Of 
course, the ability to expand this hierarchy level would depend upon the availability of 
a sufficient number of observations and data sources. 
A further study by Börsch-Supan and Pitkin (1988) explores several specifications of 
discrete choice models in estimating housing consumption decisions. Unlike previous 
studies, the authors include household formation into housing decisions. In their study, 
housing decisions are defined as the choice between headship and shared housing, 
tenure choice, and the selection of dwelling size. As a result, housing choice is 
classified into nine groups including three types of homeownership, five types of 
rented housing and a non-head household group. In order to estimate the optimal 
housing consumption decision pattern, the authors simulate several forms of decision 
tree. A variety of multinomial and nested multinomial logit models were also 
proposed to estimate these housing decision trees. Their empirical results suggest that 
the hierarchical choice models provide better goodness-of-fit in estimating housing 
decisions. The results also show that the multinomial logit model strongly 
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overestimates some of the actual price responses and underestimates others, while the 
nested multinomial logit models may present reasonable results. With respect to the 
determinants of housing choice, the results show that current income and relative out- 
of-pocket costs have strong influences on housing choice. 
Börsch-Supan and Pitkin's study provides a new insight into housing choice in which 
they put a form of housing demand, the household formation, into the housing 
decision process. Their results also demonstrate the importance of household 
headship in the selection of the optimal housing decision structure. Börsch-Supan and 
Pitkin's study suggests that a hierarchical housing choice structure provides better 
estimation results of the household's housing choice behaviour. However, the 
hierarchical structure of the housing decision process implies strong assumptions in 
the ordership of housing decision tree and thus it only represents an analytical device. 
Moreover, the use of current income as an explanatory variable in their housing choice 
models is questionable. Studies have indicated that long-term or life-cycle income 
would be more adequate than current income in estimating housing choice since the 
decision of housing demand is based on a life-cycle decision (see Maclennan 1982 
and Fallis 1985). 
In addition to the study of the nature and the process of housing choice, some studies 
have paid attention to the cause-effect of the household's housing choice, for example, 
the relationship between residential mobility and housing choice. Clark and Onaka 
(1985) suggest that the type and quantity of housing unit available for occupancy 
surely influences housing dissatisfaction as well as the cost of searching for a new 
home. As a result, the decision to move and to make a choice of a specific dwelling 
are closely interrelated. As Clark and Onaka indicate, the traditional model of 
intraurban residential mobility, however, did not fully account for the impact of 
housing choice on the mobility decision. Therefore they propose an alternative model 
of residential mobility which considers the joint nature of the decisions concerning 
mobility and housing choice. 
In their study, Clark and Onaka employ a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model to 
estimate the joint choice of moving and housing choice. In the three-level choice 
model, the choice of the dwelling type is followed by the choice of neighbourhood 
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and finally by the choice of moving or staying. The hierarchical choice model is 
estimated for three household categories stratified by the age of the household head 
and household size, and for nine neighbourhoods with different locations. Their 
model results show that space has a significant impact on the household's choice for 
dwelling type. Length of stay plays an important role in the household's mobility 
decision but it is least effective in small young households. However, a major 
weakness is that the model has less confident estimation results on neighbourhood 
choice. There is a need to make greater efforts in identifying the spatial structure of 
neighbourhoods and the factors which influence the household's choice among 
neighbourhoods. 
The above studies have attempted to estimate the household's housing choice under 
the assumption of a relatively competitive housing market. Some studies, however, 
have analysed the housing choice in a regulated housing market (see for example 
Fischer and Aufhauser 1988, and Timmerman et al. 1996). Fischer and Aufhauser 
(1988) indicate that in many Western European countries, housing markets are highly 
regulated by the government. Thus characteristics of the housing market in these 
countries are organised by a relatively competitive part of the market and a part that is 
subject to varying degrees and forms of government regulation. The authors, 
therefore, integrate several important elements of the institutionalised and regulated 
nature of the housing market, and analyse the relationship between household type 
and housing choice in Vienna where the housing market was a "prototype of a highly 
regulated and institutionalised market" (ibid., p. 48). The authors assume that the 
institutionalised nature of the housing market could be expressed in three ways. 
Firstly, dwelling units are categorised on the basis of institutional settings, such as 
public housing, private regulated rental housing, and owner-occupied housing, etc. 
Secondly, there are institutional, informational and income-based constraints in the 
access to specific tenure and dwelling type of housing units. Thirdly, government 
subsidies, such as housing and rent allowance and non-interest-bearing state loans, are 
explicitly taken into account in the choice set. 
Fischer and Aufhauser also employ a nested logit model to estimate the three-stage 
housing choice: the choice of a dwelling unit given dwelling type and residential zone, 
the choice of a dwelling type given a residential zone; and the marginal choice of a 
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residential zone. Their empirical results suggest that demographic variables 
accounted for in the definition of the household types appear to have significant 
impacts on housing choice behaviour. Residual income, used as a single explanatory 
variable as well as its interaction with dwelling size and dwelling quality, has an 
important influence on the household's choice for dwelling unit. Housing costs 
interacting with incomes appear to have a strong influence on the choice among 
dwelling types. 
Noted again in Fischer and Authauser's study, the use of nested multinomial logit 
model appears to contain strong assumptions of the hierarchical structure. The 
authors are also aware of this weakness. Therefore, they suggest that `this hierarchy 
only represents an analytical device that reflects the relative degree of similarity 
among choice alternatives and does not imply that a household choosing a dwelling 
unit necessarily follows a path down the tree' (Fischer and Aufhauser 1988, p. 49). 
This statement can also be applied to all hierarchical choice models. 
Timmerman et al. (1996) also recognise the important influence of the institutional 
structure of the housing market on the household's housing choice. They indicate that 
in The Netherlands, as well as in most Western European countries, housing markets 
are highly regulated by the government. As a result, households, when searching a 
new home, will face not only budget and socio-economic constraints but also the 
institutional constraints set by the government. Unlike Fischer and Aufhauser, the 
target household in Temmermans et at study is the divorcees who represent one of the 
vulnerable groups in the housing market that face substantial constraints. The authors 
experiment with the universal logit model to estimate the effects of those constraints 
on households' (divorcees') housing choice behaviour and residential preferences. A 
total of 16 choices are selected in the study; each choice set varies in size and 
composition and represents different constraints on behaviour, in terms of the access 
to eight housing market segments. Their results suggest that dwelling type and 
neighbourhood have the most significant influences on the divorcee's housing 
decision. The number of rooms and the social environment also have important 
impacts, while distance attributes are of lesser importance. The results also indicate 
that the importance of these attributes to divorcees is not different from those to other 
groups in the past. 
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One of the contributions of Timmermans et al. study concerns the model methodology. 
The universal logit model employed in their study is distinguished from the standard 
multinomial logit model in that the former is qualified from the assumption of 
independence from irrelevant alternatives (HA). However, the parameter estimates in 
the universal logit model are more difficult to interpret than in the multinomial logit 
model. Another contribution of Timmermans et al study is the emphasis of housing 
market segments (housing submarkets) in the housing choice process rather than the 
importance of price and non-priced constraints, which the authors intended to address 
in the study. 
In fact, the importance of the housing submarket in the housing choice process has 
been emphasised by many studies. Maclennan et al. (1987) emphasise the importance 
of housing submarkets for the research of present urban housing models. They 
suggest that "(housing) submarkets are deemed to exist when systematic differences 
exist in housing attribute prices over areas or sectors and where variations show some 
persistence" (p. 37). As a result, the household's housing choice behaviour in the 
housing market is critically influenced by characteristics of the housing commodity, 
which are the essential issue of the housing submarket and the trading system used to 
exchange housing assets. 
Based on the concept of the housing submarket, Tu (1994) estimates the household's 
housing choice behaviour under several housing submarkets divided by 
neighbourhood and dwelling types. She indicates that urban housing submarket 
structure is suitable for analysing disaggregate housing choice behaviour. In her study, 
Tu also compares several discrete choice models in estimating the housing choice 
behaviour in housing submarkets. Her results suggest that no discrete choice model in 
her study is superior to another one. The multinomial logit (NINL) model violates the 
IIA assumption, while the nested multinomial (NMNL) model does not. However, the 
MNL model provides better predictions of housing choice behaviour than the NMNL 
model does. 
A further study by Tu and Goldfmch (1996) develops a new two-stage housing choice 
forecasting model based on Tu's (1994) housing submarket structure. The authors 
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argue that previous models treat housing choice as a joint decision of all components 
associated with a dwelling. These components create a huge bundle of dwelling 
alternatives. If each dwelling were treated as an alternative, it would cause a serious 
calculation problem and bias. To avoid this problem, the Tu and Goldfinch's model 
separates the joint choice behaviour into two stages. The first stage is the choice of 
the key dwelling components, which construct housing submarkets; the second stage 
is the choice of non-key dwelling components, which distinguish individual dwellings 
in each housing submarket. The authors divide households into three different age 
groups to estimate their housing choice behaviour. Their results show that different 
age groups of households have significantly different housing preferences in terms of 
housing prices, dwelling components and neighbourhood quality, which are of interest 
in the study of housing demand forecasting as well as in the analysis of housing 
investment and housing subsidy policy. 
In a review of the above studies of housing choice behaviour a clear picture can be 
drawn where a household's housing decision can be seen as a bundle of choices, 
including the decisions of tenure, dwelling type, neighbourhood quality and location. 
Hierarchy is a way to model housing choice behaviour. In a hierarchical choice model, 
a household, for instance, may first choose tenure then choose dwelling type and so on 
before choosing neighbourhood and location. However, it is noted that the 
hierarchical framework of housing choice is just an analytical device that reflects the 
relative degree of similarity among choice alternatives. Therefore, it does not imply 
that a household should necessarily follow this kind of decision tree while making a 
housing decision. 
Furthermore, in Britain and in most Western European countries, the housing market 
is highly regulated by the government. Thus the housing market in these countries is 
characterised as partly a relative competitive market and partly a market subject to 
non-priced, administrative constraints. Therefore, there are access constraints for 
households from entering certain types of housing segments. Due to imperfect 
information in the housing market, households need to spend time and money in 
searching for a home, thus the search costs should not be ignored in the housing 
decision process. The housing market can also be separated into several submarkets 
because of imperfect information and the demand/supply constraints in the market. 
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As a result, a household's housing decision can be estimated under different 
submarket conditions, which are based on tenure, dwelling and neighbourhood 
components. 
2.2.3 Housing Demand and Tenure Choice 
In the housing demand analysis, the choice of tenure is a kind of decision of demand 
for housing services. This subsection discusses the relationship between tenure choice 
and other decisions for housing consumption. In earlier literature, the analysis of 
tenure choice and housing demand is separated, which means that housing demand is 
analysed separately with different demand specifications for renters and owners (see 
de Leeuw 1971, Straszheim 1973, and Polinsky 1977). Later research (for example 
Lee and Trost 1978, and Rosen 1979) recognised that the discrete choice for tenure 
and the continuous decision for housing demand are interdependent, by specifying the 
error terms of the discrete and continuous decision models to be correlated because 
the same elements of behaviour are in both models. 
Although studies by Lee-Trost and Rosen have indicated that the interdependent 
nature of the tenure choice and housing demand decision, they only partially deal with 
this interdependence. Neither they nor earlier literature deal econometrically with the 
capital market imperfections that influence tenure choice. A study by King (1980) 
recognises that the household's choice of tenure and its demand for housing services 
can be seen as a joint decision determined by a common preference ordering. In his 
study, King assumes that tenure choice and housing demand are based on 
maximisation of the same utility function, hence that both the discrete and the 
continuous decision models can involve some of the same parameters, depending 
upon the precise assumptions. In this sense, joint estimation involves imposing cross- 
equation constraints on the parameters of the tenure choice and housing demand 
equations, as well as recognising that the error terms are correlated. 
One of the contributions of King's study is to identify the importance of rationing in 
the British housing market. Therefore his model allows for estimating the impact of 
non-priced rationing on the access to the local authority rented market. King also 
suggests that, because of the government's high level of intervention in the housing 
market, there is subsidised social housing accounting for at least one third of total 
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dwellings in the housing market, along with the owner-occupied sector and the 
unsubsidised private rented sector. Thus the choice of tenure in Britain is not a simple 
binary choice of owning and renting. Instead, King proposes three types of choice in 
1980: (1) owner-occupation, (2) subsidised renting, consisting of local authority 
renting and unfurnished (regulated) private renting, and (3) unsubsidised private 
furnished renting. By using a cross-sectional data set from the Family Expenditure 
Survey, King estimates the price elasticity of housing demand for three alternative 
tenures, which is ranged between -0.5 and -0.65. In estimating tenure choice, his 
results show that the variables such as age, sex, and race of the household head which 
represent constraints in the capital market, have important influences on household's 
tenure decisions. 
Following King's research, Henderson and Ioannides (1983,1986) completed similar 
studies in the US. They assume tenure choice and the housing consumption decision 
as a joint decision by using the same behavioural model in analysing these discrete 
and continuous elements of housing market behaviour. Their models allow for an 
analysis of the role of capital imperfections and discriminatory practices in 
constraining housing consumption decisions. They also consider rationing and 
incomplete specification of ownership prices as important aspects of the housing 
market. In examining recent movers in 36 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(SMSAs), Henderson and Ioannides (1986) find that current income, age, education, 
and marital status have important influences on households' tenure and housing 
consumption decisions. Their results suggest that people with lower education, age 
and current income face an increased probability of being denied a mortgage, as do 
those who are single, while race does seem to have an impact but not as significant. 
Both King's and Henderson-Ioannides' studies provide a new insight into the 
relationship between tenure choice and housing demand decisions. King highlights 
the impact of non-price rationing on the household's choice for public rented housing. 
Henderson and Ioannides emphasise the effect of income tax advantages on the 
household's home ownership decision. However, Henderson and Ioannides' studies 
were carried out in the US where the housing market conditions, tax structure and 
subsidy policy are significantly different from the UK. King's study is also out of 
date. In the UK, the housing tenure pattern has been dramatically changed over the 
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last two decades due to the change in housing policy. Government regulations on the 
private rented sector have been relaxed; subsidies to social housing have been 
significantly reduced, and there has been a rapidly growing owner-occupied sector in 
the housing market. Another weakness of King's study is the rationing assumption in 
access to three tenures. King assumes that a household chooses unconstrained private 
renting because it is rationed in the access to both owner-occupation and public 
housing. However, in the real world, many households, for instance young and single 
households, choose private renting for various reasons but not only because they are 
constrained from entering owner-occupation or social housing. 
Moreover, in the analysis of housing demand and tenure choice, some researchers 
have been interested in examining the income and price effects on the household's 
demand for housing and tenure choice. For example, Kent (1983) examines the 
relationship between income and price elasticities and their effects on housing demand, 
tenure choice, and household formation. In his study, Kent delineates three distinct 
decisions pertaining to the demand for housing: a decision of household formation, a 
decision of tenure and a decision of how much housing to consume, given the 
household formation and tenure decisions. Kent theoretically demonstrates that 
income and price elasticities can be estimated to include one, two, or all three of these 
decisions. Kent's study, however, is limited on theoretical analysis. As he indicated, 
the empirical results of some of the income and price elasticities in his study may not 
be available. 
In contrast to Kent's study, Gillingham and Hagemann (1983) evaluate the empirical 
importance of the simultaneity between tenure choice and consumption level decisions 
based on the Lee-Trost (1978) model. In their model, Gillingham and Hagemann 
estimate overall income and price elasticities of housing demand, which incorporate 
the impacts of income and price on both tenure choice and consumption decisions. By 
examining the household data drawn from the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey 
in the US, they find that the structures of both tenure choice and housing demand vary 
substantially across household types and are, in general, non-linear functions of 
income and price. Although there is no evidence that the tenure choice is significantly 
affected by variations across cities in expected house price appreciation, these 
variations have statistically significant impacts on the quantity of housing services the 
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household consumed. The overall income and price elasticities vary substantially 
across household types in both overall level and the level of the tenure choice and 
conditional demand components. 
A similar study by Goodman (1988) estimates the joint decision of tenure choice and 
housing based on the Lee-Trost and the Rosen model structure. A major advance of 
Goodman's study is that he separates the consumption and the investment motives in 
tenure choice. Goodman's model emphasises the investment and consumption 
demands and adopts house value to rental ratio to measure investment demand. The 
hedonic price method is adopted to define price indices for owners and renters and to 
define value-rent ratios for the investment components of the housing purchase. 
Tenure choice is estimated as a function of the relative prices of owning or renting, 
value-rent ratios, permanent and transitory incomes, and socio-demographic variables. 
Housing demand is estimated for both owners and renters. 
Goodman's study provides a clear picture of the determinants and their impacts on 
tenure choice and the decision of housing demand. His empirical results show that 
income and price are significant impacts on tenure choice. Controlling for tenure 
choice, the effects of permanent and current incomes are approximately the same, 
whereas they differ significantly on the tenure decision. Permanent income has a 
greater influence on the tenure choice, while current income provides more 
satisfactory demand estimates. Many studies have criticised this, however, arguing 
that using current income would lead to downward bias in estimating the income 
elasticity of housing demand (see for example Reid 1962, Winger 1968, de Leeuw 
1971, Rosen 1979, Maclennan 1982). 
Further research by Loikkanen (1992) estimates the joint choice of tenure and housing 
demand in Finland. Similar to some previous studies, Loikkanen uses the two-stage 
estimation procedure suggested by Lee-Trost and by Rosen in order to estimate tenure 
choice and demand for dwelling size. The first stage is probit estimation of the 
probability of owning or renting; the second stage is the ordinary least square 
estimation of the demand for dwelling size. In his study, Loikkanen also emphasises 
rationing in the Finnish housing market, where there is rent control in the private 
rented market, administrative constraints in the public rented market and credit 
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rationing in the owner-occupied market. As a result, prices in these sectors are not 
market-determined and vary across regions. Loikkanen constructs the shadow price 
(user cost) for different tenures based on the market level. Loikkanen also assumes 
that tenure choice and demand for dwelling size are affected by the rental market 
shortage, which is a result of rent control. He recognises that rent control has a 
negative impact on the supply of private rented dwellings. Thus the rental market 
shortage is a driving force to push households in to the owner-occupied market. In 
order to estimate the impact of regional rented market disequilibrium on tenure choice 
and housing demand, Loikkanen constructs regional queue variables. His results 
show that the regional queue variables have significant influences on tenure choice 
and owners' demand for dwelling size. In addition to queue variables, his results also 
show that the user cost has an important and significant impact on tenure choice. 
Loikkanen's study highlights the importance of rationing, shortage of supply in the 
private rented sector, and the user cost in estimating tenure choice and housing 
demand. However, the rental market disequilibrium does not show significant 
influences on the renter's demand for dwelling size. Neither does it show that the 
regional user cost has a significant impact on housing demand. As the author suggests, 
these problems can be improved by using more detailed regional data. In this case, it 
also implies a weakness of measuring endogenous rationing factors, especially when 
estimating housing demand. 
In summary, the above studies have indicated that tenure choice and housing demand 
decisions are interdependent. This relationship can also link to housing choice, where 
tenure choice is included in the housing decision package, and where tenure choice 
and other housing decisions such as dwelling type, location, and neighbourhood are 
interdependent. In the study of tenure choice and housing demand, many previous 
studies have addressed income and price effects, and these studies estimated a variety 
of income and price elasticities for housing demand. In fact, the income and price 
elasticities vary by the empirical data and across countries. In Britain, income and 
price elasticities for housing demand are slightly lower than those in the US and this is 
probably because the housing market in Britain is more regulated than in the US (see 
Meen 1994 and Ermisch, Findlay and Gibb 1996). Some studies, such as King (1980), 
Fischer and Aufhauser (1988), and Loikkanen (1992), have addressed the important 
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impact of non-price rationing on tenure choice. In a series of housing decisions, 
tenure choice would be more important, particularly where there is non-price, 
administrative rationing in housing market, and where households face a choice 
between the public and private housing sectors (Clapham and Kintrea 1984). As a 
result, many studies have emphasised the importance of tenure choice in the housing 
choice study. The following section is a review of tenure choice studies. 
2.3 Tenure Choice and Its Determinants 
This section analyses the household's tenure choice and its determinants. There are 
two parts in this section. The first part reviews the studies of tenure choice model; the 
second part analyses tenure choice and its specific determinants. 
2.3.1 The Studies of Tenure Choice Model 
There have been a large number of studies that have modelled households' tenure 
choice behaviour in the last three decades. Some studies assume that tenure choice is 
made solely with regard to the contemporary period, thus emphasising the influence of 
the determinants on tenure choice by using cross-sectional data sets. Some other 
studies assume that tenure choice is made on the basis of multiple periods and thus 
address the impact of the change in determinants on tenure choice by using 
longitudinal data. As a result, the analysis of tenure choice models can be classified 
into two categories: cross-sectional analysis and longitudinal analysis of tenure choice, 
based on the nature of data and the purpose of the study. They are discussed in detail 
below. 
2.3.1.1 Cross Sectional Analysis of Tenure Choice 
With regard to cross-sectional analysis of tenure choice, some studies regarding 
housing demand and tenure choice have been discussed in the last section. In this 
section, the focus is on specifying the determinants of tenure choice. In earlier studies, 
Struyk and Marshall (1974) and Struyk (1976) have examined the determinants of 
homeownership in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area in the US. They indicate that 
tenure choice is a single and very important of aspect of housing demand, thus the 
determinants of tenure choice are essentially the same set as those for the demand for 
housing services. In their studies, Struyk and Marshall address the income effect on 
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household tenure choice. They suggest that the decision of tenure and housing need is 
based on a long term view, as is the income prospect, and as a result permanent 
income is stressed in their studies. 
In addition to household (permanent) income, Struyk and Marshall classify three other 
groups of determinants: income tax advantages, household characteristics, and the 
tenure choice of peer groups. The authors indicate that the reduction in federal 
income tax as income rises associated with the housing tax deduction is directly 
related to the income expended on housing. Other household characteristics include 
family type and size, age and sex of household heads. An additional factor of tenure 
choice, which has received little attention in previous studies, is the tenure choice of 
peer groups. Struyk and Marshall suggest that middle-age households may be more 
strongly influenced by the tenure choice of their peer groups than younger or older 
households, since middle-age households are more likely to be settled into jobs and 
family responsibilities. 
In their tenure choice model, Struyk and Marshall examine the impact of these 
determinants on different household groups divided on the basis of family type and 
age of household head by using 1970 US Census sample data. Their results suggest 
that the relationship between income and the probability of choosing owner- 
occupation is non-linear, with the effect of increase in income generally being positive 
but at a decreasing rate at the upper income range. Both current income and 
permanent income were found to have significant influences for all but individual 
households. As expected, their results show that family size, age and sex of 
household heads are important determinants of tenure choice. Tenure choice of peer 
groups was found to have significant effects on middle-aged households' tenure 
decisions. The effect of income tax advantages was found to be significant only for 
younger and small-size households. As the authors indicate, the effects of tax subsidy 
could be largely captured by the income variables, as there is a high correlation 
between income and tax subsidy variables. 
Struyk and Marshall's studies clearly delineate the determinants and their influences 
on household tenure choice. However, there are some criticisms of their studies. The 
first criticism is that they put both current income and permanent income into the 
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independent variables in the tenure choice model, and this could imply a problem of 
multicollinearity. The authors explain that the use of current income can adequately 
express the income of younger and individual households, while permanent income is 
used in middle-age and large-size households, and the coefficient of correlation 
between these two incomes in their studies is low. This could, however, imply a 
technical problem in the calculation of permanent income and it needs a further 
discussion. 
The second criticism of Struyk and Marshall's studies regards the income tax subsidy 
rate. The authors calculate the federal income tax subsidy rate based on the ratio of 
housing expenditures to permanent income. This income tax subsidy rate, in fact, 
could have a high correlation with income variables. If the subsidy is viewed as a 
reduction in the relative price of housing, the tax subsidy effect would be expressed on 
the relative price of housing rather than household income. Many studies of tenure 
choice and housing demand, such as King (1980), Gillingham and Hagemann (1983), 
and Loikkanen (1992), have demonstrated the important influence of the relative price 
of housing (also called the user cost of housing) on household tenure choice. 
Unfortunately, Struyk and Marshall's studies ignore the user cost variables. The third 
criticism is of the tenure choice of peer groups. In their studies, the peer group 
variables are associated with the household head's education and employment level. 
As a result, it is more likely the case that the household head's education and 
employment status could have more significant effects than the peer groups on tenure 
choice. 
Many studies of homeownership have employed a variety of analytical techniques 
using the Struyk and Marshall's approach. A similar study carried out by Maclennan 
and Wood (1981) examines the determinants of entry to homeownership in the British 
housing market. As discussed earlier, the housing market in the UK is more regulated 
than in the US. Thus a particular concern in Maclennan and Wood's study is the 
discontinuities in supply that exists in the British urban housing market. In this case, 
housing tenure is associated with particular house types, ages and locations. Because 
of imperfect information in the housing market, a search process is necessary for the 
household before buying a home. The authors also indicate the existence of market 
disequilibrium at the time of study and, as a result, inflation is an important 
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determinant of homeownership. Maclennan and Wood also assume that the household 
attached to the qualities of ownership is influenced by peer group pressures and family 
formation pressures. In their model, Maclennan and Wood analyse the basic 
determinants of homeownership including current household income, deposit capacity, 
family size, inflation, parents' tenure status, the age of the household head, and stay 
intentions. A variety of search variables are then added to extend their tenure choice 
model. 
In a survey of first time homebuyers and potential buyers in the private rented sector 
in the Glasgow area, Maclennan and Wood classify the sampled households into 
several groups. In their study, private tenants are categorised into temporary rationed, 
permanent rationed and disinterested groups based on their preference and income. A 
series of aggregate and disaggregate tests were undertaken both by multiple regression 
and logit models to examine the impact of homeownership determinants on these 
different target groups. Their results show that the logit model has better goodness-of- 
fit than the regression model. Household income, deposit capacity, inflation and 
search strategies show important influences on household tenure choice. The results 
also show a significant difference between entrants (first time buyers) and searchers 
(temporary rationed tenants) in terms of the coefficient estimates of these 
determinants. Cheaper entrants (lower income first time homeowners) have a greater 
propensity to adjust price, location and source of finance they searched than other 
entrants and searchers. 
In Maclennan and Wood's study, the aggregate estimation results of tenure choice 
model are insignificant. As they suggest, it still has room for improving model 
techniques. Furthermore, a neglect of local authority tenants' tenure choice would 
make this study incomplete. In particular, the local authority housing sector 
accounted for one third of total dwellings in the British housing market in 1981. As a 
result, to analyse tenure choice in the British housing market, the local authority 
rented sector should be included. In the local authority rented sector, tenure choice is 
primarily influenced by housing policy, such as the Right to Buy and the allocation 
system. The policy context will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Several studies have addressed local authority tenants' tenure choice in Britain. 
Doling (1973) develops a two-stage model to identify the determinants of tenure 
decision in the local authority sector. Doling assumes that tenure choice is a two- 
stage process. Households first evaluate their best attainable combination of a 
physical structure and of non-housing goods in each tenure market. They then choose 
the most preferable of these combinations. The two-stage tenure choice model was 
tested in the local authority housing market by using data from Derby on sales to 
sitting tenants of council houses in 1971. In the first stage of the model, Doling 
rations out ineligible sitting tenants by income and by non-purchasers. If monthly 
loan repayments exceed gross weekly income of the head of household, the household 
is identified as not being able to purchase its house. In the second stage, discriminant 
analysis is then used to generate a model producing the fewest tenure 
misclassifications of households. This objective is met in a model having five attitude 
scores, income, the cost of buying and renting and the number of adults in the 
household. In Doling's results, the signs of the coefficients in most cases are as 
expected and make economic sense. But some cases have incorrect signs for their 
coefficients. This is probably due to multi-collinearity between variables and cases. 
A recent study by McNabb and Wass (1999) also examines the tenure decision of 
council tenants under the Right to Buy regime. The main issue of McNabb and 
Wass's study is to analyse council tenants' decision about whether or not to buy the 
accommodation they currently rent. Based on Rosen's (1979) model, the authors 
employ a univariate probit model to examine the tenure decisions of council tenants 
by using data selected from the 1986 General Housing Survey. The variables in their 
model include house price after 1980, household income, life-cycle effects on 
preferences for both types of housing tenure, the characteristics of the accommodation, 
and the quality of the match between the accommodation and the household. A 
particular concern in McNabb and Wass's study is the price variable, which is the 
relative cost of owning measured by the discount value of the property. The discount 
property value is calculated on the basis of the RTB formula under the 1984 Housing 
Act. Their results suggest that the discount price of housing has a significant effect on 
the household's decision to switch from renting to owning under the RTB policy. 
This implies that tenure transfers under the RTB are efficient, undertaken by council 
tenants on the margin of owner-occupation. In addition, household income, the age of 
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the household head, and the type and age of the accommodation are also important 
determinants of tenure choice in the public sector. Regional effects are limited to 
under-presentation of transfers to owner-occupation in Scotland and the northern 
counties of England. 
McNabb and Wass' study provides a clear analysis of council tenants' decisions under 
the RTB scheme. As the authors suggested, their results would have implications to 
the RTB policy as well as the social housing policy. Both Doling's and McNabb- 
Wass' studies focus on local authority tenants. The target households of this thesis are 
households in all three main tenures. However, some determinants of tenure choice in 
their studies are still useful for this thesis. 
2.3.1.2 Longitudinal Analysis of Tenure Choice 
In addition to cross-sectional analysis of tenure choice, researchers have emphasised 
longitudinal analysis of tenure choice by using time series data sets. Many studies of 
longitudinal analysis of tenure choice have been performed by American researchers 
since there are sufficient time series data sets in the US. For example, Kent (1984) 
estimates a model of tenure choice using the US federal subsidy program annual data 
from 1955 to 1976. The aim of Kent's study is to analyse the changes in owner- 
occupation rate and the changes in homeownership determinants during the estimation 
period. Kent's model highlights two specific points. Firstly, a simple expression for 
the expected rate of return on equity for a homeowner is developed and thus its 
importance could be tested in the tenure choice equation. Secondly, the influence of 
federal subsidy programs is also included in the model. Other determinants of owner- 
occupation selected in Kent's model include permanent income, the relative price of 
owning or renting, assets, mortgage loan conditions and household characteristics. 
Kent's results show that an increase in expected return on equity has the largest 
quantitative impact on owner-occupation. In fact, an increase of this variable 
increased the demand for owner-occupation by about 4.5 per cent from 1955 to 1976. 
The federal housing subsidy programmes have substantial effects on the demand for 
owner-occupation. The homeownership subsidy programme, in its peak effect of 
1973, increased the demand for owner-occupation by 0.87 percentage points. In 
contrast, the rental subsidy programme reduced the demand for owner-occupancy by 
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1.1 percentage points from 1955 to 1976. As expected, permanent income and the 
housing user cost have important impacts on owner-occupation. Kent's results show 
that an increase of household permanent income raised the demand for owner- 
occupation by 3.5 percentage points, while an increase of the user cost reduced the 
demand for owner-occupancy by 4 percentage points from 1955 to 1976. Changes in 
mortgage payment constraints had little effect on the demand for owner-occupation 
during the estimation period. This is partly because of a loose policy in mortgage 
credit rationing and a stable mortgage interest rate during this period. 
Kent's study simply concerns the influences of the changes in determinants on owner- 
occupation during the estimation period. However, in time series analysis of tenure 
choice, another important issue is to estimate the changes in tenure status over years. 
Krumm (1987) analyses tenure status change by using data from the Michigan Panel 
Study on Income Dynamics for the period 1976-1979. Taking a different approach 
from other cross-sectional studies of tenure choice, Krumm's study focuses the 
determinants of tenure status duration and the time of their changes. Krumm indicates 
that households' differences in time-invariant characteristics are systematically related 
to differences in the propensities to change tenure status, and thus estimated effects of 
these variables on tenure choice at a specific point in time are likely to be misleading. 
As a result, Krumm extends the choice pattern over a 4-year period. A multinomial 
logit model is employed to estimate the effect of determining variables on tenure 
changes. The determinants in Krumm's model are classified into non-varying 
demographic variables and time-varying variables. Non-varying variables include sex, 
race, and education of household heads, while time-varying variables include income, 
marital status of household heads, household size and spouse employment conditions. 
The empirical results support Krumm's assumption that changes in time-varying 
variables have significant impacts on tenure status changes. The results also suggest 
that lead and lag in household conditions have systematic and substantial effects on 
tenure status changes. 
The determinants of tenure status changes in Krumm's study focuses on the household 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In fact, other factors such as 
expected mobility and length of stay would be important determinants in time series 
analysis of tenure choice. A study by Henderson and Ioannides (1989) estimates a 
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model of joint choice of tenure, length of stay, and consumption level by using the 
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the period of 1971-1981. In their 
model, Henderson and Ioannides examine a household's choices of owning or renting, 
and consumption levels at the time of moving into a dwelling unit. They also examine 
how long a household stays in the dwelling unit before moving again. The vector of 
dependent variables associated with a time of moving includes tenure choice, planned 
length of residence spell and housing consumption. The dependent variables are 
influenced by the expected future path of household income, the relative price of 
owning or renting, non-housing consumption bundles and a number of household 
characteristics. 
Henderson and Ioannides' results suggest that in the estimation of length of stay, 
wealthier and more well educated households are more mobile, while the age of the 
household head has a quadratic effect with planned lengths of stay but is minimised at 
about age 55. In the estimation of housing consumption, their results show that 
increases in planned length of stay appear to reduce housing consumption for renters. 
After accounting for tenure choice and controlling for planned length of stay, renters 
and owners were found to have similar demand function relationships. This implies 
that renters and owners are not particularly differentiated by tastes but simply in life- 
cycle circumstances as to when it is optimal to own or rent. As the authors state, these 
findings are at an initial stage and would be of interest to researchers devoting further 
analysis to this subject. 
In Britain, only a few studies have emphasised time series analysis of tenure choice 
because of a lack of sufficient longitudinal data sets. Recently, a series of studies by 
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1996) and Di Salvo and Ermisch (1997) analyse the dynamic 
aspect of tenure choice by using data from the British Household Panel Study (1991- 
1994) and data for the 1958 birth cohort from the National Child Development Study. 
Ermisch-Di Salvo's (1996) model estimates the determinants of tenure transition 
between three main tenures-owner-occupation, social renting and private renting. 
The authors emphasise that surprises like partnership breakup, acquisition of a partner 
and spells of unemployment tend to have important influences on tenure changes for 
younger households from the ages of 16-33. 
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Ermisch and Di Salvo employ multinomial logit models to estimate the influences of 
these variables on tenure changes during the estimation period. Their results show 
that a partnership breakup reduces the probability of owners remaining in their current 
tenure status. For social tenants, a partnership breakup has a significant effect in 
forcing them to return to their parents' homes. Their results also suggest that 
acquisition of a partner increases the probability of moving from renting into owner- 
occupation. In contrast, it does not affect tenure transition from owner-occupation to 
social renting. Unemployment has an increasing trigger effect on tenure transition 
from both owner-occupation and private renting to social renting. In addition, the 
authors indicate that the tenure transition rate is significantly influenced by household 
income. Households with higher income favour moving to owner-occupation and 
discouraging flows to social housing. Both owners and social tenants are more likely 
to remain in their tenure when house prices are higher. 
A further study by Di Salvo and Ermisch (1997) analyses the dynamic aspect of tenure 
choice for younger households by using data from the 1958 birth cohort collected in 
the British National Child Development Study (BNCDS). They propose a risk hazard 
model to estimate the younger household's first entry to each of the two major tenures: 
owner-occupation and social renting. Their empirical results show that lifetime 
earnings, family background, a person's spells of unemployment, regional 
unemployment rate and regional relative house prices were found to have significant 
impacts on entry into owner-occupation or social housing. Households with better 
lifetime earnings are more likely to become owners and do so earlier in their lives. 
With respect to family background, people with fathers in non-manual jobs are more 
likely to become homeowners eventually, although not more quickly, than those with 
fathers in manual jobs. People with middle class parents were found to spend more 
time in private renting before entering either owner-occupation or social renting. 
Becoming a parent was found to have strong effect on pushing young households 
toward social housing. The authors also suggest that a person's spells of 
unemployment forces young households to be less likely to become owner-occupiers. 
A higher regional unemployment rate and higher regional relative house prices were 
found to slow down the speed of entry into either owner-occupation or social housing. 
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Ermisch-Di Salvo's studies show interesting findings about British younger 
households' tenure decision behaviour and their studies can be seen as a comer stone 
for British researchers devoted to the longitudinal analysis of tenure choice. In respect 
to a comparison of cross-sectional analysis and time series analysis of tenure choice, 
as Ermisch and Di Salvo's indicated, time series analysis of tenure choice would be a 
better approach to `align' the tenure choice event, especially with the determinants, 
such as incomes, prices, demographic characteristics, which vary over time. Again, a 
time series analysis of tenure choice needs a sufficient longitudinal data set. However, 
there is a lack of sufficient longitudinal data sets in Britain, especially in Scotland, 
thus making this kind of study more difficult. 
2.3.2 Tenure Choice and Specific Determinants 
In addition to overall estimation of the determinants of tenure choice from both cross- 
sectional and longitudinal aspects, a variety of studies have addressed some specific 
relationships and determinants of tenure choice. These specific relationship and 
determinants are mainly categorised into residential mobility, rationing, and subsidies. 
2.3.2.1 Residential Mobility and Tenure Choice 
In a study of expected mobility and tenure choice, Boehm (1981) recognises that a 
household's mobility decision and tenure choice is seen as a joint choice. In this sense, 
the probability that a household makes a given tenure choice and expects to move 
should be estimated as a simultaneous system of equations. A multinomial logit 
model is employed to estimate four alternative choices: own-expected move, own- 
expected stay, rent-expected move and rent-expected stay. 
The data in Boehm's study is selected from the panel data gathered by the University 
of Michigan from 1968 to 1976. A subsample is then selected for households who 
moved and made a tenure choice during one of following three time periods: 1969- 
1970,1970-1971, and 1971-1972. The sample targets recent movers because their 
relative costs of owning or renting have significantly been adjusted. Boehm uses a 
series of house prices and lagged house price variables to represent the differential 
market conditions. In addition to household demographic variables, permanent 
income and wealth are imputed in Boehm's study to estimate the life-cycle effect on 
tenure choice and expected mobility. His results show that permanent income, wealth 
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and the house price variables have significant impacts on tenure choice and expected 
mobility. The age of the household head is statistically significant in determining 
tenure choice but it becomes insignificant in determining joint choice of tenure and 
expected mobility. Therefore, Boehm questions whether the household head's age, 
which in previous studies had been one of the most significant variables in tenure 
choice analysis, is acting as a proxy. for the expected mobility and wealth of the 
household. 
However, Boehm's results could be criticised because the age of the household head 
could be correlated to household permanent income and wealth. Another argument is 
the sample selection. Since Boehm's sample focuses on recent movers, these sampled 
households could be concentrated in certain age groups, for instance, the younger 
households. Because younger households have higher mobility, the age effect could 
be insignificant on these households. 
Another study by Krumm (1984) also estimates the joint decision of migration and 
tenure choice. In contrast to Boehm's study, Krumm emphasises the cost-benefit of 
migration decisions and tenure status choice. He indicates that the structural 
dependence of the migration and tenure status change comes from the dependence of 
the relative cost of owning or renting in both periods and expected migration benefits. 
The relative cost of owning or renting in his definition is a function of expected 
migration benefits and all other factors affecting the cost. As a result, the joint 
decision of migration and tenure choice can be seen as a function of a series of 
benefits on migration and tenure status changes in both periods, and a vector of all 
other factors. Krumm employs a logistic model to estimate the joint choice and each 
of the marginal tenure status and migration probabilities by using the data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1977-78. 
However, in Krumm's model, the net benefit does not show expected significant 
effects on migration and tenure status change. This is the weakness in his study. On 
the other hand, the household head's characteristics, such as age, race and 
employment are found to have most important influences. Other household 
characteristics, such as household income and spouse's education, also have 
significant effects. In addition, Krumm also indicates that change in household size is 
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the main driving force of migration. Location also has a significant effect on the 
migration decision and tenure choice. The most interesting finding in Krumm's study 
is that the decision to change tenure has substantial influences on the decision to 
change the household residence location. This could explain the relationship between 
the dwelling's tenure type and location. 
Similar studies performed by Ioannides (1987) and loannides and Kan (1996) use the 
same data as Krumm did from the PSID data but different time periods. Ioannides 
(1987) develops a semi-Markov model to estimate the simultaneous decision of tenure 
and length of stay by using the PSID data for 1970-81. The basic assumption of 
Ioannides' study is that tenure choice and length of stay are determined by the 
household's socio-economic characteristics at the time the move and housing tenure 
choice is made. The results show that housing price and household wealth play a 
significant role in determining the tenure choice and residential mobility. The author 
indicates that higher wealth implies a higher likelihood of owning, higher mobility for 
renters and lower for owners. Housing price is found to have statistically significant 
effects but not always as anticipated. Other demographic characteristics, such as age, 
education, race, and marital status of household head and family size, also have 
important influences on tenure choice and length of stay. 
A recent study by Ioannides and Kan (1996) employs a dynamic probit model to 
estimate households' decisions to move and whether to rent or own after moving by 
using the PSID data for 1970-87. Unlike Ioannides' previous study, Ioannides and 
Kan emphasise the impact of financial aspect of housing on tenure choice and 
residential mobility. The housing financial factors involved in their study are prices 
for owning or renting, house value and interest rate, while housing asset represents the 
financial aspect of the household. The authors also use a series of dummy variables to 
estimate the effect of liquidity constraints on tenure choice and mobility. Their 
results suggest that the financial aspect of housing plays an important role in 
determining tenure choice and residential mobility. Other variables, such as family 
size and liquidity constraints, and changes in those variables, are found to have 
significant influences on tenure choice and the decision to move. 
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The above studies indicate that the relationship between mobility and tenure choice is 
interrelated. On one hand, the decision to move and tenure choice can be seen as a 
joint choice. On the other hand, expected mobility can be seen as a determinant of 
tenure choice. For instance, it is very often the case that households who like to move 
within a short term are more likely to choose lower transaction costs of renting 
(especially private renting) rather than higher transaction costs of owning. In addition, 
wealth (or permanent income), housing prices, and household life-cycle characteristics 
(for instance, age, race, education, marital and employment status) have significant 
influences on tenure choice and residential mobility. Changes in these variables are 
the main forces pushing households to move. 
2.3.2.2 Rationing and Tenure Choice 
As discussed in the last section, the rationing factor has been discussed in some 
previous tenure choice studies. Some studies also emphasise the rationing effect in 
terms of mortgage rationing to homeownership and the administrative constraints to 
enter the public rented sector. Very few studies discuss rationing in the private rented 
sector in tenure choice analysis? 
(1) Mortgage Rationing in Owner-Occupied Housing 
Many studies regarding mortgage rationing effect on tenure choice have been 
produced by North American researchers. Linneman and Wachter (1989) carried out 
a typical study of mortgage constraints on individual homeownership propensities. 
The authors address the income and wealth requirements for mortgages, and develop 
measures of the degree to which a family is constrained by mortgage underwriting 
criteria. In their study, two key mortgage criteria are developed on the basis of criteria 
from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. The first criterion is that the 
loan-to-value ratio should be less than or equal to 0.8; the second criterion is that the 
annual mortgage payment should be less than or equal to 28% of the borrower's 
annual family income. Based on these two criteria, a family's maximum home 
purchase price can be derived. 
2 This is probably because most studies of rationing in private renting have to focus on the policy 
context, such as rent control and limited housing supply in this sector, or focus on their economic 
impacts on housing markets. In tenure choice analysis, many researchers assume that the private rented 
sector is relatively free of rationing, compared to the other two main tenures. 
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In order to determine whether a family is constrained by either the income or wealth 
criteria, Linneman and Wachter also estimate the capital value of housing as the 
predicted optimal home purchase price. They indicate that because a family facing a 
mortgage constraint may choose to purchase a home at a price that is less than the 
optimal price, the observed home purchase prices cannot be used in their study. * By 
comparing predicted optimal purchase price with maximum purchase price, the 
authors then set up a series of dummy variables to proxy the degrees of mortgage 
constraints (high and moderate income constraints, and wealth constraint). A series of 
mortgage constraint variables along with household income, relative cost of 
ownership and a vector of household characteristics are included in the explanatory 
variables to estimate probability of homeownership. Their results show that wealth 
and income constraints both reduce homeownership propensities. Wealth constraint 
shows a stronger impact when a family applies the adjusted interest rate mortgage. 
Linneman and Wachter also suggest that the impact of mortgage constraints is varied 
by the fmancial innovations and housing subsidy policy, for example the subsidy on 
interest rate or downpayment would loosen the income and wealth constraints on 
homebuyers. 
A further study by Duca and Rosenthal (1994) evaluates borrowing constraints on 
households' access to owner-occupation by using a different methodology from 
Linneman and Wachter's study. Using the data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, Duca and Rosenthal divide households into two groups. Group One 
contains households whose tenure status is affected by mortgage constraints, while 
Group Two contains those whose tenure status may be affected by mortgage 
constraints. Duca and Rosenthal employ a binary probit model to estimate the 
probability of homeownership using only group one households. A vector of 
household socio-economic characteristics is included in the model to estimate the 
influence of households' taste and preferences on homeownership. To consider the 
age-related differences in tenure preference, the binary probit model is estimated 
separately for households with three different age groups: under age 35 (Young), age 
35 through 54 (Middle age), and age 55 and over (Older). 
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The results of the binary choice model are then used to predict the probability of 
homeownership for all households, without controlling borrowing constraints. ' Thus 
Duca and Rosenthal estimate the effect of borrowing constraints by comparing these 
two model results. Their results show that borrowing constraints have a significant 
negative effect on the homeownership rate. The negative effect is shown to be more 
significant on young households aged under 35. They find that homeownership in 
young households tends to be quite sensitive to potential earnings, the costs of owning 
or renting, and borrowing constraints, especially the downpayment constraint. Some 
studies like Brueckner (1986) and Haurin et al. (1997) also emphasise the important 
effect of downpayment constraints on young households' access to owner-occupied 
housing. 
In Britain, a number of studies have discussed mortgage credit rationing. However, 
many of them analyse the impact of mortgage rationing removal on housing prices 
and on the housing market. For example, Meen (1990) estimates the effect of the 
ending of mortgage rationing on housing price. His results suggest that mortgage 
rationing in the past had statistically significant effects on house prices and that under 
rationing, inflation had quantitatively the largest impact on the length of mortgage 
queues, rather than on real house prices. A recent study by Lee (1995) examines the 
impact of mortgage rationing and the removal of rationing on the demand for 
mortgages. The results of Lee's study confirm Meen's findings that the removal of 
mortgage rationing is one of the driving forces for the house price boom and an 
increase in the homeownership rate during the middle to late 1980s. 
With respect to tenure choice analysis, only a few studies in Britain, such as King 
(1980) and Maclennan and Wood (1981), have discussed mortgage rationing on 
homeownership. However, these studies did not examine the mortgage rationing 
effect on tenure choice model as American researchers did. Although there are 
different housing market and fmance market conditions between the US and the UK, 
the important role of mortgage constraints in the access to owner-occupied housing 
should not be ignored in tenure choice study in the UK. It also indicates a need for 
It is a simulation of the probability of homeownership. In the simulation, the probability of 
households who want to reside in owner-occupied housing is calculated by using the coefficients from 
the bivariate probit model. 
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further research to address this issue in the UK. The American literature may provide 
useful techniques in the analysis of the mortgage rationing effect on tenure choice. 
(2) Rationing in the Public Rented Sector 
Rationing in the public rented sector is usually associated with housing policy and the 
allocation system. The policy context of rationing in the public rented sector will be 
discussed in the next chapter. In this part, the academic research regarding the 
rationing effect on the access to the public rented sector is addressed. A series of 
studies by Clapham and Kintrea discusses rationing and housing choice in the social 
rented sector in Britain. Clapham and Kintrea (1984) state that, unlike the private 
housing market, the price mechanism does not work out in the public rented sector, 
and there is no consistent relationship between rent levels and property value and 
location. Thus households who want to enter council housing are primarily dependent 
upon the allocation system rather than their budget constraints. The allocation system, 
according to Clapham and Kintrea (1984), is a kind of `bureaucratic rationing'. 
Because the allocation process is rarely instantaneous but relies on queuing, the ability 
to wait has been the main factor in getting access to good quality council houses 
(ibid. ). The authors also indicate that, in the waiting list, most applicants have little 
power to express their preferences and make the choice of housing and location. 
"This lack of power, however, does not mean that the household is a passive agent, it 
does not bargain with the local authority but interacts with it" (ibid., p. 266). 
Therefore, the household should have the right to respond to the actions of the 
authority and make choices in order to achieve its preferences. 
As a result, Clapham and Kintrea (1984) develop a housing choice model for the local 
authority rented sector. The model in fact has been used in previous studies to clarify 
the choice process in the private sector. The reason for Clapham and Kintrea adopting 
this model is that `it frees the analysis from the mechanistic confines of the 
institutional approach (rationing) and enables the interaction between the bureaucracy 
and the individual household to be examined' (ibid., p. 266). Therefore, Clapham and 
Kintrea's housing choice model in the local authority rented sector concerns the 
applicants' choices and preferences. They suggest that the applicants should express 
their preferences on the local authority housing application form, and that the housing 
allocator should evaluate their applications on the basis of the applicants' resources 
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(mainly income and wealth), and tenure and housing preferences. Clapham and 
Kintrea also suggest that the likelihood of the applicant entering the local authority 
rented sector is determined by income, wealth, socio-economic group, present housing 
circumstances, parental tenure and the applicant's life cycle stage. Among these 
factors, the lower the income, wealth and socio-economic groups, the higher 
likelihood of entering the local authority housing sector. Similarly, the poorer the 
housing circumstances, the higher likelihood to enter this sector. The authors also 
suggest that parental tenure in any tenure is likely to have a positive influence on 
children's tenure. 
It is noteworthy that these determinants are useful in constructing the rationing 
variable of entry into the local authority rented sector. A further study by Clapham 
and Kintrea (1986) examines some of these factors in the allocation process. In an 
analysis of per capita income, socio-economic group, and the degree of social 
segregation in the public housing allocation process in the city of Glasgow, Clapham 
and Kintrea find that income has a direct and significant impact on the allocation of 
housing area popularity. They indicate that the likelihood of accepting the first offer 
is related to income. Lower income households were found to have less ability to wait, 
thus they are more likely to accept the first offer or accept the dwelling located in less 
popular areas. On the other hand, higher income households have more ability to wait 
until they receive an offer of higher quality and better location of dwelling. However, 
Clapham and Kintrea state: 
Although income is related to ability to wait, it is clearly not income 
per se which determines the propensity to reject houses and wait for a 
better offer. Instead, income may determine the ability to afford 
suitable property while waiting or enjoying an adequate life-style 
outside the home (1986, p. 64). 
In fact, the measure of per capita income in Clapham and Kintrea's study barely 
reflects the distribution of household sizes. A weakness is that it does not take into 
account the varying needs of households at different life-cycle stages. In addition to 
income, other factors such as homelessness, unemployment, long-term sickness, and 
lone parenthood may have important influences on the allocation process, even though 
these factors are still related to income. To model the household's tenure choice 
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behaviour, these factors can be used as indicators to construct the rationing variables 
for the social rented sector. 
2.3.2.3 Subsidy Effects on Tenure Choice 
Housing subsidy has been discussed by many studies as an important determinant of 
tenure choice (see for example Struyk 1976, King 1980, Henderson and Ioannides 
1983, and Rothenberg et al. 1991). There are also quite a few studies emphasising the 
tax subsidy effect on owner-occupiers. However, previous research paid little 
attention to the rental subsidy effect on tenants' tenure decisions. In a discussion of 
tax subsidies to homeowners, Rosen (1979) provides a clear analysis of the federal 
income tax effect on homeownership decisions in the US. Based on Laidler (1969) 
and Aaron's (1972) framework, Rosen assumes that changes in income tax subsidy 
would alter the relative price of housing services and household income, so as to 
influence the propensity of homeownership. As a result, Rosen estimates housing 
demand and tenure choice equations, taking care to adjust price and income terms for 
the federal income tax. His results suggest that changes in relative price and income 
have significant effects on households' demand for housing services and tenure choice. 
In addition, Rosen also simulates the efficiency and distributional effects of the 
implicit income tax subsidy for owner-occupiers under four alternative tax regimes. 
His results suggest that both removing the federal tax benefits for owner-occupiers 
and replacing the current system with a 25% tax credit would have significant impacts 
on higher income groups in terms of changes in their housing consumption. 
Rosen's study shows an interesting finding in the effect of the marginal tax bracket on 
homeownership decisions. However, some studies, such as Rosen and Rosen (1980) 
and Linneman (1985), have argued that the marginal tax bracket is not a sufficient 
statistic for homeownership. Lineman develops a net full cost model to examine the 
marginal tax bracket effect on homeownership decisions. Two special cases are 
specified in Linneman's homeownership model. The municipal band analogy case 
assumes that consumers do not sort into homogeneous housing markets and only a 
small number of consumers will be indifferent in terms of owning or renting. In 
contrast, the efficient market proposition case assumes that the heterogeneous 
consumers are sorted into a series of internally homogeneous housing quality markets. 
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The results show that tax benefits, quality sorting and transaction costs show 
insignificant impacts on homeownership decisions in both cases. 
Linneman's study has, however, been criticised because he ignores capital gains tax in 
his model and his estimation for a landlord's self production costs could have some 
bias (Capone 1995). Instead, Capone develops a net-present-value model to estimate 
the homeownership decision for low- and moderate-income households by using 
different tax brackets. Capone's results concur with Linneman's study suggesting that 
tax benefits have important impacts on households who want to own a moderate 
priced home, except for single individuals, whereas families with children have a 
higher probability to change tenure from renting to owning. 
Whether or not a significant statistic, tax subsidy to owner-occupiers should be 
included in the determinants of tenure choice, especially in the UK. A large number 
of studies on housing subsidy between tenures in Britain has been carried out over the 
past two decades in Britain (for example, see Rosenthal 1977, Robinson 1981, 
Ermisch 1984, Hills, 1991, Hancock and Munro 1992, and Walker and Marsh 1993). 
Whilst most of these studies address both the comparisons and the distributional effect 
of housing subsidies between tenures, only a few of them estimate the subsidy effect 
on tenure choice. Thus, we have seen a need for this kind of research. Moreover, in 
tenure choice analysis, housing subsidies should not only include the tax benefits to 
owner-occupiers but also account for rental subsidies to social tenants in tenure choice, 
and they are addressed in this thesis. The comparison and distributional effect of 
housing subsidy between tenures will be discussed in detail in later chapters. 
In summary, this section has reviewed the tenure choice studies and the determinants 
of tenure choice. Tenure choice analysis can be classified into two categories: cross- 
sectional analysis; and longitudinal analysis of tenure choice, based on the nature of 
the data and the purpose of the study. The cross-sectional analysis of tenure choice 
estimates the household's tenure decision, based on their contemporary tastes and 
preferences, while the longitudinal analysis of tenure choice addresses the changes in 
tenure choice behaviour over multiple periods. The above studies of the tenure choice 
model have indicated basic determinants of tenure choice. These basic determinants 
can generally be categorised into three groups: household demographic characteristics, 
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household socio-economic characteristics, and the relative cost of housing. 
Household characteristics include the age, sex, race, and marital status of the 
household head, and the household size (or number of dependent children in a 
household). The household socio-economic characteristics basically consist of 
household income, wealth and employment status. The relative cost of housing is the 
user cost of owning or renting. 
In addition to these basic determinants, studies have indicated that some specific 
relations and determinants have significant influences on tenure choice. Decisions to 
move and tenure choice are interdependent, thus they can be seen as a joint choice. 
On the other hand, the expected mobility can also be seen as a determinant of tenure 
choice. The rationing factors, such as mortgage rationing in the owner-occupied 
sector and the administrative rationing in the public housing sector, have significant 
effects on households' access to these two sectors. Housing subsidies, such as tax 
subsidies to owner-occupiers and rental subsidies to social tenants, play an important 
role in altering (reducing) the user cost of housing, thus it affects households' tenure 
decisions. However, in Britain there appears to be a lack of study in estimating the 
impacts of these determinants on tenure choice and this is what this thesis seeks to 
address. 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the theoretical analysis of housing tenure choice begins with an 
interpretation of the definition of housing tenure. From a broader view, housing 
tenure can be seen as a whole range of financial, social, political and economic 
relations surrounding housing. As a result, the choice of housing tenure is a 
complicated decision. The definition of tenure choice in this chapter focuses on the 
economic interpretation. From an economic viewpoint, housing tenure choice 
represents a consumer's ability (budget constraints) matching his/her preferences for 
different tenures. 
The economic theory of tenure choice is based on the consumer choice theory and 
housing demand theory. The standard model of consumer choice applying to housing 
has to be modified in order to fit the specific characteristics of housing commodity 
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and the housing market. The consumer's decision for housing demand can be seen as 
a bundle of choices which, for example, include the decisions of tenure, dwelling type, 
neighbourhood and location. Previous studies have indicated that these choices are 
interrelated and that hierarchy is a way to organise these choices. Among housing 
choice studies, Quigley (1985) develops a well-established hierarchical housing 
choice model, which has three stage choices. The first stage is to choose dwelling unit, 
then to choose neighbourhood and public services. Börsch-Supan and Pitkin's (1988) 
study suggests that the hierarchical structure of the nested logit model provides better 
estimation results of housing choice than the multinomial logit model does. 
Furthermore, it is noted that the hierarchical housing choice model involves a strong 
assumption of the tree structure, which reflects the relative degree of similarity among 
these choice alternatives. 
The housing market in Britain and in most Western European countries is 
characterised as comprising a relatively competitive part of the market and a part of 
the market subject to non-priced, administrative constraints. There are constraints on 
households entering certain types of housing segments. Clark and Onaka (1985) and 
Fischer and Aufhauser (1988) have provided well-established results of housing 
choice in the regulated housing market. These studies also indicate the importance of 
non-price rationing factors in housing choice analysis. Moreover, studies like 
Maclennan et al. (1987) and Tu (1996) suggest that the housing market can also be 
separated into several submarkets because of the imperfection of market information 
and the demand or supply constraints in the market. As a result, the household's 
housing decision can be estimated in different submarkets, based on tenure, dwelling, 
and neighbourhood components. 
In the housing demand analysis, previous studies (see for example King 1980, 
Henderson and Ioannides 1983) have indicated that the household's tenure choice and 
housing consumption decisions are interdependent. In other words, the discrete nature 
of tenure choice and the continuous housing consumption decision can be seen as a 
joint decision. King (1980) provides an important empirical analysis of tenure choice 
and housing demand in Britain. However, King's study should be treated with caution 
because current housing market characteristics and tenure categories are dramatically 
different from King's study two decades ago. Moreover, in a series of housing 
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decisions, tenure choice would be more important when a household faces a choice 
between public and private housing; in the public housing sector, particularly the 
tenure is usually attached to certain dwelling types, neighbourhood and location (see 
Clapham and Kintrea 1984,1986). 
Tenure choice analysis can generally be categorised into the cross-sectional analysis 
and the longitudinal analysis of tenure choice, depending upon the nature of data and 
the purpose of study. Studies such as Kent (1984), Di Salvo and Ermisch (1997) have 
emphasised that the longitudinal analysis of tenure choice is a better approach to 
estimate the effect of changes in the determinants over time on the household's tenure 
choice behaviour. It is unquestionable that the cross-sectional analysis of tenure 
choice provides a simple way to estimate the household's tenure choice behaviour in a 
given time period which avoids complicated data matching and the problem of 
autocorrelation happening in time series data (Koop 2000). In particular, while some 
areas like Scotland do not have sufficient longitudinal data, the cross sectional 
analysis of tenure choice, as this thesis intends to do, is currently the best alternative 
approach. 
It has been seen that many studies have employed hierarchical choice models to 
estimate tenure choice and other decisions such as residential mobility, dwelling type 
and location. There is also a debate about whether the hierarchical choice model, such 
as the nested multinomial logit model, or the multinomial logit model provides a 
better estimation result of the household's housing decision behaviour (see for 
example, Börsch-Supan and Pitkin 1988 and Tu 1994). Since the multinomial logit 
model has a weakness of violating the IIA assumption, more recent studies have 
adopted the nested logit model to estimate the household's tenure choice behaviour. 
However, there is an opportunity to employ these two types of model in this thesis in 
order to compare the robustness of these two models in estimating the household's 
tenure choice behaviour in Scotland. 
With respect to tenure choice determinants, studies like Struyk and Marshall (1976), 
Maclennan and Wood (1981) have delineated some important determinants of tenure 
choice, which can be classified into three basic groups: household demographic 
characteristics, such as household age, size, gender and marital status; household 
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socio-economic characteristics, such as permanent income and employment status; 
and the user cost of housing. In addition to these basic determinants, several specific 
determinants, such as expected mobility, mortgage rationing and housing subsidies, 
have significant influences on tenure choice. These determinants are also included in 
the tenure choice models of this thesis. It is noted that mobility decision and tenure 
choice is interrelated and they can be seen as a joint choice, particularly in the 
longitudinal analysis of tenure choice and residential mobility (for example see 
Boehm 1981, Ioannides 1987, and Ioannides and Ken 1996). Although this thesis 
adopts a cross sectional analysis of tenure choice, the interdependent relationship 
between mobility decision and tenure choice will be examined in the thesis. 
In a review of tenure choice literature, a gap has been seen in estimating the rationing 
effect and the housing subsidy effect on tenure choice. Mortgage rationing, as stated 
before, is an important determinant of homeownership. Equally important, the non- 
price, administrative rationing, such as the allocation system, plays an important role 
in the admission to enter the social rented sector. There is a lack of research in 
estimating the effect of social housing rationing on the household's tenure decision 
behaviour. Regarding the housing subsidy effect, the majority of studies has 
emphasised the effect of tax advantages on homeownership. There obviously is a lack 
of an analysis in estimating the effect of below market rent subsidies and the effect of 
fair rent subsidies on the household's tenure decision. These gaps will be filled in this 
thesis. 
Finally, the household's tenure choice behaviour and the determinants of tenure 
choice are shaped by the housing market conditions. The next chapter will discuss the 
housing tenure pattern and the housing market conditions in Scotland. 
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CHAPTER THREE HOUSING TENURE AND HOUSING 
MARKFT STRUCTURE IN SCOTLAND 
The last chapter provides us with a review of the tenure choice theory and empirical 
studies of tenure choice. The determinants of tenure choice are also identified from 
the literature review. The characteristics of tenure choice determinants are shaped by 
the housing market conditions as well as the household's tenure and socio-economic 
structure. To clarify the characteristics of tenure choice determinants in Scotland as a 
preparation work of modelling Scottish households' tenure choice behaviour, there is 
a need to analyse Scotland's housing development. In particular, housing in Scotland 
has developed a different pattern from the rest of Great Britain over the last several 
decades. This chapter discusses Scotland's housing development, with an emphasis 
on housing tenure and housing market structure, rationing and housing subsidy. This 
chapter is organised into five sections. The first section reviews the housing tenure 
structure. The second section analyses housing market conditions. The third section 
discusses rationing in the housing market. The fourth section discusses housing 
subsidies to help with housing costs and the last section is a brief summary. 
3.1. Housing Tenure Structure 
Different local economic activities and demographic developments have left different 
patterns in terms of the age and types of dwellings in the housing stock. State 
intervention in the housing sector and the exercise of local political power have also 
profoundly affected the patterns of housing development (Murie 1996a). These 
differences are reflected in tenure structure. In other words, tenure can be seen not 
only as an outcome but also a parameter of policy development. This section analyses 
the long-term tenure patterns in Scotland when compared with the rest of Great 
Britain. Since housing tenure in Britain is measured on the basis of dwelling stock, 
the Scottish dwelling characteristics between tenures are also discussed in this section. 
3.1.1 Long Term Housing Tenure Patterns 
Over several decades, Scottish housing has developed in a different way from housing 
in the rest of Great Britain and this has been most apparent in the different tenure 
53 
patterns of Scotland. Figures in Table 3.1 (see page 59) reveal significant differences 
between Scotland and England/Wales. Historically, Scotland has a lower rate of 
owner-occupied dwellings compared with England and Wales. In 1971, Scotland's 
owner-occupied dwellings only accounted for 31% of the total housing stock, while 
England and Wales both had more than half of the housing stock for owner- 
occupation. The most dramatic changes in tenure mix in Britain have taken place in 
the 1980s. There was a rapid increase in owner-occupied housing during this period. 
Between 1981 and 1989, the homeownership rate in both England and Wales 
increased about eight percentage points, while Scotland experienced a more dramatic 
increase in the homeownership rate up to 13 percentage points. The higher percentage 
growth in Scotland's owner-occupied housing is partly because of the lower starting 
point for homeownership, and is partly influenced by a relatively stable economic and 
housing market growth and the national housing policy (Wilcox et al. 1998). 
In Britain, the growth of homeownership in the 1980s was mainly affected by a series 
of government policies. For example, fmancial markets were deregulated in the mid- 
1980s. The release of mortgage rationing along with income growth have encouraged 
the demand for owner-occupation and thus promoted a market boom in the late 1980s 
(Meen 1989). The mortgage interest tax relief provided substantial tax advantages to 
homeowners. The Right to Buy scheme offered a big discount price for sitting council 
tenants to buy their homes. These are the important driving forces to increase the 
homeownership rate over the last two decades. The growth of Scotland's owner- 
occupied housing in the 1980s was the result of the Right to Buy and related policies 
and new house building, which were contributory factors to almost equal extents 
(Murie 1996a). 
In the 1990s, RTB policy and new house building continued to contribute to a rapid 
increase in Scotland's homeownership. Between 1990 and 1998, Scotland's 
homeownership rate increased by 10 percentage points, while the homeownership rate 
in both England and Wales increased by less than one percentage point. In fact a 
relatively stable economy in the 1990s has been one of major factors for the growth of 
new built owner-occupied dwellings in the Scottish housing market (Wilcox et al. 
1998). The continuous market boom in the Scottish housing market also reveals 
different market conditions in terms of house prices, housing starts and housing 
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transactions from the rest of Britain. They are discussed in the later section. 
Although Scotland experienced a rapid growth in owner-occupied housing in the past 
two decades, its homeownership rate is still the lowest among the three countries. By 
1998, the homeownership rate in Scotland accounted for 61.3%, while it was 68% and 
71.5% in England and Wales respectively. Since the national housing policy has 
aimed to continue to promote owner-occupied housing, there may be room for 
increasing Scotland's homeownership rate in the future but the growth rate will not be 
as fast as in the last two decades. 
The historical importance of the public housing sector is greater in Scotland than in 
England and Wales. ' In the 1970s, Scotland's public dwellings accounted for half of 
the total housing stock, while in both England and Wales public dwellings accounted 
for less than 30% of their housing stock. Since the 1980s, council housing stock in 
Britain has rapidly reduced primarily due to the Right to Buy scheme. The decrease in 
council dwellings in Scotland is more significant than that in England and Wales. 
This implies a successful Right to Buy scheme in Scotland. Between 1980 and 1998, 
more than 300,000 public dwellings were sold to sitting tenants under the RTB 
scheme in Scotland, which accounted for 17% of the total RTB sales in Britain 
(Wilcox 2000). 
Accompanying the Right to Buy scheme, a large number of council dwellings were 
sold to housing associations under the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer scheme after 
1989 and this accelerated the reduction in council dwellings. In Scotland, between 
1989 and 1998, there were more than 88,000 public dwellings transferred from local 
authorities, Scottish Homes and New Town Development Corporations to local 
housing associations (Taylor 1998). Because of the successful exercise of RTB and 
LSVT schemes with a very low level of new building and acquisition, Scotland's 
public housing stock reduced significantly over the past two decades (Murie 1996a). 
By 1998, Scotland's public housing stock only accounted for 26.6% of the total 
dwellings. Nevertheless, the share of public housing stock in Scotland still remained 
the highest among three countries and was about 10 percentage points higher than that 
in England and Wales by 1998. 
The public housing sector in Scotland includes local authorities, new towns and Scottish Homes (now 
Communities Scotland). 
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The sale of council dwellings and stock transfers may have speeded the residualisation 
process in the public rented sector (Murie 1996a). Many affluent council tenants have 
become owner-occupiers under the RTB scheme. Moreover, the stock transfer 
scheme has transferred many better quality council dwellings to local housing 
associations. In this environment, council housing has been dominated by lower 
income groups who, in many cases, are living in lower quality dwellings. The rise of 
income inequality in the public rented sector has become a critical issue in Britain. In 
Scotland, the Scottish House Condition Survey provides rich data which can be used 
to examine the income inequality between tenures. This issue will be analysed in 
Chapter Seven. 
The one part of the rented sector which has expanded, with government sponsorship 
since 1979, is the housing association sector. The expansion has taken place both 
though new building and stock transfers, and has only been partly offset by sales of 
properties (Murie 1996a). In spite of its expansion, housing association stock only 
forms a small proportion of the total housing stock. By 1998, the share of housing 
association dwellings accounted for 5.3% of the total housing stock in Scotland, 
compared to 5% and 4% in England and Wales, respectively. It is of interest to note 
that Scotland's housing association sector remains much smaller and there are no 
equivalents of the large English housing associations (ibid. ). The new financial 
regime for the housing association sector established in 1988 has had substantial 
impacts on changing their role and also promoting their expansion. In Scotland, the 
financial regime did not lead to such significant impacts as it did in England, 
particularly in terms of the rent level (Wilcox et al. 1998). The new financial regime 
of the housing association sector and its impact is discussed in Section Four. 
In Britain, the private rented sector also experienced a decline over the last several 
decades. The government's strong rent policy is the key factor for the decline in this 
sector. Rent control and large scale slum clearance have been the driving forces to 
limit the supply of private rented dwellings (Freeman et al. 1996). Equally important, 
the tax and subsidy system favouring owner-occupiers and social tenants is another 
key factor explaining the small size of this sector. In Scotland, in contrast to a 
growing owner-occupied housing and a strong social rented sector, private rented 
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dwellings have declined substantially. This may imply that Scottish households are 
more likely to stay in the social housing sector than the private rented sector, and 
regard social renting as a substitute for private renting. The share of private rented 
dwelling in the total housing stock is the lowest among the three countries in Britain. 
After the deregulation of private rents in 1989, the private rented sector appeared to be 
reviving in England and Wales but it only had positive impact on Scotland's private 
renting in 1990/91. After that, Scotland suffered continuous decline in the proportion 
of private rented dwellings. By 1998, Scotland's private rented dwellings only 
accounted for 6.7% of the total housing stock, compared to 11.1% and 8.5% in 
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3.1.2 Tenure and Housing Characteristics 
In addition to the long-term housing tenure pattern, another important subject in the 
analysis of housing tenure structure is the dwelling characteristics compared with 
housing tenure, since the housing tenure is measured on the basis of dwelling units. 
Table 3.2 presents dwelling characteristics by tenures in Scotland based on the 
Scottish House Condition Survey in 1996. Houses have been the dominant dwelling 
type in Scotland, accounting for 62% of the total dwellings in 1996. Dwelling type is 
significantly different between owner-occupation and social renting. In the owner- 
occupied sector, about three quarters of dwellings were houses, while tenements and 
four-in-a-block flats were dominant dwelling types in the social rented sector in 1996. 
Dwelling type in the private rented sector is significantly varied between unfurnished 
and furnished renting. More than half of private unfurnished renting and 87% of tied 
accommodation were houses, while 72% of furnished renting were flats in 1996. 
In Scotland, more than 60% of dwellings were built after the Second World War, 
while 21% were built before 1919. Similarly, most dwellings in the owner-occupied 
sector and the public rented sector were built after 1945. The difference is that there 
were 27% of owner-occupied dwellings built before 1919, compared to only 3% of 
public dwellings being built before 1919. The market boom and the growth of new 
built dwellings have contributed to an increase in the share of dwellings built after 
1982 in the owner-occupied sector. Dwelling age of the housing association sector is 
significantly diverse. As the government aimed to expand the housing association 
sector, a large number of new dwellings have been built since the late 1980s. As a 
result, this increases the share of association dwellings built after 1982 which 
accounted for 39% of the total housing association dwellings in 1996. In contrast to 
new construction, a quarter of association dwellings were built before 1919, and many 
of these dwellings are rehabilitated tenements and flats located in the inner city 
providing for elderly people and those with special needs (Murie 1996a). Dwelling 
age of the private rented sector is very old with fewer new constructions compared to 
other tenures. More than 70% of private furnished rented dwellings and about half of 
unfurnished and tied accommodations were built before 1919, while less than 10% of 
private rented dwellings were built after 1982. This is the result of the long term 
decline of this sector. 
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In 1996, about two thirds of dwellings in Scotland had 4 or 5 rooms. Dwellings with 
4-5 rooms were the dominant size in the owner-occupied sector and the public rented 
sector. About 80% of housing association dwellings had 3 or 4 rooms. To some 
extent, dwelling size is correlated to household characteristics and, in this case, the 
above results may imply different patterns of household size and household type 
between the public rented sector and the housing association sector. Similar to 
housing association dwellings, most private unfurnished and furnished rented 
dwellings had less than 5 rooms in 1996. In contrast, most tied accommodations are a 
larger size. Around 80% of tied accommodations had 5 or more rooms. With respect 
to dwelling location, most dwellings in the owner-occupied sector and the social 
rented sector were located in urban areas, while there were substantial proportions of 
private unfurnished and tied accommodation located in rural areas of Scotland. 
In brief, there has been a rapid increase in owner-occupied housing over the last two 
decades in Scotland. Owner-occupied dwellings are dominated by houses with 4 to 5 
rooms and most of them were built after Second World War, including a substantial 
amount of new construction after 1982. The historical importance of Scotland's 
public rented sector significantly comprises flats and tenements in the urban areas. 
The independent housing association sector is relatively small and young in terms of 
dwelling size and age. The government's policy to expand the housing association 
sector is a key force for a rapid increase in new built dwellings after 1989. The long- 
term state intervention in the private rented sector has resulted in the small size of this 
sector. Most furnished rented dwellings which are very old and of a smaller size are 
located in the inner city. On the contrary, many unfurnished rented dwellings and tied 
accommodation are located in rural areas and are a larger size. 
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3.2 Housing Market Conditions 
We have thus seen a significant change in tenure mix in Scotland over the last several 
decades. The change in tenure pattern has had substantial impacts on the housing 
market. This section briefly discusses the difference of housing market conditions 
between Scotland and the rest of Great Britain in terms of new house building, house 
prices and housing transactions. 
3.2.1 New House Building 
New house building plays an important role in stimulating housing market activities as 
well as economic activities. According to Wilcox (2000), almost 20,400 new 
dwellings were completed in Scotland in 1998, adding nearly 0.9% to the housing 
stock. The number of Scotland's housing starts was about 20,200 dwellings in 1998, 
and accounted for 11.4% of the total of Great Britain's housing starts. Figure 3.1 
reveals the level of new house building (housing start) in Scotland and in Great Britain 












1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1 Scotland --m-- Great Britain 
Figure 3.1 New House Building in Scotland and Great Britain 1985-1998 
(Index, 1993=100) 
Source: Based on Wilcox (2000), Table 19e and 19f. 
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Scotland's new house building experienced a smoother growth during the market 
boom in the late 1980s. Housing starts in Scotland reached its high level in 1989, one 
year later than that for the rent of Great Britain. The market recession beginning in 
the early 1990s had less influence on Scotland's new housing construction. It is 
striking that new house building in Scotland experienced a greater fluctuation in the 
mid-1990s than in the late 1980s. New house building in Scotland reached its highest 
level in 1994. About 25,100 new dwellings were built in that year. Then housing 
starts suffered a decline to some degree. The recent boom and slump of Scotland's 
new house building was partly affected by private market conditions and partly by the 
housing association activities since housing associations have been the main suppliers 
of new social dwellings in the 1990s (Wilcox et al. 1998). 
In Scotland, the tenure division of new house building has significantly changed over 
the last two decades. Figure 3.2 shows the tenure share in Scotland's new house 
building between 1985 and 1998. It shows a clear picture that the share taken by the 
public sector was dramatically reduced after 1989. In 1990, there were about 1,600 
dwellings built by the public sector. By 1998, public sector housing starts had 
dropped to 50 dwellings, accounting for only 0.2% of total housing starts (Wilcox 
2000). The estimates of the local authority housing need vary widely. Studies have 
suggested that the current level of production is well below the requirement to meet 
the local authority housing need (Meen et al. 2001). In contrast, the number of 
housing starts taken by housing associations has been significantly increased after 
1989 and reached its peak of 5,400 dwellings in 1995. It is evident that a rapid boom 
in Scotland's housing starts in the mid-1990s was partly boosted by the new 
housebuilding in the housing association sector. Recently, the number of new 
construction in the housing association sector has slightly declined. Nevertheless, the 
share constantly remained at 16%-18% of the total housing starts in Scotland between 
1997 and 1998. 
New house building in the private sector has been growing steadily over recent 
decades. This is partly a result of a rapidly growing demand for owner-occupied 
housing during these years. As discussed above, Scotland's new private house 
building also experienced less fluctuation than the rest of Great Britain in the last two 
decades. Scotland's private housing starts reached a high level in 1989 and then had a 
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slight slump during the market recession in the early 1990s. After recovering from the 
recession, private housing starts reached another high level of 19,450 dwellings in 
1994. After that, the number of new private house building fell slightly but remained 
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® Public Sector a Housing Associations [3 Private Sector 
] 
Figure 3.2 Tenure Shares in New House Building in Scotland, 1985-1998 
Source: Based on Wilcox (2000), Table 19e 
3.2.2 House Prices 
House prices have always been an important indication of housing market conditions. 
House prices in Scotland have shown a different trend from the rest of the UK over 
the last two decades. Figure 3 .3 shows that house prices in Scotland were more stable 
than at the UK level over the past twenty years. ' According to Council of Mortgage 
Lenders' (CML) data, the UK housing market experienced a price boom during the 
late 1980s. House prices reached their peak in 1989. Many factors determined the 
price boom during this period. As Meen (1996) pointed out, the liberalisation of the 
mortgage finance sector is undoubtedly one of the major causes, in addition, the 
increase in real income in the mid-1980s also contributed to the house price boom. 
House price data is available at the UK level. Most comparisons in this chapter are based on Great 
Britain level data. 
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The economic recession beginning in the 1990s, however, caused a great fluctuation 
in the UK housing market. House prices changed from boom to slump between 1989 
and 1990, and continued to decline until the mid-1990s. During 1990 to 1994, falling 
house prices and reduced housing transactions along with rising unemployment had 
together slowed down the recovery from the market recession (Murie 1996a). The 
consequences had been rising mortgage arrears and repossessions at their highest level, 
and many owner-occupiers also having negative equity (ibid. ). 
All of the above problems existed in the UK housing market. However, they did not 
happen in the Scottish housing market. House prices in Scotland experienced a 
smoother boom than the rest of the UK during the late 1980s. The economic recession 
in the early 1990s did not have such a strong impact on the Scottish housing market. 
While house prices in the UK level declined in the recession, Scotland's house prices 
continued to grow by 15 percentage points between 1990 and 1993. However, the 
impact of the market recession was a reduction in housing starts and the number of 
housing transactions in the Scottish housing market. As discussed earlier, a stable 
economy and a constant growth of the demand for owner-occupied housing may have 
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Figure 3.3 Average House Prices in Scotland and the UK, 1980-1999 
(Mix adjusted index, 1993=100) 
Sources: Compendium of Housing Finance Statistics, Council of Mortgage Lenders, 




After recovering from recession in the early 1990s, house prices in Scotland continued 
to grow smoothly over the second half of 1990s, while housing markets in the rest of 
the UK were likely to have another price boom, specifically after 1996. An analysis 
of CML data suggests that between 1996 and 1999, house prices in Scotland increased 
nearly 15 percentage points compared to 44 percentage points in the UK as a whole. 
By 1999, the average house price in Scotland was £69,368 compared to an average of 
£83,845 at the UK level (see Table 3.3). With respect to the volatility of house prices, 
according to CML data, Scotland had the lowest volatility of house prices at around 
7%, compared to about 15% at the UK level over the 1968-2000 (Meen et al. 2001). 
Table 3.3 also shows a breakdown of prices by dwelling size in Scotland compared to 
the UK as a whole between 1998 and 1999. In Scotland, the prices for 6 room 
dwellings had the biggest increase (7.3%), followed by 5 room dwellings with a 5% 
increase between 1998 and 1999. In contrast, the prices for 3 room dwellings had 
declined by nearly 8%. In the UK level, the prices for 7 more room dwellings had the 
biggest increase, by nearly 12%, followed by 6 room dwellings with an 11% increase 
in prices between 1998 and 1999. 













'change 2 rooms or less 40,076 46,026 14.8 48,047 51,504 7.2 
3 rooms 47,884 44,155 -7.8 53,254 54,660 2.6 
4 rooms 52,296 54,269 3.8 56,192 61,191 8.9 
5 rooms 64,325 67,686 5.2 64,661 70,343 8.8 
6 rooms 79,226 85,001 7.3 76,449 84,689 10.8 
7 rooms or more 124,701 129,770 4.1 126,651 141,409 11.7 
All type average 64,083 69,386 8.3 81,991 92,717 13.1 
Sources: DETR/CML 5% Sample Survey of Mortgage Lenders. Analysis and adopted 
from Wilcox (1999) and (2000) Tables 43a, 44. 
Notes: Figures for 2 room dwellings should be treated with particular caution due to 
very small sample sizes 
Rooms include kitchens but no bathrooms, lobbies, landings or sculleries. 
Figures are for sales to all purchasers, with the exception of sitting tenants. 
3.2.3 Housing Transactions 
In addition to new house building and house prices, housing transactions are also an 
important indication of housing market conditions. Table 3.4 presents the number of 
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private housing sales in Scotland and the rest of Great Britain from 1990 to 1997. 
Unfortunately, the latest data for Scotland is only available up to November 1997. 
Thus the data can not present recent transaction activities in the Scottish housing 
market. ' The economic recession during the early 1990s did not have a strong 
influence on Scotland's house prices but it did impact on housing transactions. The 
number of housing transactions in Scotland and the rest of Great Britain reduced 
significantly in the early 1990s. 
Between 1993 and 1996, the number of private housing sales in Scotland and the rest 
of Great Britain continued to decline but at a slower rate. In 1997 there was a quick 
increase in housing transactions in Great Britain level. A rapid increase in the number 
of housing transactions along with rising house prices implies that the housing market 
in Great Britain, particularly in England would "heat up" to experience another boom 
like the late 1980s. However, this evidence would not be confirmed until more up-to- 
date data was collected. In Scotland, the housing market would not be as "hot" as the 
level in the rest of Great Britain, since the number of housing transactions and house 
prices increased slowly in 1997. 









1990 142 115 1,425 115 
1991 133 107 1,358 110 
1992 131 106 1,162 94 
1993 124 100 1,238 100 
1994 125 101 1,239 100 
1995 110 89 1,159 94 
1996 100 81 1,223 99 
1997 101 82 1,398 113 
Source: Wilcox et al. (1998), Table 6.6a 
Note: Scotland data for 1997 is only for the eleven months to November. 
In summary, the Scottish housing market has shown different conditions from the rest 
of Great Britain over the last two decades. Housing markets in England and Wales 
experienced a great fluctuation during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The picture 
6 According to Gibb's (2001) study of CML data, Scottish private housing transactions were about 
123,000 in 1999. 
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for Scottish housing market was of much greater stability. House prices in Scotland 
grew steadily without significant fall back during the past two decades. The Scottish 
housing market was much less affected by the recession beginning in the early 1990s 
and consequently had negligible negative equity. Housing starts and rates of housing 
transactions in Scotland were decreased less significantly than the rest of Great Britain 
during the market recession. In general, Scotland does not show the volatility of the 
housing market in England and Wales, and the `ripple effect' stops at the border (Gibb 
2001). 
Many factors could explain different housing market conditions between Scotland and 
the rest of Great Britain. One of the most important factors is that the housing market 
is deeply influenced by local economic activities and by local housing demand and 
supply. Gibb (2001) indicates that economic, behavioural and institutional reasons 
can be seen as attributes to the Scottish housing market's stability. Another important 
factor is housing policy. Connecting to housing tenure, housing market is also viewed 
as an important policy tool. For example, homeownership supports and underpins 
area regeneration, while rental housing can provide wider choices other than owner- 
occupation and support wider housing flexibility (ibid. ). Housing policy and the 
subsidy programmes play important roles in subsidising households as well as housing 
suppliers or placing constraints in the housing market. The following two sections 
will discuss rationing and subsidies in the Scottish housing market compared to the 
rest of Great Britain. 
3.3 Rationing in the Housing Market 
Rationing in the housing market can generally be divided into price mechanism and 
non-price mechanism. From an economic viewpoint, price constraints are related to 
the prices of housing services and the household's budget constraints. Non-price 
constraints are mainly the administrative rationing imposed by the market controller. 
In Scotland, as well as the rest of Great Britain, rationing in the housing market 
mainly consists of price and non-price constraints towards entry into the three main 
tenures: the owner-occupier sector, the social housing sector and the private rented 
sector. 
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3.3.1 Rationing in the Owner-Occupied Sector 
As the house is a commodity that is expensive in relation to incomes, most households 
need to obtain a mortgage to buy their own home. Thus mortgage finance can be seen 
as the most significant constraint to households who want to be homeowners. In 
Scotland and the rest of Great Britain, the mortgage lenders, mainly building societies 
and banks, often impose some rationing to mortgage borrowers in order to secure their 
loans. The rationing includes price and non-price constraints. Before the 1980s, the 
most significant constraint was the credit rationing set by building societies. 
Before the mid-1980s, the building societies enjoyed tax advantages which allowed 
them to offer a better net return on saving rates than their banking competitors (Gibb 
and Munro 1991). Because of these competitive advantages in the saving market, 
building societies could offer cheaper mortgages to borrowers and, as a result, demand 
for mortgages was frequently greater than the supply. Therefore, many building 
societies then implemented credit rationing by reducing the mortgage loan to value 
ratio, by reducing income to value ratio for potential borrowers, by imposing saving 
conditions on borrowers and also by tightening up lending rules on older properties 
and those in less desirable neighbourhoods (ibid. ). 
Building societies' credit rationing created inflexibility in the financial market and had 
a significant impact on many potential homebuyers. Many homebuyers, particularly 
in the marginal income level, found it difficult to obtain a mortgage from building 
societies. This went against the government's policy to promote homeownership in 
Great Britain. In the mid-1980s, the government deregulated the mortgage market so 
that building societies could face more competition from banks and other financial 
institutions. As Maclennan and Gibb (1990) suggest, the deregulation of the financial 
sector has had a fundamental effect on the mortgage market. Price competition has 
removed the historical mortgage rate fixing cartel and quantity constrained queuing 
for mortgage and, at the same time, has enabled households to borrow more against 
the value of housing asset (ibid. ). In other words, the mortgage constraint since the 
mid-1980s has been focused on price mechanism, which mainly depends upon house 
prices, borrowers' incomes, mortgage interest rates and inflation. 
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In order to safeguard their loans, many building societies and banks have imposed 
some criteria towards mortgage borrowers. The most common criteria are: house 
price to income ratio, loan to house price ratio and loan to income ratio. These criteria 
have been used by the Council of Mortgage Lenders to estimate housing affordability 
for homebuyers. To some extent, these affordability measures do reflect some 
conditions of mortgage constraints to homebuyers. Many building societies and banks 
have used these measures as the norms for their lending criteria. In many cases, these 
mortgage criteria apply differently to first time buyers and former homeowners. 
Figure 3.4 to Figure 3.6 present these three common mortgage criteria to first time 
buyers and former homeowners in Scotland compared to the UK level. 
In Scotland and the UK level, the price to income ratio for former homeowners is 
significantly higher than that for first time buyers. This is probably because former 
homeowners usually have higher incomes and savings thus they can purchase higher 
price homes than first time homebuyers and also former homeowners can obtain 
capital gains from their previous houses. For example, in Scotland 1997, the average 
house prices purchased by former homeowners were £78,287 and their average annual 
incomes were £27,197, while the average house prices purchased by first time buyers 
were far lower at £38,613 and their average annual incomes were £17,827 (Wilcox et 
al. 1998). Although these figures represent a big gap, the price to income ratio for 
both first time buyers and former homeowners in Scotland remained stable and was 
less affected by the house price boom and slump than the rest of the UK in the past 
two decades. The price to income ratio for former homeowners in the UK level was 
significantly affected by market boom and recession during the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s. 
With respect to loan to house price ratio (or called loan to value ratio LTV), first time 
buyers have higher ratio than former homeowners. Over the past fifteen years, the 
loan to house price ratio for first time buyers in Scotland was similar to the UK 
average except in recent years. The recent house price boom (between 1997 and 1999) 
in the UK as a whole has resulted in a quicker reduction in loan to house price ratio 
than that in Scotland. Compared to former homeowners, the loan to price ratio for 
first time buyers was likely to be affected by housing market conditions in Scotland 
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Figure 3.4 House Price to Income Ratio in Scotland and the UK, 1986-1999 
FT Buyer: first time buyer; F Owner: former homeowner 
Source: Council of Mortgage Lenders, Housing Finance 
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Figure 3.5 Loan to House Price Ratio in Scotland and the UK, 1986-1999 
FT Buyer: first time buyer; F Owner: former homeowner 
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Figure 3.6 Loan to Income Ratio in Scotland and the UK, 1986-1999 
FT Buyer: first time buyer; F Owner: former homeowner 
Source: Council of Mortgage Lenders, Housing Finance 
At the UK level, the loan to income ratio for first time buyers was higher than for 
former homeowners. This is probably because former homeowners had historically 
higher price to income ratio and lower loan to price ratio. As a result, this makes a 
lower loan to income ratio for former homeowners than for first time buyers. In 
Scotland, the conditions are different from the UK level. The loan to income ratio for 
Scotland's first time buyers was much lower than for former homeowners during the 
late 1980s. It is noted that lower loan to income ratio for first time buyers does not 
simply mean that homeownership for first time buyers is more affordable than for 
former homeowners. The interpretation of the above situation would be complicated. 
It depends upon average house prices and incomes between first time buyers and 
former homeowners. Since the 1990s, the loan to income ratio for first time buyers 
has steadily increased and it has been very close to former homeowners' level in 
recent years. This raises the possibility that Scotland's first time buyers have found it 
more difficult to buy their homes in recent years than a decade ago. 
3.3.2 Rationing in the Social Rented Sector 
As the aim of social housing is to make affordable homes available to households in 
greatest housing need, the process of obtaining access to the social rented sector is 
, 
e: me 
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very different to the private rented sector or the owner-occupied sector. The access 
constraint to social housing is not the price mechanism but the non-price, 
administrative mechanism. The concept of rationing in the social housing sector is 
different from the common concept applied to the private housing market. Social 
housing rationing can be treated as a positive rationing which sets to help households 
in greatest housing need. That is to say, if households are in low-income, vulnerable 
groups, they would have higher opportunities to enter the social housing sector than 
households with higher income and better socio-economic status. 
In Britain, the gatekeeper of the social housing sector is the allocation system. The 
allocation system applies to new entry tenants registered on the waiting list and to 
existing tenants for rehousing. To a certain extent, the allocation system can be 
viewed as a `bureaucratic rationing' in the social housing sector (Clapham and Kintrea 
1984, Somerville 2001). Studies have criticised that the need-based allocation system 
fails to provide a realistic solution on the conflict between needs and aspirations and 
inevitably disadvantages those who are least able to choose (Clapham and Kintrea 
1986,1991, and Cowan 2001). The recent English Housing Green Paper in 2000 
proposed a reform for the allocation system. The proposal offers a more customer 
choice based letting system, with an emphasis on the supply of proper information to 
applicants to ensure housing choices are well informed (Smith 2000). It is expected 
that the social landlords will move away from entirely needs-based housing allocation 
system to schemes which offer a degree of flexibility and a local base system 
(National Housing Federation 2000). 
In addition to the allocation system, most social landlords have other restrictions on 
households who register on the waiting list or apply for rehousing. Table 3.5 presents 
some restrictions imposed by local authorities and housing associations in Scotland. 
There is a strong feeling that housing associations were more exclusive in their 
policies than local authorities because they do not want `problem tenants' (Scott et al. 
2000). Tenants with rent arrears and people involved in anti-social behaviour are the 
group most restricted by local authorities and housing associations. There are some 
differences between local authorities and housing associations. In addition to the 
above two most restricted groups, local authorities are more likely to have restrictions 
on people living outside the area, probably because of their policy of local connection. 
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Housing associations are more likely to have eligibility restrictions on homeowners . 
and households who were intentionally homeless. There are almost no restrictions on 
tenants of other landlords. 
Table 3.5 Restrictions on Eligibility for Waiting Lists and for Rehousing in Local 
Authorities and Housing Associations in Scotland 
Local Authorities Housing Associations 
Group Restriction on Restriction on Restriction on Restriction on 
waiting lists rehousing waiting lists rehousing 
Home owners 0 6 1 15 
Tenants with rent 15 78 21 59 
arrears 
People living outside 33 13 2 1 
the area 
People responsible 13 39 18 33 
for anti-social 
behaviour 
People prey. evicted 19 59 34 48 
for anti-social behav. 
Households previous. 3 16 7 17 
homeless 
Tenants of other 1 0 0 0 
social landlords 
Source: Scott et al. (2000). 
In contrast to the restrictions on accessing the social rented sector, some types of 
households are more likely to enter the social housing sector. Generally speaking, 
households with socio-economic disadvantages are more likely to enter the social 
housing sector, since the allocation system very often sets priorities for those types of 
households. A survey by Hardin (1997) found that three types of households: single 
adults without children, older persons and lone parents, accounted for the majority of 
new tenants in the Scottish social rented sector. Housing associations had a higher 
proportion of older persons and single adults without children among their new 
tenants than local authorities and Scottish Homes. Local authorities and Scottish 
Homes had a higher proportion of lone parents than housing associations. 
Hardin (1997) also found that an average of 30% of new tenants were unemployed in 
the social rented sector. Scottish Homes had a significant higher proportion of 
unemployed new tenants (39%) than local authorities (27%) and housing associations 
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(28%). Local authorities had a higher proportion of new tenants reported to be long- 
term sick when compared with housing associations and Scottish Homes. 
Furthermore, households who were previously homeless also accounted for an 
important proportion of new social tenants. Local authorities had the highest 
percentage (26%) of new tenants who were previously registered as homeless 
compared with 14% in Scottish Homes and 10% in housing associations. 
3.3.3 Rationing in the Private Rented Sector 
The private rented sector in Scotland is relatively small in size but it remains an 
important part of the housing system, particularly for young people, students, new 
households and those who need to be mobile (Kemp 2000). Access to private renting 
is relatively easy compared to owner-occupation and social renting, however, some 
low-income households have difficulty in entering this sector. Rationing in private 
renting primarily depends upon the rents and the deposit. In addition to rent and 
deposit constraints, there are some rationing conditions, such as the regulated tenancy 
and private landlords' letting preferences, in the Scottish private rented market. 
After the deregulation of private renting on 1 January 1989, most private tenants now 
are either in assured tenancies or new-style short assured tenancies. There are still 
some tenants in regulated tenancies, however, the number of private regulated tenants 
only accounted for a small proportion in the private rented sector. By 1998, about 9% 
of private tenants were in regulated tenancies in England (Wilcox 1999). It is 
estimated that the percentage of Scotland's private regulated tenants could be close to 
England's figures. For tenants in regulated tenancies, many of them are elderly 
people and are on low incomes, paying fair rents, living in old and poor quality 
accommodation, and renting unfurnished housing (Kemp 2000). Since many older 
tenants die or leave this tenancy, this sub-segment of the market has gradually 
declined. 
Moreover, some constraints may come from private landlords. For example, private 
landlords' letting preferences could make it difficult for some households to rent 
accommodation. According to Kemp and Rhodes' (1994) survey of private landlords 
in Scotland, private landlords would most prefer to let to households who are in work 
or self-employed, while they would least prefer to let to unemployed people or 
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students. With regard to private landlords' preferences on household types (see Table 
3.6), 30% of responding landlords would most prefer to let to couples with no children, 
while 36% of respondents would least prefer young single people. There are also 14% 
and 11 % of responding landlords showing their least preferences on lone parents and 
couples with young children respectively. However, there are about one third of 
responding private landlords who do not have any letting preference. 
Table 3.6 Private Landlords' Most and Least Preferred Types of Tenants- 
Household Type 
Most preferred Least Preferred 
No preference 35 29 
Young single people 5 36 
Middle-aged single people 7 1 
Lone parents 0 14 
Couple with no children 30 1 
Couple with young children 8 11 
Couple with older children 8 2 
Elderly people 7 6 
Sample base 401 401 
Source: Kemp and Rhodes (1994). 
In addition to preferences on household types, many private landlords have preferred 
to let to tenants who do not receive Housing Benefit. Kemp and Rhodes (1994) found 
that 67% of private individuals and 51% of agents prefer tenants who are not on 
Housing Benefit. In terms of asking the reasons why landlords prefer to let to tenants 
who are not on Housing Benefits, many landlords experienced that tenants on Housing 
Benefit did not look after the property, they did not always pay the rent and/or spent 
the housing benefit money on other things (ibid. ). 
A recent government policy called `access schemes' aims to help tenants to gain 
access to the private rented sector (Rugg 1995). Access schemes can lower the price 
rationing for low-income tenants or homeless people by way of providing rent in 
advance or deposit guarantees to landlords (Kemp 2000). In England, access schemes 
have shown some successful influences on preventing or alleviating homelessness 
(and hence social exclusion) in a highly cost-effective manner (Randall and Brown 
1994). These schemes have lately been introduced in Scotland, and are expected to 
play a vital role, as they did in England. 
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In summary, this section discusses the rationing conditions in the three main tenure 
sectors in Scotland. For most homebuyers, mortgage finance is the main constraint to 
enter the owner-occupied sector. After the deregulation of the financial market in the 
mid-1980s, mortgage rationing has been focused on the price mechanism. The price 
to income ratio, loan to price ratio and loan to price ratio are the three common criteria 
for many building societies and banks to evaluate mortgage borrowers' liability. To 
some extent, these three criteria can be seen as a rationing index for homebuyers. It is 
noted that these ratios only indicate the possibility of households to be constrained by 
mortgages. In the real world, some households can still obtain a mortgage even if 
they are disqualified by these ratios. In the social rented sector, the allocation system 
acts as the gatekeeper for households applying to this sector. Under the allocation 
system, households with socio-economic disadvantages and with special needs would 
have priority on the waiting list as well as applying for rehousing. Access to private 
renting is relatively easy except for regulated tenancy and some tied housing. 
Rationing in private renting mainly depends upon the rent and deposit. However, 
some types of households such as young single people or households in receipt of 
Housing Benefit may find it difficult to rent a home because of private landlords' 
letting preferences. 
3.4 Help with Housing Costs 
This section discusses housing subsidies to help with housing costs across tenures in 
Scotland. Housing subsidies addressed in this section are the government's 
expenditures on housing subsidy programmes to households and housing suppliers in 
different tenures. 
3.4.1 Housing Subsidies to Owner-Occupiers 
Most housing subsidies to owner-occupiers are through the tax system and are called 
tax expenditures. ' Since the 1990s, the focus of housing subsidies has been switched 
from general subsidies to means tested subsidies. The most significant changes are 
7 Tax expenditure is a means by which the government can encourage particular activities without 
appearing to spend money, and usually by giving a tax allowance, which reduces net tax paid by an 
equal amount. 
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phasing out of mortgage interest tax relief and a growth of expenditures on income 
support for mortgage interest payments. 
3.4.1.1 Mortgage Interest Tax Relief 
Mortgage interest tax relief, known as MIRAS-mortgage interest relief at source 
from 1990, was a general subsidy available to all mortgaged owners and gave 
exemption from paying income tax on any income used to pay the interest payments 
on a mortgage (on the first £30,000 of the mortgage) (Gibb and Munro 1991). In 
Scotland, the cost of MIRAS increased dramatically due to a rapid growth of owner- 
occupation during the late 1980s and reached a peak at £530 millions in 1990/91 (see 
Table 3.7). After that, the cost of MIRAS rapidly reduced due to the government's 
policy to drive the cost down and to phase out this programme gradually. In 
combination with the maximum eligible mortgage of the first £30,000, the British 
goverment also reduced the basic rate of tax relief from 25% in 1988/89 to 10% in 
1998/99 till its end in April 2000. The average tax relief for Scotland's mortgaged 
owners was reduced from its peak of £790 in 1990/91 to £170 in 1998/99. 
Table 3.7 Recipients and Costs of Mortgage Interest Tax Relief in Scotland, 
1988/89-1998/99 







£ per annum) 
UK Average 
tax relief 
£ per annum) 
1988/89 25 370 640 580 585 
1989/90 25 470 660 710 735 
1990/91 25 530 670 790 800 
1991/92 25 420 680 620 630 
1992/93 25 340 700 490 530 
1993/94 25 300 720 420 430 
1994/95 20 260 780 330 340 
1995/96 15 200 830 240 260 
1996/97 15 180 840 210 230 
1997/98 15 200 860 230 250 
1998/99 10 150 870 170 180 
Sources: Wilcox et al. (1998), Wilcox (2000) 
Since the cutback of the basic rate in the 1990s, MIRAS had had less influence on 
house prices, especially in response to lower interest rates in recent years (Wilcox 
1999). Therefore, the abolition of this tax relief from April 2000 would have less 
impact on house prices and on most existing owners' mortgaged costs. The only 
homebuyers likely to face a short-term increase in mortgage costs would be the 
minority with fixed interest rate mortgages (ibid. ). In addition, the abolition of 
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MIRAS could have an impact on low-income homeowners in Scotland and this will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
3.4.1.2 Income Support for Mortgage Interest Payments 
Unlike MIRAS which was available to all mortgaged homeowners, Income Support 
for Mortgage Interest Payments (ISMI) is a means tested subsidy provided to those on 
income support - unemployed, elderly, sick, disabled people and other vulnerable 
groups (Gibb, Munro and Satsangi 1999). In the mid-1990s, the government 
introduced reforms for ISMI, which reduced the mortgage ceiling to £100,000 and 
lengthened the waiting period for new and existing borrowers before they are eligible 
for limited and subsequently full Income Support (ibid. ). Under the new rules 
introduced in October 1995, existing mortgage borrowers who make a new claim for 
ISMI receive no support for 2 months before moving onto 16 weeks of 50 per cent 
support (and full support thereafter), while new mortgage borrowers receive no 
support for 9 months before moving onto 50 per cent support (and a full support only 
after a further 16 weeks) (ibid. ). 




£ Per week £ Per week 
(Great Britain 
1990 14 32.64 34.33 
1991 18 35.33 44.41 
1992 19 32.59 44.02 
1993 22 27.74 41.92 
1994 24 25.51 37.81 
1995 24 28.15 39.16 
1996 23 26.73 36.98 
1997 20 24.27 33.62 
1998 20 28.20 37.16 
1999 19 25.33 32.93 
Source: Wilcox (2000). 
After the economic recession and the rise of unemployment in the early 1990s, the 
number of mortgaged owner-occupiers who claimed ISMI rose significantly. Table 
3.8 shows that the number of ISMI claimants in Scotland reached a peak at 24,000 
persons in 1994 as well as in 1995. The introduction of new rules after October 1995 
had impacts on reducing the number of claimants and the average ISMI. The number 
of ISMI claimants reduced from 24,000 to 19,000 between 1995 and 1999, and the 
average subsidy was also cutback from £28.15 to £25.33 per week during the same 
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period. These new rules may suggest that owner-occupiers will be more vulnerable to 
repossession if they become unemployed in the future. While the intention of these 
changes is to improve work incentives, the effect is still being observed. 
3.4.1.3 Other Tax Exemptions 
Despite the abolished mortgage interest tax relief, homeowners can still benefit from 
some tax exemptions. The most important one is the exemption from capital gains tax. 
Since 1988/89 capital gains tax has been levied on realised gains at the appropriate 
marginal tax rate for income tax on transactions (Hills 1991). Capital gains tax 
applied in the UK is indexed for inflation, and is thus not applied to the full cash 
increases in asset values (ibid. ) Each taxpayer including each married couple from 
1990/91 is allowed his/her first £6,500 (now increased to £7,100 in 1999/00) for 
exemption (Wilcox 2000). 
All these features above have reduced the relative value of owner-occupiers' 
exemption from the tax. Most homeowners are completely exempt and private 
landlords pay capital gains tax at a lower effective rate than their ostensible income 
tax rate (Hills 1991). As a result, capital gains tax exemption on owner-occupied 
housing represents a significant subsidy. However, as it is a tax exemption rather than 
a payment, the subsidy cost is difficult to estimate and it fluctuates considerably, 
depending upon housing market conditions and hence the numbers of homes sold 
(Holmans and Whitehead 1998). The estimated value of capital gains tax exemption 
was £1.4 billion in the UK as a whole in 1998/99 (Wilcox 2000). 
Moreover, owner-occupiers also benefit from imputed rents which are the returns 
generated from their properties or called the values of living in the dwelling. While 
private landlords have been taxed on their income from rents, owner-occupiers' 
imputed rental values are untaxed since 1963 (Hills 1991). Although it could have 
some technical difficulty in taxing imputed rents in the current income tax system, the 
untaxed imputed rental values should be treated as a kind of tax subsidies (in 
economic term) to owner-occupiers, if we see housing subsidies on the basis of tenure 
neutrality (see Hills 1991, Holmans and Whitehead 1998). The measurement of 
untaxed imputed rents as well as the capital gains tax exemption to owner-occupiers in 
Scotland is discussed in Chapter Five. 
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3.4.2 Housing Subsidies to Tenants 
In the current subsidy system, there are several subsidy schemes available to public 
and private tenants. Housing Benefit (HB) is undoubtedly the most important subsidy 
to help with tenants' housing costs. Housing Benefit is a means tested subsidy, so 
applicants must have relatively low incomes to qualify. The current Housing Benefit 
scheme was introduced in 1988, following a rationalisation of the means test 
requirements for different types of benefits. In that year, the means test was made as 
the same as for income support (for unemployed households) and family credit (for 
low-income working households) (Harriott and Matthews 1998). 
Table 3.9 presents Housing Benefit to tenants in Scotland over the last decade. It 
clearly shows that Housing Benefit plays an important role in subsidising tenants in 
terms of the number of claimants and average Housing Benefit. It is undoubtedly the 
case that the local authority rented sector has the highest number of Housing Benefit 
claimants since this sector remains the second largest tenure in Scotland. It was found 
that more than three quarters of new council tenants and about 70% of new housing 
association tenants received full or partial Housing Benefit between 1995 and 1997 
(Hardin 1997, SFHA 1998). Since the 1990s, the number of Housing Benefit 
claimants in council housing has reduced, probably because many council tenant 
claimants have been transferred to the housing association sector under the Large 
Scale Voluntary Transfer scheme. On the other hand, it is partly because the rise in 
incomes and employment or the age cohort effect in council housing. It is noted that 
the number of private tenants in receipt of Housing Benefit has steadily reduced after 
1996, which Wilcox (2000) claims that because of the introduction of local reference 
rent and the single room rent in 1996. The local reference rent and single room rent 
set up the rent ceiling for people who want to claim Housing Benefit in the private 
rented sector. As a result, many private tenants have a restriction of the amount of 
new rent that is eligible for Housing Benefit. 
In Scotland, the average amount of Housing Benefit received by private tenants is 
much higher than social tenants. In 1999, eligible council tenants received an average 
Housing Benefit of £34.4 per week to pay for their rents, which only accounted for 
two third of the amount (£53.9) received by private tenants. This may indicate a big 
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rent gap between social renting and private renting as Housing Benefit usually covers 
partial or full rents. Furthermore the average amount of Housing Benefit received by 
private tenants has been significantly increased in the 1990s, partly because of a rapid 
increase in private rents. In addition, a steady increase in the average Housing Benefit 
to eligible tenants in both the public and the private rented sectors may reflect a fact 
that the benefit recipients have increasingly depended upon the state benefit. 
Table 3.9 Housing Benefit to Tenants in Scotland, 1988-1999 
Number of Recipients (000s) Average Weekly HB (E) 
Year Council HA Private Council HA Private 
tenants tenants tenants tenants tenants tenants 
1988 496 - - 13.76 - - 
1989 478 - - 15.75 - - 
1990 467 - - 17.71 - - 
1991 466 - - 19.87 - - 
1992 461 17 61 22.13 25.40 36.90 
1993 458 28 57 23.79 27.10 41.20 
1994 450 32 68 24.84 31.30 44.00 
1995 434 40 70 26.25 32.90 47.30 
1996 424 54 68 28.60 33.40 51.80 
1997 405 63 65 31.90 34.00 50.30 
1998 388 75 57 32.70 35.80 51.60 
1999 375 80 52 34.40 38.20 53.90 
Sources: Wilcox et al. (1998), Wilcox (1999), (2000). 
Notes: Separate statistics for housing association tenants receiving Housing Benefit 
have only been collected since May 1992. 
All figures are for the May of the year. The early figures probably 
underestimate the number of housing association cases. 
In Scotland, the average amount of Housing Benefit received by council tenants is not 
significantly different from housing association tenants. However, in England, the 
average Housing Benefit received by housing association tenants is much higher than 
the benefit received by council tenants. According to the Department of Social 
Security in 1999, housing association tenants in England received an average Housing 
Benefit of £54.6 per week compared to £40 for council tenants. In the same year, 
housing association tenants in Scotland received an average of £38.2 per week 
compared to £34.2 per week for council tenants. This reflects different rent levels and 
the different developments of the housing association sector between England and 
Scotland. While the rent level and the development of the housing association sector 
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in England have gradually caught up with the private rented sector, Scottish housing 
associations still retain a close relationship with the local authority rented sector. 
In addition to Housing Benefit subsidy to tenants, social tenants also benefit from the 
below market rent subsidies if we treat housing subsidies on the basis of tenure 
neutrality. Private regulated tenants also benefit from below market fair rent subsidies 
under the concept of tenure neutrality. However, it is difficult to measure these 
subsidies in real terms. The measurement of below market rent subsidies to social 
tenants and private regulated tenants is discussed in Chapter Five. 
3.4.3 Housing Subsidies to Social Housing Suppliers 
Housing subsidies to social landlords can primarily be divided into general subsidies 
to local authority dwellings and capital grants to housing associations. 
3.4.3.1 General Subsidies to Local Authority Dwellings 
The central government's general subsidies to local authorities are to reduce the cost 
of local authority rented dwellings. These subsidies primarily go into the Housing 
Revenue Account (HRA). The 1989 Housing Act introduced a new financial regime 
to local authorities in England and Wales (activated from 1990/9 1) which gives more 
controlling power to local authorities over their rents and expenditures on their 
dwellings (Gibb, Munro and Satsangi 1999). On the other hand, central government 
withdrew general subsidies to local authority dwellings. The gap due to the subsidy 
cutback was bridged by local authorities' revenue income primarily through 
increasing council rents. Therefore we have seen a sharp reduction in central 
government's general subsidies (though exchequer subsidy and rate fund transfer) in 
England and Wales, specifically subsidies have become negative (refund from local 
authorities' revenue account) after 1994/95 (see Table 3.10). 
However, the new financial regime for local authorities did not apply to Scottish local 
authorities. In Scotland, there has been no reform for the local authority financial 
regime to date. The Scottish local authority financial system currently operating bears 
more similarity to the English system of the 1980s than that of the 1990s (Gibb, 
Munro and Satsangi 1999). The central government continued to provide a large 
amount of funding to subsidise Scottish council dwellings. Even though the central 
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government's general subsidies have rapidly reduced since mid-1990, these subsidies 
still remained positive subsidies (expenditures) in Scotland rather than negative 
subsidies (refund) in England. By 1999/2000, Scottish local authorities received £11 
million from the central government to subsidise their dwellings compared to -£960 
millions to English local authorities. 
Table 3.10 General Subsidies to Local Authority Housing in Scotland, Compared 
to England, 1988/89-1999/00 
(Em) 
Scotland England 
Year Exchequer Rate fund Total net Exchequer Rate fund Total net 
subsidy transfer subsidy subsidy transfer subsidy 
1988/89 55 25 80 535 309 844 
1989/90 65 10 76 636 83 719 
1990/91 58 8 67 1,156 -19 1,137 1991/92 56 -1 55 873 -19 852 
1992/93 47 -1 47 508 -25 483 1993/94 36 -2 34 121 -17 104 
1994/95 24 -2 23 -108 -19 -127 
1995/96 22 -3 19 -408 -28 -436 1996/97 19 -2 17 -481 -44 -525 
1997/98 16 0 16 -563 -47 -610 
1998/99 13 0 13 -740 -65 -805 
1999/00 11 0 11 -884 -76 -960 
Source: Wilcox (2000) 
3.4.3.2 Subsidies to Housing Associations 
Subsidies to housing associations are mainly through capital funding. The most 
important capital grant to housing associations is known as the housing association 
grant (HAG) in Scotland (now called the Social Housing Grant in England and Wales 
following the 1996 Housing Act). The Housing Act 1988 and Housing (Scotland) Act 
1988 introduced a new financial regime to housing associations. Under the new 
regime, the amount of HAG is determined before the housing association scheme 
development, and would not cover the over-run costs. The grant rate also is set up as 
a fixed percentage of the development costs. In other words, housing associations 
need to manage risks in their schemes and need to seek private funds to bridge the gap 
between the public funds and the operating costs (Best 1997). 
In Scotland, housing associations registered with Scottish Homes are eligible for 
applying Housing Association Grant. Housing associations usually bid for HAG on 
the basis of costs against agreed limits for certain types of development and an 
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acceptable rent level (Gibb et al. 1999). The capital funds need to be scrutinised by 
Scottish Homes, and the amount of scrutiny is based on housing associations' 
performance and regulation ratings (ibid. ). Then the rest of the capital cost for 
housing associations' development scheme needs to be raised from private financial 
institutions, such as banks and building societies. In England, housing associations 
registered with Housing Corporation are eligible for Social Housing Grant. The 
process for housing associations' bidding for SHG is similar to Scotland, except for 
some small housing associations and associations located south of the border (ibid. ). 
Table 3.11 Capital Grants to Housing Associations in Scotland, Compared to 
England, 1989/90-1998/99 
Scotland England 
Year Programme Grant rate Programme Grant rate 
£m % £m % 
1989/90 203 - 1,034 75 
1990/91 195 - 1,234 75 
1991/92 220 - 1,732 73 
1992/93 255 85 2,369 72 
1993/94 263 84 1,843 67 
1994/95 268 81 1,530 62 
1995/96 279 79 1,183 58 
1996/97 256 74 1,068 56 
1997/98 174 70 702 56 
1998/99 165 66 621 54 
Sources: Wilcox et al. (1998), Wilcox (2000). 
Notes: Consistent Scottish figures for the year to 1991/92 are not available. 
In Scotland no separate HAG rent figures exist before 1992. 
In order that housing associations can be self-sufficient in their development schemes, 
the HAG (and SHG) rate has reduced annually since 1990s. Between 1992/93 and 
1998/99, the target HAG rate was reduced from 85% to 66% in Scotland and from 
72% to 54% in England, thus the capital funding has been sharply cut back in both 
countries (see Table 3.11). In other words, many Scottish housing associations 
needed to borrow one third of capital costs from the private sector in 1998/99. To 
cover rising private loans, many housing associations have increased their rents, and 
this may explain why there has been a rapid increase in housing association rents in 
the 1990s. 
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3.4.4 Subsidies to Private Housing Suppliers 
The government's subsidies to private housing providers have primarily depended 
upon tax incentives and capital grants. In Scotland, two main subsidies have been 
provided to private housing suppliers to help with their rented dwellings over the last 
decade. These two subsidy schemes are the Business Expansion Scheme (BES) and 
Grants for Rent and Ownership (GRO). 
The Business Expansion Scheme was originally set up to help new manufacturing 
companies to raise venture capital. From 1988 to 1993, the BES was extended to 
unquoted companies letting assured tenancies, thus providing tax incentives for 
individuals to buy shares in companies letting in the newly deregulated market (Crook 
and Kemp , 
1996). Under the BES, assured tenancy companies can raise up to £5 
million in a tax year. Individuals who buy shares in these assured tenancy companies 
can get income tax relief up to £40,000 in any one tax year and are eligible for capital 
gains tax relief on any chargeable real gains arising from the disposal of their shares in 
the future (ibid. ). The BES also has regulations for shareholders as well as assured 
tenancy companies. Shareholders must hold their shares for at least five years and the 
companies must let on assured tenancies for at least four years (ibid. ). Between 1988 
and 1993, there were £119 million invested in BES assured tenancy companies in 
Scotland (Wilcox et al. 1998). 
GRO grant, introduced in 1990, is a deficit subsidy for private operating in Scotland 
and the grant is available through Scottish Homes that has no parallel in England. 
GRO grant is designed to provide private builders with a secured and pre-determined 
rate of return on agreed projects so that they will build in areas that they would not 
otherwise consider to be attractive (Gibb, Istephan and Kemp 1997). In other words, 
the grant is used to correct problems of market failure in declining areas. The grants 
are mainly used to support three types of projects (Munro and Gibb 1996, p. 100): 
" In rural areas, where speculative building has been seen as too risky or as 
too costly; 
" To provide low-cost housing in pressured market areas where new houses 
are generally beyond the reach of lower income purchases; 
" To contribute towards tenure diversification in large estates and renewal in 
urban areas, through either new-build or rehabilitation. 
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The GRO grant for market rented housing is now discontinued. The grant for owner- 
occupation has been suspended. Between 1990/91 and 1995/96, Scottish Homes 
funded 211 projects (2,126 dwellings) for market rented sector through the GRO grant 
(Gibb, Istephan and Kemp 1997). 
3.4.5 A Comparison of Housing Subsidies across Tenures 
A review of public expenditures on housing subsidies in the 1990s shows a clear 
picture of a reduction in fiscal support for general subsidies but a large increase in 
means tested assistance towards housing costs, principally in the form of Housing 
Benefit and also through income support for mortgage interest payments. These 
changes have significantly influenced housing subsidies to households across tenures 
in Scotland (see Figure 3.7). 
Due to a diminishing mortgage interest tax relief, the average amount of subsidies to 
owner-occupiers have been sharply reduced. Meanwhile income support help with 
mortgage interest payments has fallen since the mid-1990s. This has been partly the 
result of falling unemployment and interest rates, and partly due to the new 
restrictions to ISMI introduced in October 1995 (Wilcox 1999). On the contrary, the 
cost of Housing Benefit to council tenants and private tenants has steadily increased. 
In particular, the growth rate of Housing Benefit to private tenants was faster than that 
to council tenants. This is partly a result of a rapid increase in private rents in recent 
years. In 1997 and 1998, average subsidies (mainly ISMI) to owner-occupiers were 
lower than to council tenants in receipt of Housing Benefit, let alone the higher 
Housing Benefits received by private tenants. For example, in 1998, eligible owner- 
occupiers received average subsidies £31.5 per week (£28.2 from ISMI) compared to 
£32.7 and £51.6 per week of Housing Benefit to eligible council tenants and private 
tenants respectively. However, one should note that the number of ISMI claimants 
only accounted for a very small proportion (2% in 1998) of total mortgaged 
homeowners compared to more than half of social tenants and one third of private 
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Figure 3.7 Housing Subsidies to Households across Tenures, 1990-1998 
Sources: Wilcox et al. (1998), Wilcox (2000) 
Notes: MIRAS: mortgage interest relief at source; ISMI: income support for mortgage 
interest; HB: Housing Benefit 
Moreover, the housing subsidies presented above are the government expenditures 
direct to households to reduce their housing costs. To some extent, these subsidies 
can be called cash-flow subsidies, as Hancock and Munro (1992) suggest. In a 
discussion of the distributional effect of housing subsidies between tenures, studies 
have emphasised economic subsidies rather than cash flow subsidies (see for example 
Rosenthal 1977, Robinson 1981, Hills 1991, Maclennan, Gibb and More 1991, and 
Hancock and Munro 1992). As Hills suggests, economic subsidies to owner- 
occupiers consist of capital gains tax exemption and untaxed imputed rents. For social 
tenants, economic subsidies include the below market rent subsidies. The concept of 
economic subsidies is used in this thesis to model the subsidy effect on households' 
tenure decisions. As O'Sullivan (1984) suggests, the definition of formal subsidy (or 
called economic subsidy in this thesis) is theoretically more acceptable, and the 
measures of (economic) subsidy have more effective impacts on housing finance 
system. Also, these measures are consistent with household reallocation decisions as 
well as tenure shift. The distributional effect of economic subsidies as well as cash 
now subsidies between tenures will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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3.5 Summary 
Over the last two decades, housing in Scotland has developed in a different pattern 
from housing in the rest of Great Britain, and this has been shown in different tenure 
structure and housing market conditions. The growth of owner-occupied housing in 
Scotland is significantly faster than in England and Wales. The historical importance 
of Scotland's public rented sector is greater than the other two countries. Housing 
associations in Scotland are relatively young and small in size compared to housing 
associations in England. Scotland's share of private renting dwellings to the total 
housing stock is the lowest among the three nations, and there is a substantial number 
of private unfurnished and tied housing located in rural Scotland. 
The change in tenure pattern in Scotland has influenced its housing market. Unlike 
the housing market in England and Wales, which suffered a great fluctuation during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Scottish housing market had much greater stability. 
We have seen a steady growth of private new house building over the last two decades. 
A stable economy and continuously growing demand for owner-occupied housing 
have led the Scottish housing market to be less fluctuating than the housing markets in 
England and Wales. House prices in Scotland grew steadily and housing transactions 
remained more stable than in the other two countries. 
In addition, there are some rationing factors which influence households' tenure 
preferences and housing market conditions. In the owner-occupied sector, mortgage 
finance is the main constraint for most homebuyers. After deregulation of the 
financial market, the mortgage rationing has been focused on price mechanism. The 
price to income ratio, loan to price ratio and loan to income ratio are the three 
common criteria for building societies and banks to evaluate mortgage borrowers' 
liability. Since Scotland has a stable housing market, these three ratios have been less 
fluctuating than those in the rest of the UK. The allocation system acts as the 
gatekeeper of the social rented sector. Scotland's social housing allocation system 
presents its unique characteristics to mainly house people with socio-economic 
disadvantages and in special needs. Rationing in the private rented sector mainly 
depends upon the rent and deposit. However, due to some private landlords' certain 
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letting preferences, young and single people or households in receipt of Housing 
Benefit may have difficulty in renting a home in Scotland. 
Housing subsidies also play an important role in the changes in tenure mix and 
housing market conditions. There has been a switch of the government's housing 
subsidy policy from general subsidies to means tested subsidies in the last decades. 
The most significant changes have been the phasing out mortgage interest tax relief 
and a rapid increase in Housing Benefit expenditures. In Scotland, the average 
Housing Benefit to social tenants was higher than the average mortgage interest tax 
relief and income support for mortgage payments to owner-occupiers in recent years. 
The unique financial system in the Scottish social rented sector also continues to 
benefit social tenants. It is noted that the use of economic subsidies rather than cash 
flow subsidies is more appropriate in estimating the household's tenure decision as 
well as the distributional effect of housing subsidies between tenures. 
The discussions above provide us with an analysis of the Scottish tenure structure and 
the housing market conditions which differ from the rest of Great Britain. These 
unique characteristics in the Scottish housing market should help to construct the 
explanatory variables of the tenure choice models in Chapter Five. In particular, the 
three mortgage ratios can be used to construct the mortgage rationing variable; the 
criteria of the allocation system can apply to the social housing rationing variable in 
the tenure choice models. In economic terms, housing subsidies are more suitable in 
estimating the housing subsidy effect on households' tenure choice behaviour than, 
housing subsidies in cash terms. Moreover, the analysis of Scottish tenure patterns 
and the housing market conditions in this chapter can provide some expectations to 
the estimation results of Scottish households' tenure choice behaviour as discussed in 
Chapter Six and also to the outcome of policy analysis derived from the 1996 Scottish 
House Condition Survey covered in Chapter Seven. Further chapters will focus on 
tenure choice model development, data and variables applied to the tenure choice 
models and an analysis of the model results. 
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CHAPTER FOUR TENURE CHOICE MODELS 
In this chapter, two models with different structures are developed in order to estimate 
the household's tenure choice behaviour. The first model discusses a one-level choice 
model analysing the household's tenure choice and its determining factors. The 
second model consists of a hierarchical choice structure to estimate the household's 
move-stay decision and tenure choice. This chapter is organised into three sections. 
The first section discusses the one-level choice model of tenure choice. The second 
section is the hierarchical choice model of mobility and tenure choice, and a brief 
summary forms the last section. 
4.1 The Model of Tenure Choice 
As discussed in chapter two, tenure choice theory is derived from the theories of 
consumer choice and housing demand. The structure of the tenure choice model in 
this chapter is based on a consumer choice and housing demand model. The first part 
of this section discusses the theoretical framework of the tenure choice model. The 
multiple tenure choice function is then derived and, finally, a multinomial logit 
functional form is selected to estimate household tenure choice behaviour 
4.1.1 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of the tenure choice model is illustrated in Figure 4.1. In 
this structure, a household's housing demand decision and its tenure choice are 
interdependent, which has been discussed in detail in Chapter Two. More attention 
will be paid to tenure choice in this chapter. The choice of tenure in Britain can 
simply be classified into three main groups: owner-occupation, social renting, and 
private renting. 
The household's tenure choice is influenced by a variety of factors. Summarised from 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three, this framework suggests that a household's tenure 
decision is influenced by the household's socio-economic characteristics, expected 
mobility, previous tenure status, location, neighbourhood quality, the user cost of 
capital, housing subsidies and rationing factors. The household's socio-economic 
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characteristics generally include the household head's age, sex, marital status, 
employment, income and also the size of household. The user cost of capital is the 
relative cost of owning or renting. Moreover, in Britain the household's tenure choice 
is deeply influenced by housing policy and subsidy programmes. For example, 
income related assistance would change households' housing costs and their budget 
constraints, thus altering their tenure decisions. The detailed measurement of these 




Housing Policy age, sex, marital, 
and Subsidy size, income, 
employment 
" Household's IIE 
The User Tenure HH's Exp 
Cost of Capital 4--ý Decision mobility, Prev 
tenure, Location, 
Neigh. quality JIL 
Mortgage ®\ Admin. 
Rationing Constraints 
Owner- Social Private 
Occupation Renting Renting 
Figure 4.1 The Structure of the Tenure Choice Model 
In addition to those factors, households could face some constraints in accessing 
different tenures. As discussed in previous chapters, mortgage rationing factors, for 
example the loan-to-value ratio, the loan-to-income ratio and price-to-income ratio 
imposed by banks and building societies, are the most common constraints to 
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homebuyers in Britain. Administrative rationing factors, such as the waiting list and 
the allocation schemes applied in the social rented sector, constrain some household's 
ability to access this sector. As stated in Chapter Three, the allocation system in the 
social rented sector is to encourage households in low-income and in special needs to 
have more opportunities to live in affordable homes. In certain contexts, 
administrative rationing does set priorities to limit some households' access to social 
housing. Compared to owner-occupation and social renting, households are less 
constrained to enter or leave the private rented sector, except for the rent and deposit 
constraints. In Britain, the private rented sector plays an important transitional role 
between owner-occupation and social renting. 
4.1.2 Tenure Choice Function 
Based on the model framework, the tenure choice function is derived from a standard 
housing demand function. Thus tenure choice can be seen as a function of a vector of 
determining variables, as expressed in equation (1). 
Ti = [H, M, C, S, PT, L, N, R] (1) 
where T denotes choice for tenure j; H is household characteristics; M is household's 
expected mobility; C is the user cost of capital; S is housing subsidy, PT is previous 
tenure status, L is location, N is neighbourhood quality and R is the rationing factor. 
Further, the tenure choice function is assumed to satisfy the principle of consumer 
choice behaviour so that a household chooses a tenure alternative in that the level of 
utility derived from the choice is maximised subject to budget constraints. The 
maximum utility function for household i choosing tenure j is expressed as: 
Ui, =V [H, M, C, S, PT, L, N, R]+E (2) 
=V';; +Eli (3) 
where V *U is the deterministic component of the utility of household i choosing tenure 
j alternative, and si is an error term. The model of tenure choice is formulated on the 
basis of equation (3). 
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Then, based on the random utility function, the probability of a household i choosing 
tenure alternative j can be expressed as: 
Pu = Pr(U. > Uj 
for i# J', j, j'E J 
(4) 
Where, j andj'=l,... J. J denotes the set of alternatives available to household i. In 
this case J=3, denoting three main tenures. 
Substitution of equation (3) into equation (4) yields: 
P =, 
)4V, +su > vi, +Eý, ) 
=Prsiý, <v +E; y -r' . (5) 
Subject to the logical condition assuming that the sum of all J choice probabilities 
J 
should be exactly equal to 1, denoting as P, =1. 
The actual calculation of the choice probabilities depends heavily upon the 
assumption of the probability distribution of the error term E, (Maddala 1983). Based 
on above conditions, it is necessary to find a suitable discrete choice model in order to 
analyse the multiple tenure choice function. 
4.1.3 The Discrete Choice Model 
The model of tenure choice in this chapter contains a multiple-choice function and 
also the choice for tenure is a discrete choice rather than a continuous choice. 
Therefore, a discrete choice model is employed to estimate the probability of a 
household choosing a tenure alternative among three tenures. The model selection 
and the derivation of model functional form and the test of independence of irrelevant 
alternative property are discussed below. 
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4.1.3.1 The Selection of Discrete Choice Model 
As stated in Chapter Two, a wide range of discrete choice models have been 
developed to estimate tenure choice behaviour during the past two decades. Among 
discrete choice models, the multinomial logit model (MNL), the multinomial probit 
model (MNP), and the nested multinomial logit model (NMNL) are the most widely 
used models in housing decision and tenure choice analysis, as discussed in Chapter 
Two. Among these three types of models, the MNL model provides a convenient 
simple form for the probabilities without any requirement of multivariate integration. 
Furthermore, the likelihood function for the multinomial logit specification is globally 
concave, which allows for an easy computation (McFadden 1973). Because of its 
simple structure, the interpretation of the MNL model is more straightforward than the 
NMNL model and the MNP model. 
However, the MNL model has a widely known limitation which regards the violation 
of independence from irrelevant alternative (IIA) property. According to Hausman 
and McFadden (1984), the IIA property states that "the ratio of the probabilities of 
choosing any two alternatives is independent of the attributes of any other alternatives 
in the choice set" (p. 1219). Many housing researchers have pointed out that the IIA 
property can easily be violated in the MNL model of housing choice (see for example, 
Boehm 1982, Quigley 1985, Bursch-Supan and Pitkin 1988, and Tu and Goldfinch 
1996). They indicate that in the housing choice analysis, the relative probability of a 
buyer choosing two dwelling alternatives might be influenced by the existence of the 
third dwelling, and thus it violates the IIA property of using the MNL model. 
The multinomial probit (MNP) model is an alternative model which satisfies the IIA 
assumption. But the use of the MNP model has been limited due to the requirement 
that multivariate normal integrals must be evaluated to estimate the unknown 
parameters (Hausman and McFadden 1984). Because of its complexity, the MNP 
model does not provide a specification test as convenient as the MNL model. Another 
model maintaining the IIA property is the nested multinomial logit model (NMNL), 
which has been widely applied to many housing choice studies (see Quigley 1985, 
Börsch-Supan and Pitkin 1988, Tu and Goldfinch 1996). The NMNL model requires 
an assumption of a hierarchy level (two or more levels) of choice alternatives, which 
is only suitable for a model with a hierarchical choice framework. 
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In this chapter, the first model of tenure choice aims to interpret the household's 
choice behaviour among three tenures. Thus this model contains a one-level choice 
framework and it does not require an assumption of hierarchical choices. As a result, 
the multinomial logit model is suitable for the first model of tenure choice. However, 
this model needs to overcome the IIA problem. 
4.1.3.2 Multinomial Logit Model Functional form 
The functional form of the multinomial logit model can be derived on the basis of 
equation (5). According to Maddala (1983), if the residuals e are identically and 
independently distributed, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of is 
expressed as: 
F(, 6, <. a. ) = exp(- E') (6) 
the probability density function (PDF) is as: 
(E, ý) = exp(-Eli -eEir 
) 
ýýý 
Then equation (5) can be written as: 
Py =PI(Eý, <Ey +Vy -V, ) for all j 
= 
fflF(c, 
+Vd -VV, ) "f (Ej)deij (8) 
where F(") and f (") are given by equation (6) and (7), respectively. Now 
fJF(e, +Vy -J, )-f(Ey)=JJexpE-e-6'-v1+yll)exp(-c, -e7"') 
j'#I . i'#J 
V. 0 
=ex E, ý -e 
ýy 1+Zepy (9) 
p# fe 
If we let 
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J 
eY 4 =1 l+ýey =1 ý4 y 
then equation (8) can be expressed as: 
Pi =f exp( e-e 
(--l- l)ýeu 








where 6 *y =6u -A; ý 
(io) 
(11) 
Equation (11) is the general functional form of the MNL model. Where, VV is a vector 
of explanatory variables describing tenure choice and J represents all tenure choice 
alternatives. In this thesis, J=3 denoting three tenures. Equation (11) is interpreted 
as the probability of household i when faced with J choice set with V vector of 
explanatory variables, will choose j tenure alternative. 
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where Xk denotes a variable of kth attribute specific to household i, and /3k is a 






k j'=1 k 
for all j j'=1... J. 
The log likelihood method is employed to estimate the multinomial logit model as 
presented in equation (15). According to Greene (2000), the log likelihood function 
can be derived by defining, for each household, dy 1 if tenure alternative j is chosen 
by household i, and di =O if not, for the J+1 possible outcomes. Then, for each i, one 
and only one of the d, 's is one. 
J 
1nL = ZEdy 1nP 
i j=0 








forj=l,.. J (16) 
The second derivative matrix has Y blocks, each K by K. 
a21nL 
-E [ (j ) ]ý ' (17) afliafl, i=l 
where 16=1) equals 1 if j equals 1 and 0 if not. 
4.1.3.3 Testing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternative Property 
The functional form of the MNL model implies the necessary and sufficient 
characterisation, termed the independence of irrelevant alternative property, which 
means that the ratio of probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of 
the attributes or the availability of a third alternatives, presented as follows: (Hausman 
and McFadden 1984) 
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P(il z, C, ß) =P(il z, S, Q)P(sl z, C, ß) (18) 
where iEScC and 
P(S z, C, ß) = 1: P(. jlz, C, ß) (19) 
JEA 
where C= {1.... } is a full choice set; S is a subset of C; i j, are alternatives in C; z is a 
K-vector of explanatory variables describing tenure choice; ß is aK -vector parameters 
to be estimated. 
With respect to testing the IIA property, Hausman and McFadden (1984) suggest an 
alternative specification-error test for the 11A property. They indicate: 
If a subset of the choice set truly is irrelevant, omitting it from the 
model altogether will not change parameter estimates systematically. 
Inclusion of these choices will be inefficient but will not lead to 
inconsistency. But the remaining odds ratios are not truly independent 
of these alternatives, the parameter estimates obtained when these 
choices are eliminated will be inconsistent (quoted from Greene 2000, p. 
865) 
Greene (2000) states that assuming c is the full choice set, and s is a proper subset of c. 
Let j6, be the parameter estimate obtained by maximum likelihood estimation on the 
full choice set c, and V, denotes the estimate covariance matrix. Let 8, and V, be the 
corresponding estimates for maximum likelihood estimation applied to the restricted 
A 
choice set s. Under the null hypothesis that the IIA property holds, / -, ß, is a 
consistent estimator of zero. Under the alternative specification where the IIA fails, it 
is not zero. Under the null hypothesis, has an estimated covariance matrix 
V, 
- 
V,. Thus, the statistic is: 
2 (/ AAAAjAA 






The statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with degree of freedom equal 
to the rank of V, - 
V,. 
Another specification test of IIA property suggested by Hausman and McFadden is to 
apply the nested logit model (currently called nested multinomial logit model). The 
nested multinomial logit model provides an optimal test procedure for 1IA property. 
Studies like Hausman-McFadden (1984) and Quigley (1985) indicate that the 
parameter of inclusive values can be used to test the IIA property in the nested 
multinomial logit model. The test of IIA property in the nested multinomial logit 
model will be discussed in the next section. 
In summary, this section introduces a model to analyse the household's tenure choice 
behaviour. In Britain, the household's tenure choice can be simply classified into 
three alternatives: owner-occupation, social renting and private renting. Based on this 
structure, a multinomial logit model is employed to estimate the multiple tenure 
choice function. The multinomial logit model provides a simple functional form and 
allows for easy computation. Because of its simple structure, the interpretation of the 
multinomial logit model is more straightforward than other discrete choice models. 
As a result, the multinomial logit model is suitable for the first model to directly 
interpret the influence of the determinants on tenure choice. However, the 
multinomial logit model has its weakness in terms of violating the 11A assumption. 
Therefore, the multinomial logit functional form of tenure choice model needs to be 
improved. A model with more complex functional form than the MNL model is 
introduced in the following section. 
4.2 The Model of Mobility and Tenure Choice 
As an improvement of the first model, the second model provides a decision tree to 
analyse the household's tenure choice behaviour given its moving/stay decision. The 
theoretical framework, the hierarchical level of mobility and tenure choice function 
and the selection of the hierarchical choice model and its functional form are 
discussed in turn. 
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4.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the relationship between the household's decision to 
move and the choice of tenure is interdependent. Some studies have suggested that 
the household's mobility decision and tenure choice is a joint choice (see for example 
Boehm 1981, Zorn 1988, Ioannides and Kan 1996). Some applied a hierarchical 
choice function to estimate the mobility decision and tenure choice (see Clark and 
Onaka 1985, Deurloo, Dieleman and Clark 1987). This chapter assumes that a 
household's mobility decision and tenure choice can be seen as a hierarchical choice 
function. The structure of the mobility decision and tenure choice is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. In this framework, a household's mobility decision and tenure choice can 
be divided into two levels. The upper level is the household's decision to move or 
stay; the lower level is the choice for three alternative tenures, and the stay. It is noted 
that the stay in the lower level is a degenerated branch from the upper level. 
The household's mobility decision is influenced by a variety of factors. Summarised 
from Chapter Two, housing dissatisfaction is one of the most important factors 
triggering households to move (Clark and Onaka 1985). For many households, the 
housing dissatisfaction may come from their dissatisfaction with housing and 
neighbourhood quality. Households in different life-cycle stages would have different 
housing demand, thus triggering them to move and sometime to change their tenure 
status (Clark and Dieleman 1996). As a result, this thesis assumes that, from a cross- 
sectional perspective, households' socio-economic characteristics, such as age, sex, 
marital status, household size, income and employment status, as well as 
neighbourhood quality have important effects on households' likeliness to move or 
stay. Furthermore, as stated in Chapter Two, searching and moving costs are also 
important factors while households consider moving. However, searching and 
moving costs to some degree are difficult to identify from housing costs. Again, the 
detailed measurement of variables affecting mobility and tenure choice will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
With respect to the tenure choice level, this framework assumes that a household's 
choice for a tenure alternative is made following its decision to move. This shows that 
the decision to move and the choice of a tenure alternative are interrelated. In other 
words, the variables influencing mobility decisions are interrelated with the variables 
102 
of tenure choice. In this model, the variables affecting households' tenure choice are 
the same as the first model which not only includes the household socio-economic 
characteristics but also includes the housing and neighbourhood attributes such as 
location, dwelling type, and neighbourhood quality. More importantly, housing 
subsidy and rationing effects will be examined in this model. It is assumed that some 
variables could affect both the decision to move and the choice of tenure, and this will 
be examined in the later chapters. 
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4.2.2 Mobility and Tenure Choice Function 
It is assumed that the household's mobility and tenure decision is derived from the 
housing demand function. Thus the utility function of mobility and tenure choice is 
presented in equation (21). 
UU =V[M, T]+Ec (21) 
where U. denotes the total utility for a household to choose moving and choose 
alternative tenure j; V is the measurable utility function; M is a vector of variables to 
determine household's mobility; T is a vector of variables to determine tenure choice; 
sJ is an error term. 
However, the total utility function in equation (21) does not exactly express the 
hierarchical relationship between mobility decision and tenure choice, as shown in 
Figure 4.2. In order to express the hierarchical choice function, the total utility of 
mobility and tenure choice in equation (21) can be separated into two utility functions, 
as: 
Uy' = Uik +Uin (22) 
where U; 1 _ 
V[ M] + 9tik (23) 
Ufn =VLTJ+ Pin (24) 
Where k denotes a choice whether to move or stay, n denotes a choice of tenure 
alternative, M and T are the same as in equation (21), zc and cp are error terms. The 
model of mobility and tenure choice is formulated on the basis of equation (23) and 
equation (24). 
Based on a random utility function, the probabilities of a household i choosing to 
move/stay and choosing a tenure alternative can be expressed as: 
Pik = Pr(Uik > U; k, 
) for all k; -*, k and k' eK (25) 
Pn = Pr(U1, > Ui,,. 
) for all men, n and We N (26) 
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where K denotes a set of mobility decision; N denotes a set of tenure choice. 
4.2.3 Hierarchical Choice Model 
The model contains a two-level decision tree, thus a hierarchical choice model is 
employed to estimate the probability of the household's move/stay decision and tenure 
choice. The selection of the hierarchical model, the derivation of the model functional 
form and the test of independence from irrelevant alternative property are discussed as 
follows. 
4.2.3.1 The Selection of Hierarchical Choice Model 
Among hierarchical choice models, the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model has 
been widely applied to housing choice study, as discussed in Chapter Two. Compared 
with the multinomial logit model, the nested multinomial logit model does not need an 
assumption about the error terms, which allows the nested multinomial logit model to 
have a variety of applications (Tu 1994). Maddala (1983) indicates that the nested 
multinomial logit model can be derived from the assumption that the residuals (or 
error terms) have a generalised extreme-value distribution. Therefore, the NMNL 
model allows for a general pattern of dependence among the choices and avoids the 
problem of the 11A property that occurred in the MNL model. In simple terms, the 
NM1VL model contains two or more levels of choice sets and the choices between 
different levels or between different branches within the same level are independent 
from other alternatives, and thus satisfying the IIA property. Referring to our model, 
the choice to stay and the choice of tenure alternatives are independent and irrelevant, 
and therefore satisfy the IIA property. On the other hand, it is necessary to test the 
HA property for the choice among three tenures. 
However, one critical weakness of the NMNL model is that the structure contains a 
strong assumption in terms of the hierarchical choice level. For instance, Zorn (1988) 
and Ioannides and Kan (1996) have argued that a household's mobility decision and 
tenure choice is made simultaneously rather than a hierarchical choice set. Therefore, 
it should be noted that the hierarchical framework of mobility decision and tenure 
choice is just an analytical device that reflects the relative degree of similarity among 
choice alternatives (Fischer and Aufhauser 1988). 
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4.2.3.2 The Nested Multinomial Logit Model Functional Form 
The nested multinomial logit model functional form is derived on the basis of 
equation (23) and (24), and these two equations can be rewritten as: 
Unk = Vnk + Cnk (27) 
where Uk denotes the utility for a household's decision to move or stay (k) and to 
chose a tenure alternative (n); Vk is a function of all the measurable characteristics 
and e is an error term. According to Greene (2000), if it is assumed that s,, k is 
independently and identically distributed with CDF given in equation (6) and (7), then 
the probability for a household choosing to move/stay (k) and choosing a tenure 
alternative (n) is expressed as: 
K Nk 
Pnk = eV^k 1: 1: eV^k 
k=1 n=t 
(28) 
where K and N denote a set of mobility decisions and a set of tenure choices, 
respectively. Equation (28) is the general functional form of the nested multinomial 
logit model of mobility and tenure choice. 
Further, it is assumed that 
1nk xnk + ayk (29) 
where Xnk denotes a vector of observed attributes that vary with both mobility and 
tenure choice; yk is a vector of attributes that vary only with mobility; a' and 8' are 
vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
It can be written 
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The inclusive value for the kth branch is defined as: 
Nk 
Ik =In E epx^& 
n=1 
Then, after cancelling terms and using this result, the equation (30) follows as: 
P= eJPX elk n/k 
K 







where Tk is the parameter to be estimated in the inclusive value. Greene (2000) 
indicates that rk equals to one, the NMNL model reduces to the MNL model. The 
NLML model arises if 0< Tk <1. In fact, the parameter Tk can be used to test the IIA 
property and this will be discussed in the next part of this section. 
With respect to the estimation method, the full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML) method is a better approach to estimate the nested multinomial logit model. 
As Greene (2000) indicates, in the FIML estimation, the entire NMNL model is 
estimated in a single pass instead of a two-step estimation. The joint, full-information 
maximum likelihood approach is more efficient than the two-step, limited information 
maximum likelihood approach. The FIML estimates are obtained by maximising the 
full log likelihood for the NMNL model. The log likelihood is: 
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In L= Et 1n Pnk = j:, 1n Pn, k + 1n Pk (34) 
4.2.3.3 Testing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternative Property 
There are two methods to test the IIA property in the nested multinomial logit model. 
The first method is to apply the Hausman-McFadden's statistic of the IIA property, as 
shown in equation (20). In the model of mobility and tenure choice, the inclusive 
value parameter tir is fixed equal to one in the stay branch(shown in equation (33)), 
then the nested multinomial logit form would reduce to multinomial logit form (or so 
called condition logit form in Greene (2000)). Then the Hausman-McFadden's 
statistic can apply to test the lIA property in the tenure choice branch. This method is 
an alternative way to test the 1TA property in the MNL model of tenure choice. 
The second method is to estimate the inclusive value parameter Tk. Studies such as 
Hausman-McFadden (1984), Quigley (1985) and Greene (2000) suggest that in the 
NMNL model, the inclusive value parameter Tk should be between 0 and 1 to satisfy 
the random utility property, and also if 0<ik<1 and statistically significant, the NMNL 
model satisfies both random utility property and the HA property. 
In summary, this section introduces a hierarchical choice model to analyse the 
household's mobility decision and tenure choice. The two-level choice model of 
mobility and tenure choice provides a substitute for the multinomial logit model of 
tenure choice, and it also relaxes the problem of IIA property occurred in the MNL 
model. Among the hierarchical choice models, the nested multinomial logit model has 
been widely applied to housing and tenure choice studies. The full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) method is employed to estimate the parameters of the 
NMNL model. With respect to the test of HA property, the Hausman-McFadden's 
statistic can be applied to test this assumption in the NMNL model. The inclusive 
value parameter can also be used to test the IIA property. While the inclusive value 




Two tenure choice models with different structures are developed in this chapter. The 
first model contains a simple one-level choice set. The tenure choice splits into three 
choices: owner-occupation, social renting and private renting. A multinomial logit 
(MNL) model is chosen to estimate the three-choice function. The MNL model 
provides a simple and convenient functional form to estimate the choice probabilities. 
The maximum log likelihood approach is applied to estimate the parameters of the 
MNL model. However, the MNL model has a widely known weakness in terms of 
violating the IIA property. The rejection of the RA property in the MNL model 
implies that the estimation of tenure choice could be bias (Greene 2000). As a result, 
the MNL model should be treated with caution. 
The second model estimates the household's mobility decision and tenure choice. 
This model contains a two-level choice structure, which assumes that the household's 
choice for different tenures is made under its decision to move. The hierarchical 
choice model of mobility and tenure choice provides an alternative way to relax the 
11A problem and without breaking the tenure choice structure presented in the first 
model. Thus, the two-level choice model can be seen as a substitute of the first model. 
A nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model is selected to estimate the probability of a 
household choosing to move/stay and the probability of choosing a tenure alternative. 
The full information maximum likelihood approach is applied to estimate the 
parameters of the NMNL model. In the NMNL model, the inclusive value parameter 
is an indication for the IIA property. Since the inclusive value parameter is between 0 
and 1, the NMNL model satisfies both the IIA property and the random utility 
function. 
Due to the I1A problem in the MNL model, it is expected that the NMNL model 
would provide robust results in the estimation of the household's mobility decision 
and tenure choice. The MNL model in this thesis can be treated as a pilot model to 
test the initial influence of the explanatory variables on tenure choice. Unlike the 
NMNL model requiring specific data arrangement and variable interactions in the 
specification, the MNL model is useful to estimate the direct relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the choice alternatives. Then the initial results in the MNL 
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model are examined in the NMNL model. The data and variables applied to the two 
tenure choice models and an analysis of estimation results of the two models will be 
discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter Six respectively. 
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CHAPTER FIVE DATA AND VARIABLES 
This chapter discusses the empirical data and variables applied to the two tenure 
choice models. This chapter is organised into five sections. The first section 
introduces the data used in the two tenure choice models. The second section 
describes the variables applied to the multinomial logit form of tenure choice model. 
The third section discusses the variables applied to the nested multinomial logit form 
of mobility and tenure choice model. The fourth section analyses the properties of the 
data and variables applied to the two tenure choice models including the selection of 
the explanatory variables and the correlation analysis of these explanatory variables. 
The last section is a brief summary. 
5.1 The Data 
In this section, the data selection, the content of the chosen data set, and the strengths 
and the weaknesses of applying the chosen data set to the two tenure choice models 
are discussed in turn. 
5.1.1 Data Selection 
Two types of quantitative data are generally applied in research: primary data and 
secondary data. The selection of these two types of data sets depends upon a variety 
of factors, for instance, the scope, objectives, and methodology of the research. In the 
field of housing and tenure choice, many studies have used secondary data set to 
examine their choice models because it saves much time and money compared to 
using primary data. More importantly, many secondary data sets are carried out by 
the public sector or by large private organisations which usually have sufficient 
financial ability to provide a large, detailed and better quality data set. However, the 
main weakness of using secondary data set is that it is not designed for the research. It 
is very often the case that the data set does not contain all of the information the 
research needs. Therefore, it is important to select a data set to meet the research 
objectives and an imputation of the data set is necessary under this circumstance. 
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To model the household's tenure choice, it is expected that the empirical data set 
should contain a variety of household attributes. Also, the data set containing a larger 
sample size would be better to examine the tenure choice model. As a result, this 
thesis adopts secondary data set applied to the two tenure choice models. Several 
points should be noted in the selection of secondary data set. First, in order to 
examine the household's tenure choice behaviour, the chosen data set should be a 
household survey data set containing the household's tenure status, social-economic 
attributes, and the dwelling and neighbourhood conditions in which the household 
resides. For example, the household's social-economic characteristics are important 
variables to interpret the households' tenure decision behaviour, while the physical 
dwelling and neighbourhood conditions are important factors to estimate the capital 
value of the property. 
Second, to estimate the household's choice between three tenures, the data set should 
contain information on three tenures and also the tenure structure should represent a 
normal distribution to the population in a defined area. Third, the sample size of the 
data set should be large enough in order to provide the maximum degree of freedom in 
the two tenure choice models. The data for the multinomial logit model and the 
nested multinomial logit model should be divided into several subgroups by tenures 
and by move-stay mode. Each subgroup should reach a minimum number of valid 
observations in order to avoid sampling bias. 
Based on above criteria, this thesis chooses the 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey 
(SHCS) to be the empirical data set for the two tenure choice models. The discussion 
of the SHCS 1996 is as follows., 
5.1.2 The 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey 
The 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (SHCS) is the second national 
comprehensive survey of house conditions in Scotland, which is directed by a steering 
group chaired by Communities Scotland, previously known as Scottish Homes. The 
first survey was carried out in 1991. The 1996 SHCS is a cross sectional survey, 
which aims to describe both the physical condition of the dwelling stock and the 
socio-economic characteristics of the household residing in the dwelling. Thus, this 
survey consists of two important components: an internal and external physical 
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dwelling inspection and a socio-economic interview with a member of the household 
in the dwelling. Through the comprehensive survey, the results offer both the public 
sector and the private sector a better understanding of the relationship between the 
characteristics of resident households and house conditions in Scotland. 
The 1996 SHCS for socio-economic interviews began in February 1996 and finished 
in August 1996. The fieldwork for the physical inspection started in May 1996 and 
ended in September 1996. Some important components of the survey methodology 
are discussed as follows. 
" Sampling 
The 1996 SHCS was based on several discrete samples of addresses. The main 
elements of the sample consisted of a systematic random sample drawn from the 
December 1995 Postal Address File (PAF) and a systematic random sample drawn 
from all core addresses sampled from the SHCS 1991 (the longitudinal or panel 
component). In addition to these two core components, there were boosted samples in 
eight local authority areas, an additional boosted sample of housing association 
properties and boosted samples from private rented dwellings. 
" Response Rates 
In the socio-economic interview, a total of 31,795 addresses were issued to the 
interviewers, of which 28,573 were found to be valid addresses. Of the 28,573 valid 
addresses, 19,892 addresses had responses, accounting for 70 per cent of the total 
valid addresses. The overall response rate for the physical inspection was 81 per cent. 
A total of 17,918 full dwelling inspections were achieved, of which 16,481 dwellings 
also completed a full household interview. 
" Sample Size 
The 1996 SHCS data set contains a total of 18,158 cases of household socio-economic 
interview, accounting for 91 per cent of the total samples (19,892). According to the 
1996 SHCS main report, cases issued from the special local authority boost samples 
and from the private rented boost samples were not included in the current data set. 
On this basis, the number of cases for which a full physical inspection and a full 
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household interview are available is 15,105, accounting for 92 per cent of the total 
dwelling samples (16,481). 
" Imputation 
The 1996 SHCS data set inevitably contains missing value cases in both the socio- 
economic interview and the physical inspection. Therefore, imputation was carried 
out to make up the missing value cases. According to the 1996 SHCS user guide, 
when the level of missing data was 1 per cent or less, the missing data was not then 
combined with other responses to produce compound measures. Where the level of 
missing data was more than 1 per cent, imputation was carried out. In the 1996 SHCS 
data set, imputation was applied to the main financial variables such as income, rent, 
mortgage and fuel payments. The specific methods used in the survey were hot deck 
imputation, defined as "where the sample is divided into subgroups (imputation 
classes) based on the relevant characteristics, and predictive mean matching where a 
statistical model was constructed and the value selected from those with a similar 
predicted value" (1996 SHCS User Guide, p. 20). The advantage of imputation is that 
it provides a complete data set without too many missing value cases. However, the 
drawback is that the data imputation may not reflect the real household information 
and dwelling conditions. 
" Weighting 
There are several weighting procedures in the 1996 SHCS. The weighting samples 
provide information about the total stock and vacancy rate estimated from the survey. 
This thesis does not need to present this kind of information in the tenure choice 
models. As a result, this thesis uses unweighted data to estimate the household's 
tenure choice behaviour in Scotland. 
5.1.3 Applying the 1996 SHCS into Tenure Choice Analysis 
The 1996 SHCS data set contains more than 18,000 cases, and this survey inevitably 
contains missing value cases and inappropriate cases, which would be excluded in our 
sample. Furthermore, this thesis also excludes 320 private rent free cases from the 
data set. In the 1996 SHCS, most rent-free cases in the private rented sector were tied 
accommodation provided by employers, thus these cases should not be included in our 
sample, otherwise the average private rental value in the sample could be 
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underestimated. After excluding those missing value cases and inappropriate cases, a 
total of 13,114 observations are available for the sample of MNL tenure choice model. 
The number of observations available for the sample of NMNL mobility and tenure 
choice model reduces to 13,012 due to a different type of data arrangement required 
by this model. The two tenure choice models contain different functional forms, thus 
involving different types of data arrangement. The data arrangement and the variable 
interactions for the two tenure choice models will be discussed in the second and the 
third sections. 
The main advantage of applying the 1996 SHCS data to the two tenure choice models 
is that the survey contains a large sample size with rich information about the 
household's socio-economic characteristics and dwelling conditions. Generally, the 
larger the sample size of a data set, the less sampling bias occurs. The 1996 SHCS 
contains variables from various aspects, which provide important information to 
analyse the household's tenure decision behaviour. The socio-economic interview 
contains variables describing the household's tenure status, income, age, gender, 
ethnic origin, employment and household size. These are basic variables in the tenure 
choice model. Further, the interview contains information about households' tenure 
aspiration, previous tenure and mobility aspiration and also the date of the household 
moving into the current address. These variables are useful in estimating households' 
tenure preferences and mobility decisions. The house purchase prices, gross rents and 
housing costs are also important variables to construct the housing user cost, housing 
subsidy and rationing variables. The physical dwelling inspection contains a variety 
of dwelling attributes and neighbourhood variables. These are important to estimate 
capital values of the property. 
The 1996 SHCS data set, of course, is not specifically designed for tenure choice 
analysis. There are some weaknesses in applying the data to the two tenure choice 
models. One of the most serious problems is that it lacks sufficient locational data. 
Although the 1996 SHCS provides Post Address File (PAF) containing the current and 
the previous postcode addresses for each surveyed household, there are many missing 
value cases in the previous location variable, thus making it difficult to analyse 
households' mobility behaviour. Further, the survey does not contain location- 
distance data, such as the distance from home to city centre and to working place. 
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These distance variables are important factors in estimating the hedonic price index of 
the dwelling (see for example Rosen 1974, Linneman 1980, Quigley 1982). 
In addition to locational data, the survey does not contain the information about the 
changes in household attributes, for instance the changes in household size, 
employment, and income. As stated in Chapter Two, the changes in household 
attributes have substantial influences on the household's mobility decision (also see 
Boehm 1981 and Ioannides 1987). Such data containing the changes in household 
attributes may not be collected in a cross-sectional survey like the 1996 SHCS. It has 
raised an argument as to whether longitudinal data or cross sectional data is more 
suitable for tenure choice analysis. As discussed in Chapter Two, the use of 
longitudinal data or cross sectional data in tenure choice analysis mainly depends 
upon the purpose of the study. Some studies have used time series data to estimate the 
influences of changes in determinants over time on the household's tenure choice. 
Some other studies have assumed that the household's tenure decision is made solely 
on the basis of the contemporary period, thus emphasising the influence of 
determinants on tenure choice (in the contemporary period) by using cross sectional 
data, as this thesis intends to do. The cross sectional analysis of tenure choice indeed 
provides a simple approach to estimate the household's tenure decision behaviour in a 
given time period which avoids a complicated process of data matching and the 
autocorrelation problem happening in time series data (Koop 2000). 
Although there has been increasingly used panel data in tenure choice analysis in 
Britain (see for example, Ermisch and Di Salvo 1996, Di Salvo and Ermisch 1997, 
Andrew 2000), a cross sectional analysis of tenure choice in Scotland remains the best 
alternative approach in a short term. In particular, there is no appropriate panel data in 
Scotland now suitable for tenure choice analysis. Under this circumstance, the 1996 
SHCS is the best alternative data to be used in this thesis. From a long-term 
viewpoint, the use of 1996 SHCS data to estimate Scottish households' tenure 
decisions is a start. Further steps will connect the 1996 SHCS with the 1991 SHCS or 
the forthcoming 2002 SHCS to analyse the change in Scottish households' tenure 
choice behaviour during these periods. 
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5.2 The Variables of the Tenure Choice Model 
The variables applied to the multinomial logit form of tenure choice model consist of 
original variables and derived variables from the 1996 SHCS and, also, some variables 
are imputed by this thesis. The dependent variable to be estimated in the tenure choice 
model is the household's existing tenure status, which is grouped into three tenures: 
owner-occupation, social renting, and private renting. Table 5.1 presents the 
household's tenure composition to be analysed in the model. About 52 per cent of 
households in the sample are owner-occupiers, while 42.5 per cent of households are 
social tenants. Private tenants only account for 5.4 per cent of the sample. 
Table 5.1 The Household's Tenure Composition 
Tenure No. of Valid Observation Percentage (%) 
Owner-Occupation 6,829 52.1 
Social Renting 5,578 42.5 
Private Renting 707 5.4 
Total 13,114 100.0 
Source: Sampled from the 1996 SHCS 
The explanatory variables of the tenure choice model come from several categories 
including the household's demographic characteristics, employment status, previous 
tenure, expected mobility, location, dwelling type, neighbourhood quality, income, 
user cost, subsidy and rationing variables. The descriptive statistics and expected 
signs of these variables are reported in Table 5.2. The full definition of variables used 
in this chapter is listed in Appendix A. 5.1 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Expected Signs of Explanatory Variables for 
the Tenure Choice Model 








Age 51.28 17.72 + + - 
Agesq 2943.45 1898.49 - - + 
Ndepch 0.58 0.96 + + - 
Marry 0.58 0.49 + + - 
Male 0.69 0.46 + - + 
Fullwork 0.45 0.50 + - - 
Partwork 0.05 0.21 + - - 
Unemploy 0.06 0.24 - + + 
House 0.63 0.48 + - ? 
Prevown 0.29 0.45 + - - 
Prevsoc 0.37 0.48 - + ? 
Prevprv 0.15 0.35 ? ? + 
Likmov2 0.12 0.33 - - + 
Urban 0.80 0.40 ? ? ? 
Affown 0.12 0.32 + - - 
Prvtcity 0.11 0.31 - - + 
Poorcnl 0.10 0.30 - + - 
Lnperinc 9.20 0.46 + - - 
Lnucc_1 7.88 0.52 - - - 
Lnuccn 1 7.28 0.80 - - - 





0.48 + - + 
j 
iYumy; wumver or ooservanons: 13114. 
00: Owner-Occupation; SR: Social Renting; PR: Private Renting. 
"+": Positive Effect; "-": Negative Effect; "? ": Cannot Determine 
Source: Sampled from the 1996 SHCS. 
" Household Demographic Characteristics 
Household characteristics such as household heads' age, sex, race, marital status and 
household size are found to be important determinants of tenure choice (see Struyk 
and Marshall 1976, Li 1977, Henderson and Ioannides 1986, Kleinman and 
Whitehead 1987, Gyourko 1998, and McNabb and Wass 1999). In the MNL tenure 
choice model, household characteristics include the household head's age (AGE), 
marital status (MARRY=1), gender (MALE=1), and the number of dependent 
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children in a household (NDEPCH). The household size and the number of dependent 
children in the household are correlated. This thesis adopts the number of dependent 
children in the household because this variable can not only present the household size 
but also implies different levels of housing demand at the household's life cycle than 
the household size variable does. The household head's race has been an important 
determinant of tenure choice in American studies (Struyk and Marshall 1976 and 
Gyourko and Linneman 1997). However, in our sample, nearly 99 per cent of 
household heads were white. In this case, we would ignore this variable in the tenure 
choice model. In Table 5.2, the average age of the head of household was around 51 
years old. Married household heads accounted for 58 per cent of the sample, while 
the average number of dependent children in a household was only 0.58. This reveals 
that the majority of households in the sample were married couples with an average of 
less than one dependent child. In addition, male household heads accounted for 70 per 
cent of the sample. 
A number of North American studies have indicated that the homeownership rate is 
found to increase with the age of household head (see Struyk and Marshall 1976 and 
Fallis 1985). However, in Britain, Kleinman and Whitehead (1985) point out that 
there is a significant non-linear relationship between homeownership and the age of 
the household head in the cross sectional analysis. This result partly comes from a 
cohort effect. The homeownership rate declines in older generations because many 
older households can obtain a secure tenancy from the social rented sector. Therefore, 
to capture the non-linear relationship between the household head's age and tenure, 
the age-squared of the household head is included in the model. It is expected that the 
age-square of household heads has an opposite sign to the age of household heads. 
In the household's life cycle, married households with children tend to have stronger 
likelihood to choose secure tenancies (see Clark and Onaka 1983, Dieleman and 
Everaers 1994, and Clark and Dieleman 1996). In Britain, owner-occupation and 
social housing are considered to be more secure tenures than private renting. As a 
result, it is expected that married household heads with dependent children would like 
to choose owner-occupation and social renting. In contrast, younger and single 
household heads and adult-only households have relatively unstable incomes and 
employment, and that makes them more likely to change their residing places. 
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Therefore, these types of households would like to choose lower transaction costs and 
shorter terms of tenancy, such as private renting. Moreover, it is often the case that 
male household heads may have higher incomes and better economic status than 
female household heads. Hence, it is expected that male household heads would have 
stronger likelihood to be owner-occupiers, while female household heads are more 
likely to choose the lower costs of social housing. However, it could be difficult to 
tell whether male or female household heads are more likely to choose private renting. 
" Employment Status and Expected Mobility 
The household head's employment status is also an important determinant of tenure 
choice. Household heads having better jobs usually imply that they have higher 
incomes, thus making them more capable homeowners. To examine the impact of 
employment status on tenure choice, this thesis uses three dummy variables to present 
three types of employment status: full-time work (FULLWORK=1), part-time work 
(PARTWORK=1), and unemployment (UNEMPLOY=1). The selection of the 
employment status variables from the original variables in the 1996 SHCS is 
discussed in the fourth section of this chapter. Table 5.2 shows that 45 per cent of 
household heads in the sample had a full-time job; only 5 per cent of household heads 
had a part time job. The unemployed household heads accounted for 6 per cent of the 
sample. It is expected that household heads who have full-time or part-time jobs 
would have stronger likelihood (positive sign) to choose owner-occupation. In 
contrast, unemployed household heads would be more likely to be tenants in either the 
social housing sector or the private rented sector. 
With regard to the household's expected mobility, it is very often the case that 
households who expect to move in the future are more likely to choose renting than 
owning. Owner-occupation generally has higher transaction costs than social renting 
or private renting. Therefore, households who are likely to move in the short run 
would be more likely to choose the lower transaction costs of renting. In Britain, 
studies have indicated that households in the social housing sector are less likely to 
move partly because the existing allocation system makes it difficult for social tenants 
to relocate their homes (see Kintrea and Clapham 1986, Harriot and Matthews 1998). 
As a result, households who are likely to move in the future would be more likely to 
choose private renting than social renting. To examine the impact of the household's 
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expected mobility on tenure choice, this thesis uses a dummy variable to present the 
household head's likeliness to move within two years (LIKEMOV2=1). Table 5.2 
shows that the majority of household heads in the sample were likely to stay, while 
only 12 per cent of household heads were likely to move within two years. It is 
expected that household heads who are likely to move within two years would be 
more likely to choose private renting than the other two tenures. 
" Previous Tenure and Location 
The household's previous tenure status has an important influence on their current 
tenure decision. This thesis uses three dummy variables to present the household's 
previous tenure status: previous owner-occupation (PREVOWN=1), previous social 
renting (PREVSOC=1), and previous private renting (PREVPRV=1). The selection 
of the previous tenure status variables from the original variables in the 1996 SHCS is 
discussed in the fourth section of this chapter. It is noted that according to the user 
guide of the 1996 SHCS, Table 5.2 shows average 29 per cent of households in the 
sample were previously owner-occupiers, while 37 per cent of households were 
previously social tenants and 15 per cent of households were previously private 
tenants. In the sample, households who were previously social tenants have higher 
percentage points than households who were previously owners. This properly 
matches the trend of tenure changes in Scotland over the past two decades. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the Right To Buy policy is the major driving force for the 
tenure changes from social renting to owner-occupation over the last two decades. It 
is expected that households who were previously owners or social tenants would be 
more likely to stay in the same tenure while making a tenure decision. As many 
households see private renting as a transitional tenure between social renting and 
owner-occupation, it would be difficult to tell the expected sign in terms of 
households who were previously private tenants on tenure choice. 
Location is also an important determinant of the household's tenure choice. In Britain, 
there exist spatial concentrations of certain tenure types of dwellings. For example, a 
large number of owner-occupied dwellings are located in suburban areas due to the 
result of suburbanisation. In contrast, many social rented and private rented dwellings 
are located in the inner city area where it is convenient to access public transport and 
other public facilities. Meanwhile, in some cities such as Glasgow, there are large 
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housing estates located in the periphery. Therefore households are likely to consider 
location while making their tenure choice. Due to data limitations, this thesis uses a 
simple urban-rural indicator (URBAN=1) to proxy location variable in the tenure 
choice model. Table 5.2 shows that 80 per cent of households live in urban areas. 
Due to data limitations, it would be difficult to tell the expected sign of the urban-rural 
indicator to the three alternative tenures. The use of an urban/rural indicator would be 
too simple to interpret the complex spatial concentration of certain tenure types of 
dwellings in Scotland. 
" Dwelling Type and Neighbourhood Quality 
Dwelling type and neighbourhood quality are also important determinants of tenure 
choice. In Britain, dwelling type is usually associated with tenure type. The 
relationship between dwelling type and tenure is interdependent. For example, owner- 
occupied dwellings are predominately houses, while most social rented dwellings are 
flats. Therefore, from the tenure choice perspective, a household's tenure choice is 
deeply influenced by dwelling type. To examine the effect of dwelling type on tenure 
choice, this thesis uses a dummy variable to present a simple dwelling type, house or 
flat (HOUSE=1). It is expected that households who live in houses would be more 
likely to choose owner-occupation. In contrast, households who live in flats would be 
more likely to choose social renting or private renting. However, there are many 
privately rented houses located in rural Scotland, as discussed in Chapter Three. 
Similar to dwelling type, the relationship between neighbourhood quality and tenure 
type is interdependent. It is very often the case that high quality neighbourhoods 
predominately consist of owner-occupied housing. In contrast, many council estates 
are located in low quality neighbourhoods. In the 1996 SHCS data set, the most 
suitable variable to present the neighbourhood quality is the ACORN group variable. 
The ACORN group variable presents different levels of neighbourhood quality which 
are associated with tenure types. Drawn from the ACORN group variable, this thesis 
therefore constructs three dummy variables to represent three different levels of 
neighbourhood quality: whether the household is in high quality neighbourhood 
predominated by affluent owners (AFFOWN=1); whether in medium quality 
neighbourhoods predominated by private tenants in the inner city (PRVTCITY=1); 
and whether in low quality neighbourhoods predominated by the poorest council 
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tenants (POORCNL=1). The selection of the neighbourhood quality variables from 
the ACORN group variable is discussed in the fourth section of this chapter. It should 
be noted that the neighbourhood quality is not necessarily associated with tenure types. 
These variables are the best alternative variables used in the 1996 SHCS data. Since 
the neighbourhood quality variables connected to tenure types, it is expected that 
households in high quality neighbourhoods (predominately affluent owners) would be 
likely to choose owner-occupation. Households in medium quality neighbourhoods 
(predominantly inner city private tenants) would be likely to choose renting, 
specifically private renting rather than owner-occupation, since most dwellings in the 
neighbourhood are privately rented. Households in lower quality neighbourhoods 
(predominantly the poorest council tenants) would be more likely to choose social 
renting. It would be important to identify the impact of the neighbourhood quality 
variables which are not predominant in the neighbourhood. 
" Household Income 
As discussed earlier, the 1996 SHCS data set does not contain all the variables needed 
for the analysis. Therefore, this thesis needs to construct some variables. The first 
variable to be estimated is household income. Previous research has indicated that the 
household's tenure decision is based on long term and multiple periods rather than 
current and single period (see Struyk and Marshall 1974, Fallis 1985, Clark and 
Dieleman 1996). For the household income variable, the long term income has a 
stronger influence on tenure decision than the current income. This model thus adopts 
the household long-term income as the household income variable which is presented 
by log value (LNPERINC). A multiple linear regression function is established to 
estimate household long term income. The estimation results are shown in Table 5.3. 
The dependent variable is log annual household income. In the 1996 SHCS, the 
household income was defined as the annual net income of the head of household and 
partner. The log annual household income is explained by household heads' 
demographic characteristics, whether in long term illness, self-employment, socio- 
economic group and location. The household head's demographic variables include 
age, age square (explaining non-linear relationship between income and age), marital 
status, sex, race and the number of dependent children. According to the 1996 SHCS 
user guide, the socio-economic group is established for the head of household only 
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and can only be estimated for those individuals who were in or had been in 
employment during the interview period. The household head's socio-economic 
group is classified into six different subgroups: professional/managerial jobs; 
employers and managers; intermediate/junior non-manual jobs; skilled manual 
workers; semi-skilled manual workers; and non-skilled manual workers. 
Unfortunately, the 1996 SHCS data set does not contain the household head's 
education variable, which has been indicated by many studies as an important variable 
in order to explain the household's permanent income (see for example Struyk and 
Marshall 1974 and Laakso and Loikkanen 1995). The use of the household's head's 
socio-economic group to some degree can represent the household head's educational 
level in the household long-term income model. 
Table 5.3 Estimation Results of the Household Long Term Income Model 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 8.193 155.9 
Age 0.018 13.65 
Agesq -0.0002 -19.55 
Marry 0.514 48.28 
Ethnics 0.166 4.09 
Male 0.056 4.87 
Ndepchgp 0.055 12.36 
Sick -0.101 -10.69 
Selfemp 0.173 7.61 
Prof 0.761 33.46 
Empman 0.488 27.15 
Interjun 0.368 22.91 
Skill 0.197 11.99 
Semiskil 0.09 5.38 
Unskill 0.057 2.93 
Urban 0.022 2.35 
Adjusted RZ 0.47 
F value 1053.4 
No. of obs 18,040 
Notes: The sample size is based on the total observations (18,158) of the 1996 SHCS 
excluding missing value cases. The definition of variables is listed in 
Appendix A. 5.1 
The estimation results shown in Table 5.3 are then used to calculate the predicted 
household long-term income applied to the tenure choice model. The predicted 
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household long term income by tenures is shown in Table 5.4. It is clear that owner- 
occupiers have the highest average long term income, while social tenants had the 
lowest average long term income. The average long-term income of private tenants is 
shared between owner-occupiers and social tenants. The household long-term income 
is expected to have a positive effect on owner-occupation. This means that while 
household long-term income increases, households are more likely to own rather than 
to rent their homes. 
Table 5.4. Predicted Household Long Term Income by Tenures 
Tenure Average Annual 
Amount £ 
No. of Valid 
Observation 
Owner-Occupation 12,762 6,829 
Social Renting 8,731 5,578 
Private Renting 10,223 707 
Total 10,911 13,114 
" User Cost of Capital 
The second important variable to be measured is the user cost of capital, which is also 
presented by log value (LNUCC_1). The user cost in this thesis is measured in 
nominal terms. ' For owner-occupiers, user cost is to calculate the capital cost of the 
property. Based on Gibb and Mackay (1999), the user cost for owner-occupiers is 
defined as: 
UC0 =[(1-t)*i+d+a-g]*Ph (35) 
where t denotes a household's marginal tax rate, i is the nominal mortgage interest 
rate, d is the depreciation rate, a is the property tax rate, g is the expected annual rate 
of nominal house price increase and P`' is the current market value of the property. 
Here, the household's marginal tax rate is assumed to be zero' and the property tax 
rate is based on the council tax rate. The average nominal mortgage interest rate in 
1996 is 6.7%. Based on Hills' (1991) estimation, the depreciation rate is set at 1.2%, 
8 The use of nominal user cost would be convenient to calculate the user cost for tenants (the rent) since 
the 1996 SHCS data set only identifies the gross rent for tenants. 
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and the long term nominal house price increase rate is set at 3.7%1° annually. The 
current market value of the dwelling is measured by the hedonic price index. The 
estimation results of the hedonic price model are reported in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Estimation Results of the Hedonic Price Model 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 6.580 47.85 
Detach 0.347 17.54 
Dwagel -0.123 -5.95 
Dwage3 -0.096 -3.55 
Dwage5 0.073 3.47 
Lntfa 0.875 28.04 
Fullheat 0.110 5.19 
Urban 0.110 5.46 
Prospown 0.074 4.34 
Poorcnl -0.240 -4.11 
Graff -0.135 -4.66 
Dparking 0.039 1.99 
Vacsite -0.097 -3.60 
Yr94 0.038 1.99 
Yr95 0.058 2.98 
Adjusted R2 0.53 
F value 175.55 
No. of obs. 2,596 
Notes: The sample size is based on owner-occupiers who moved within recent five 
years. The definition of variables is listed in Appendix A. 5.1 
In the hedonic price model, the dependent variable is log house purchase price. The 
log house purchase price is explained by dwelling conditions, location, neighbourhood 
conditions and the year of purchase of the current dwelling. The dwelling conditions 
include dwelling type, age, total floor area and heating condition. The locational 
variable is presented by the urban/rural indicator. The neighbourhood conditions 
include whether or not the property has graffiti and vandalism, vacant site, adequate 
parking space and two different levels of neighbourhood quality (i. e. whether the 
neighbourhood is dominated by prosperous owners or by the poorest council tenants). 
As Gibb and Mackay (1999) suggested, due to its erosion in the 1990s and recent termination, the 
MIRAS is treated as a "lump sum" tax relief to mortgaged owners, which does not affect their user 
costs at the margin but only affects their disposable income. 
1 The 3.7 per cent of annual nominal capital gains increase rate is estimated on the accrual basis. 
127 
Unfortunately, the 1996 SHCS data set does not contain the distance variable such as 
the distance to the Central Business District (CBD), nor does it contain some dwelling 
condition variables such as the number of bathrooms. In fact, studies have suggested 
that the distance variable and the number of bathrooms in the dwelling are important 
variables to estimate the hedonic price (see for example, Rosen 1974, Linneman 1980 
and Quigley 1982). Therefore, it may affect the goodness-of-fit of the hedonic price 
model. 
It is noted that the sample selection in the hedonic price model is identified as owner- 
occupiers and those who have been moved in recent five years. Therefore, the model 
could contain a dual sample selection bias as suggested by Ermisch, Findlay and Gibb 
(1996). According to a study by Ermisch, Findlay and Gibb, the difference between 
the hedonic house price adjusted for sample selection bias and the unadjusted hedonic 
house price is about 3.75%. In this thesis, the difference could not significantly affect 
the results of the tenure choice models because, after deflated by natural log, the 
difference between adjusted hedonic prices and unadjusted hedonic prices is 
minimised. In the hedonic price model, it is found that the year of moving into current 
dwelling, specifically the last two years, have important influences on our hedonic 
price index. The estimation results of hedonic price model are then applied to all three 
tenure sample base (13,114). The break down of the hedonic price by tenures is 
presented in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 Hedonic Prices of the Property by Tenures 
Tenure Average Hedonic 
Price (E) 
No. of Valid 
Observation 
Owner-Occupation 52,630 6,829 
Social Renting 33,911 5,578 
Private Renting 42,556 707 
Total 44,125 13,114 
Moreover, the estimated market value for social rented property could be 
overestimated if it is based on the purchase price of owner-occupied property. For 
example, it may not be certain that the estimated hedonic price would take adequate 
account on very poor council housing neighbourhoods. In addition, there are different 
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demand characteristics between social renting and owner-occupation (Hancock and 
Munro 1992). Several studies have attempted to make this adjustment. For instance, 
Maclennan, Gibb and More (1991) adopt the bottom half of hedonic prices applying to 
social rented property; Hills (1991) uses 20 per cent discount of hedonic prices 
applying to local authority property. This thesis is aware of this issue and makes 
adjustment by putting the neighbourhood quality variables into the hedonic price 
model. As discussed earlier, the neighbourhood quality variables are the ACORN 
group variables which are associated with tenure types. Therefore, the estimated 
hedonic price can be distinguished in different quality levels of neighbourhoods. 
The housing user cost for renters is usually the gross rent. However, the rent in the 
social rented sector is subsidised and cannot represent the true cost of rented dwellings. 
Therefore, this thesis measures the user cost of social renting on the basis of the 
economic rent, that is, the rent is assumed to be charged at the open market level. 
Based on Hills' (1991) definition, the economic rent in the social rented sector is 
estimated as follows: 
UC, =(m+r+d-g)*P' (36) 
where m denotes maintenance and repair costs; r is the nominal rate of return on 
property; d, g, and P" are defined as the same as in equation (35). However the 
maintenance and repair costs in Hills' calculation for local authority tenants is based 
on real costs. Due to data restrictions, this thesis sets the maintenance and repair costs 
as a certain percentage of the rented property value. In this case, m+r is set at 7.8% 
of property values, which is based on the average index of private rents and yields to 
the private landlords in Scotland, in the fourth quarter of 1996, as measured by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (see Rhodes and Kemp 1997). 
The user cost for private renters is the gross rent at the market level. The breakdown 
of the average user cost by tenures is reported in Table 5.7. Owner-occupiers had the 
highest user cost, as owning a home was expensive. ' In contrast, the user cost for 
social tenants was the lowest because it reflected the property value of the social 
rented stock. With respect to the expected sign, the user cost is expected to have a 
negative effect to each tenure. 
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Table 5.7 User Costs by Tenures 





Capital Value (%) 
No. of Valid 
Observations 
Owner-occupiers 3,531 6.7 6,829 
Social tenants 2,374 7.0 5,578 
Private tenants 3161 7.4 707 
" Housing Subsidy 
The third important variable to be estimated is the housing subsidy. The form of 
housing subsidy in this thesis is estimated in economic terms. The definition of the 
housing subsidy in economic terms (from now on called economic subsidy) is based 
on O'Sullivan's (1984) formal subsidy or Hills' (1991) first round subsidy. 
According to O'Sullivan's interpretation, the formal subsidy is defined as `the amount 
of the original purchase price of a commodity an economic unit (normally the state) 
undertakes to fund itself if another economic unit (the consumer) purchases it' (1984, 
p. 120). The economic subsidy in this thesis is also based on a tenure neutrality 
framework, which treats housing as both a consumption and an investment commodity 
in all tenures equivalently. Under the tenure neutrality concept, the economic subsidy 
for owner-occupiers is defined as the difference of tax expenditures between owner- 
occupiers and private landlords. As Hills suggests, compared to private landlords, the 
tax advantage to owner-occupiers comes from untaxed imputed rents and untaxed 
capital gains, as shown in equation (37): 
So =(CG+IR)*t, (37) 
where CG denotes the nominal capital gains, IR is the imputed rent and t, is the 
marginal income tax rate. The capital gains (CG) are calculated as the long term 
annual nominal capital gains rate (3.7%) multiplied by hedonic prices (Hills 1991). 
For mortgaged owners, the imputed rent (IR) is set as the net equity multiplied by the 
long-term rate of net return on property. The net equity is defined as the purchase 
price minus mortgage debts. The net rate of return on property is set at 5.5%, which is 
based on the long-term government bond rate. For outright owners, the imputed rent 
(IR) is estimated as the economic rent. The definition of economic rent is the same as 
130 
in equation (36). The marginal rate of income tax (t) is set at the benchmark income 
tax rate (24%) in 1996/97. 
Based on the tenure neutrality framework, the economic subsidy to social tenants is 
defined as the difference between the rent charged in the open market and the below 
market rent charged by the social landlords, as shown in equation (38): 
Ss =ER - GR (38) 
where ER denotes the economic rent, as defined in equation (36); GR is the gross rent 
charged by the social landlords. 
Renters in the private rented sector do not receive any economic subsidy if they pay 
the market rent. The subsidy stems from tenants paying below market fair rents in the 
regulated tenancy. In this case, the economic subsidy to tenants in the regulated 
tenancy is the difference between the market rent (estimated economic rent) and the 
fair rent, as shown in equation (39). 
Sp =ER-FR (39) 
where ER denotes the economic rent, as defined in equation (36); FR is the fair rent. 
Unfortunately, the 1996 SHCS does not identify whether a household is paying a fair 
rent or not. Therefore, this thesis attempts to impute the fair rent variable. According 
to the advice of the experts", private tenants could possibly pay fair rents under the 
following conditions, if private tenants are: 
1. more than 45 years old 
2. living in unfurnished properties 
3. living in tenement or four-in-a-block dwellings 
4. living in urban areas. 
The annual average amount of economic subsidy broken down by tenures is reported 
in Table 5.8. The economic subsidy tends to reduce the user cost. Thus, the net user 
" It is difficult to find the document or reports for the characteristics of households in regulated tenancy 
in Scotland. Therefore, this thesis asks for the advice of the experts. 
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cost (presented by log value LNUCCN 1) is derived by the user cost subtracting the 
economic subsidy. In other words, the economic subsidy effect can be expressed on 
the difference between the user cost and the net user cost. In the tenure choice model, 
the intention is to estimate the subsidy effect between the user cost and the net user 
cost. The economic subsidy effect by tenures is shown in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.8. Economic Subsidies by Tenures 
Subsidy Average Annual 
Amount £ 
Percentage of 
Capital Value % 
No. of Valid 
Observations 
Owner-occupiers 834 1.6 6,829 
Social tenants 638 1.9 5,578 
Private tenants (all) 21 0.05 707 
Private tenants in un- 
regulated tenancy 
0 0.0 662 
_ Private tenants in 
regulated tenancy 
472 1.1 45 
Table 5.8 shows that owner-occupiers received the highest amount of economic 
subsidies. In contrast, most private tenants do not receive any economic subsidies. 
However, the economic subsidies to private tenants in the regulated tenancy are higher 
than the subsidies to social tenants. Furthermore, it is of interest to see the impact of 
economic subsidies on the user cost among the three tenures. Under the economic 
subsidy effect, the difference between owner-occupiers' net user costs and social 
tenants' net user costs is reduced. In contrast, private tenants have the highest net user 
cost than the other two tenures. Thus, the changes in user costs under the economic 
subsidy effect could have important impacts on households' tenure decisions. 
Table 5.9 Economic Subsidy Effect by Tenures 
(£ Der annum) 





Owner-occupiers 3,531 6.7 834 2,697 5.1 
Social tenants 2,374 7.0 638 1,735 5.1 
Private tenants 3,161 7.4 21 3,140 7.3 
UC = user cost; NUC =net user cost; CV= capital value. 
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" Rationing Variables 
Rationing variables are measured by two types of constraints: mortgage rationing 
(RATMORT=l) and social housing rationing (RATSOC=1). The construction of the 
proxy variable of mortgage rationing is based on three criteria: price-to-income ratio 
(PTI), loan-to-value ratio (LTV), and loan-to-income ratio (LTI), which are the most 
common criteria set by banks and building societies, as stated in Chapter Three. In 
this thesis, the house price or the house value is measured as the hedonic price. The 
household income is measured as the household long term income. Mortgaged 
owners, if they have more than two of the following conditions, could find it difficult 




Potently, renters in both the social rented sector and the private rented sector, if their 
price-to-income ratio (PTI) is greater than 3.0, could be constrained by mortgages. 
These constraint conditions are based on the average ratio for first time buyers in 
Scotland 1996 (see Council of Mortgage Lenders 1997). The results of the mortgage 
constraint by tenures are shown in Table 5.10. It shows that 17% of existing owner- 
occupiers were not qualified for these mortgage ratios and were potentially 
constrained from mortgages. In contrast, more than three quarters of public and 
private tenants were potentially constrained from mortgages. It is noted that Table 
5.10 only shows the general information of the mortgage constraint breaking down by 
tenures. In fact, the mortgage constraint not only varies by tenures but also varies by 
some other household demographic characteristics, such as the household head's age 
and gender. Since the intention is to estimate the impact of the mortgage constraint on 
tenure choice, the focus here is on tenure rather than other factors. In this case, it can 
be assumed that, if households were constrained from mortgages, they would be 
constrained to choose either social renting or private renting. 
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Table 5.10 Mortgage Rationing by Tenures 
Rationed Not Rationed Total 
Owner-occupiers 1,121 5,708 6,829 
(16.4%) (83.6%) (1000/0) 
Social Tenants 4,228 1,350 5,578 
(75.8%) (24.2%) (1000/0) 
Private Tenants 555 152 707 
(78.5%) (21.5%) (1000/0) 
Total 5,904 7,210 13,114 
(45%) (55%) 100% 
The social housing rationing can be treated as a reverse concept of rationing, which is 
different from common rationing. The aim of social housing is to provide affordable 
homes to low income households with special needs. That is to say, households with 
socio-economic disadvantages should not be rationed from this sector. In other words, 
households who have higher income and better socio-economic status could be 
rationed from social housing. Drawing from Chapter Three, this thesis establishes 
five reverse rationing criteria as follows. Whether the household is/has: 
1. experienced long term illness, 
2. unemployment 
3. retired 
4. a lone parent 
5. more than 50% of incomes from state benefits 
If a household had more than one of the above conditions, the household could not be 
constrained from entering the social rented sector, otherwise it is constrained from this 
sector. These rationing variables can be treated as a simulation applying to 
households in all three tenures. The results of social housing rationing are shown in 
Table 5.11. It shows that about 80% of owner-occupiers and 70% of private tenants 
are potentially constrained from entering the social housing sector. In contrast, most 
social tenants (60%) qualify for the rationing conditions and are not potentially 
constrained from accessing this sector. Furthermore, it is assumed that if households 
are rejected by social renting, they would choose either owner-occupation or private 
renting. 
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Table 5.11 Social Housing Rationing by Tenures 
Rationed Not Rationed Total 
Owner-occupiers 5,449 1,380 6,829 
79.8% (20.2%) (100%) 
Social Tenants 2,228 3,350 5,578 
(39.9%) (60.1%) (1000/0) 
Private Tenants 483 224 707 
(68.3%) (31.7%) (100%) 
Total 8,160 4,954 13,114 
(62.2%) (37.8%) (100%) 
In summary, this section describes the variables applied to the multinomial logit form 
of the tenure choice model. The household's demographic attributes, employment 
status, previous tenure status, expected mobility, and dwelling and neighbourhood 
conditions can be derived from the data set. These variables are expected to have 
substantial influences on tenure choice. This thesis also constructs some variables 
including household long term income, user cost, housing (economic) subsidy and 
rationing variables. The use of long term income implies that the household's tenure 
decision is based on long term, multiple periods rather than a current and single period. 
The user cost presents the relative cost of owning and renting. The economic subsidy 
effect is expressed as the difference between the user cost and the net user cost, while 
the rationing effect is a simulation of households' access constraints to different 
tenures. 
5.3 The Variables of Mobility and Tenure Choice Model 
The variables applied to the NMNL mobility and tenure choice model are drawn from 
the last MNL tenure choice model. However, the mobility and tenure choice model 
contains a two-level nested multinomial logit form that requires specific data 
arrangement and variable interactions. In the mobility and tenure choice model, each 
individual household in the sample faces four possible choices: to stay; to move and 
choose owner-occupation; to move and choose social renting; and to move and choose 
private renting. For each household, the choice which the household has made is 
observed. Thus, the data of each household observation is expanded to four rows - 
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one row for each possible choice. In our case, the data matrix for the mobility and 
tenure choice model consists of 52,048 rows with 13,012 household observations. " 
The model of mobility and tenure choice consists of a two-level decision tree, thus the 
variables also split into two levels-the mobility decision level and the tenure choice 
level, described as follows. 
" Variables in the Mobility Decision Level 
In the mobility decision level, the sample firstly is divided into recent movers and 
stayers. The recent movers are defined as households who moved in the last two years. 
The results of recent movers and stayers by tenures are reported in Table 5.12. Of the 
total 13,012 household observations, 1,425 households moved in the last two years, 
accounting for 11 per cent of the sample. Among recent movers, social tenants 
account for 44 per cent of the movers; owner-occupiers also account for 37 per cent of 
the movers. Private tenants only account for less than 20 per cent of the movers. 
Regarding the mover/stayer distribution between tenures, only 8 per cent of owner- 
occupiers and 11 per cent of social tenants moved in the last two years. As discussed 
in Chapter Three, it is not surprising to see that owner-occupation and social renting 
are the two stable tenures in Scotland. In contrast, households in the private rented 
sector are highly mobile. Around 40 per cent of private tenants in the sample moved 
in the last two years. 
Table 5.12 Movers and Stayers by Tenures 
Movers Stayers Total 
Owner-occupation 525 6,258 6,783 
(7.7%) (92.3%) (100%) 
(36.8%) (54%) (52.1%) 
Social renting 620 4,902 5,522 
(11.2%) (88.8%) (100%) 
(43.5%) (42.3%) (42.4%) 
Private renting 280 427 707 
(39.6%) (60.4%) (100%) 
(19.6%) (3.7%) (5.5%) 
Total 1,425 11,587 13,012 
(11.0%) (89.0%) (100%) 
(100%) (100%) 100% 
'2 The sample originally has 13,114 observations, the same as in the MNL tenure choice model but 
some observations were excluded in the variable interactions. Thus the total number of observations in 
the mobility and tenure choice model reduces to 13,012. 
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Note: the first percentage is the row percentage; the second percentage is the column 
percentage. 
The dependent variable to be estimated in the mobility and tenure choice model is the 
household's move-stay and tenure status (ACHOICE). Based on the model structure 
(see Figure 4.2 in Chapter Four), the dependent variable contains four different 
statuses: stay, move to choose owner-occupation; social renting; and private renting. 
For each individual household, if the household is a stayer, it is marked as "stayer". If 
the household is a recent mover, it is specifically assigned to its current tenure status. 
According to Table 5.12, the dependent variable contains 11,587 stayers, 525 mover- 
owners, 620 mover-social tenants, and 280 mover-private tenants. 
The explanatory variables in the mobility decision level come from several categories 
including the household's demographic characteristics, employment status, income, 
and neighbourhood quality conditions. In fact, these variables may influence both the 
mobility decision and tenure choice. As discussed in previous chapters, the 
household's demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as age, sex, marital 
status, number of dependent children, employment and income data would represent 
different household life cycle stages, thus generating different housing demand. The 
household characteristics can also be used to present housing attributes such as the 
dissatisfaction of housing size, type and quality. As a result, these variables would 
influence the household's likeliness to move. It is noted that these explanatory 
variables in the mobility decision level interact with the "stay" choice, denoting the 
relationship between these variables and stay choice and thus separating from the 
tenure choice level. The expected signs of these interacted variables are reported in 
Table 5.13. The descriptive statistics and the definition of the original variables are 
reported in Table 5.2 and Appendix A. 5.1, respectively. 
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Table 5.13 The Expected Sign of Explanatory Variables in the Mobility Decision 
Level 
Original Variable: Interacted Variable Expected Sign 
Age (interacted with stay): Ageheads + 
Marry (interacted with stay): Marrys + 
Male (interacted with stay): Males + 
Ndepch (interacted with stay): Ndepchs + 
Unemploy (interacted with stay): Unemps - 
Lnperinc (interacted with stay): Lnincs + 
Affown (interacted with stay): Affowns + 
Prvtcity (interacted with stay): Pvcitys - 
Poorcnl (interacted with stay): Porcnls ? 
A number of studies have indicated that older and married household heads with 
dependent children are less likely to move than younger and single individuals and 
adult-only couples (see Clark and Onaka 1985, Zorn 1988, Clark and Dieleman 1996). 
As a result, it is expected that while age increases, household heads' would be more 
likely to stay rather than to move. Married household heads and male household 
heads are also expected to be likely to stay. Households with more dependent 
children would be more likely to stay. While income increases, the household would 
be more stable and thus it is likely to stay, given other conditions in constant. It is 
expected that unemployed household heads would be more likely to move. Since 
unemployed households are likely to have lower incomes, they would be more mobile. 
Regarding the neighbourhood quality, it is expected that households located in high 
quality neighbourhoods in which affluent owners predominate, would be more likely 
to stay. In contrast, households located in inner city neighbourhoods where they are 
predominated by private tenants could be influenced by their neighbour households 
and thus would be expected to be more mobile. Households located in the lowest 
quality council housing neighbourhoods would be less likely to stay. However, it is 
very often the case that households in the lowest quality neighbourhood may not be 
able to afford to move. 
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0 Variables in the Tenure Choice Level 
The explanatory variables in the tenure choice level are drawn from the MNL tenure 
choice model. As a requirement of the nested multinomial logit model, the 
explanatory variables in the tenure choice level are interacted with three choices: 
owner-occupation, social renting and private renting in order to estimate the 
coefficients among three tenure alternatives. According to Greene (1998), if the rule 
is set as if the explanatory variable is measured for the individual, such a variable can 
only be incorporated in the nested multinomial logit model by using the equivalent of 
dummy variable interaction terms. Otherwise, the variable is the same for all choices, 
and its coefficients cannot be estimated. 
In the mobility and tenure choice model, the explanatory variables of households' 
demographic characteristics, employment status, income, previous tenure, location, 
dwelling type, neighbourhood quality and rationing variables are all measured for the 
individual, which means that these variables are not different across tenures. 
Therefore, these variables need to be interacted with three dummy variables of tenure 
alternatives. One exception is that the user cost in the model is measured as an 
attribute across tenures not for the individual. In the data matrix, each household 
observation faces four possible choices - three tenure alternatives and stay, and 
therefore each choice would be assigned to its specific user cost in order to examine 
the effect on each tenure. Since the data matrix is unable to specify the user cost for 
each individual, this thesis considers that the user cost not only varies across tenures 
but also varies across areas in Scotland. As a result, the user cost in the model is 
measured by the average cost across tenures and across all 32 unitary authorities in 
Scotland. The estimation results of the user cost, the net user cost and the economic 
subsidy across tenures and across all 32 unitary authorities are reported in Appendix 
A. 5.2. 
Moreover, this thesis sets owner-occupation as the default tenure in estimating the 
household's comparative choice behaviour between social renting and owner- 
occupation, and between private renting and owner-occupation. " As a result, the 
" The default tenure can be changed in the model. This thesis sets owner-occupation as the default 
tenure because most households see homeownership as the ideal tenure, compared to social renting and 
private renting. Furthermore, in the pre-test model, this thesis found that the estimation results based 
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variables interacted with owner-occupation will not be shown in the model. The 
expected sign of the explanatory variables (interacted with social renting and with 
private renting) is reported in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14 the Expected Sign of Explanatory Variables in the Tenure Choice Level 
Original Variables: Interacted Variables Expected Sign 
Lntcost (log user cost): attribute - 
Lnatcost (log net user cost): attribute - 
Age (interacted with social renting): Agehsoc - 
Age (interacted with private renting): Agehprv - 
Ndepch (interacted with social renting): Ndepsoc ? 
Ndepch (interacted with private renting) Ndepprv - 
Marry (interacted with social renting): Marrysoc ? 
Marry (interacted with private renting): Marryprv - 
Male (interacted with social renting): Malesoc - 
Male (interacted with private renting): Maleprv ? 
Fullwork (interacted with social renting): Fullsoc - 
Fullwork (interacted with private renting): Fullprv - 
Partwork (interacted with social renting): Partsoc - 
Partwork (interacted with private renting): Partprv - 
Unemploy (interacted with social renting): Unempsoc + 
Unemploy (interacted with private renting): Unempprv ? 
Prevown (interacted with social renting): Pvownsoc - 
Prevown (interacted with private renting): Pvownprv - 
Prevsoc (interacted with social renting): Pvsocsoc + 
Prevsoc (interacted with private renting): Pvsocprv ? 
Prevprv (interacted with social renting): Pvprvsoc ? 
Prevprv (interacted with private renting): Pvprvprv + 
House (interacted with social renting): Housoc - 
House (interacted with private renting): Housprv . ? 
on owner-occupation as the default tenure are more reliable than the results based on other two tenures 
as the default tenures. 
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Urban (interacted with social renting): Urbansoc ? 
Urban (interacted with private renting): Urbanprv -? 
Affown (interacted with social renting): Afownsoc - 
Affown (interacted with private renting): Afownprv - 
Poorcnl (interacted with social renting): Pocnlsoc + 
Poorcnl (interacted with private renting): Pocnlprv - 
Prvtcity (interacted with social renting): Pvctysoc ? 
Prvtcity (interacted with private renting): Pvctyprv + 
Lnperinc (interacted with social renting): Lnincsoc - 
Lnperinc (interacted with private renting): Lnincprv - 
Ratmort (interacted with social renting): Mratsoc + 
Ratmort (interacted with private renting): Mratprv + 
Ratsoc (interacted with private renting): Sratprv ? 
The expected sign of these explanatory variables in the tenure choice level is drawn 
from the MNL tenure choice model. The variable interacted with social renting and 
private renting denotes the relationship between the variable and the choice of social 
renting or private renting respectively. As stated earlier, the user cost is an attribute 
varying across tenures and it is expected that the user cost would have a negative 
effect on households' tenure choice under the moving decision. With respect to 
household demographic variables, it is expected that when age increases, the 
household would be less likely to choose social renting and private renting, compared 
to owner-occupation, when considering moving. Married households with dependent 
children would be less likely to choose social renting and private renting, compared 
with owner-occupation. Female household heads are expected to be more likely to 
choose social renting, while it could be hard to tell whether the male or female 
household heads would be likely to choose private renting or owner-occupation when 
making decisions about moving. 
With respect to employment status, it is expected that households who have full time 
or part time jobs would be more likely to choose owner-occupation than the other two 
tenures, given their decisions to move. In contrast, unemployed households would 
prefer social renting or private renting. When a household considers moving, the 
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household's previous tenure status may have an important influence on its current 
tenure decision. It is expected that households who were previously owners or social 
tenants would be more likely to remain at the same tenure when making a moving 
decision. As discussed earlier, many households see private renting as a transitional 
tenure between owner-occupation and social renting. Therefore, it would be difficult 
to decide those households who were previously private tenants in choosing between 
social renting and owner-occupation. 
As discussed in the last section, dwelling type is usually associated with tenure type. 
In Britain, it is very often the case that owner-occupied dwellings are dominated by 
houses, while social rented dwellings are dominated by flats or tenements. Therefore, 
it is expected that households who live in houses would be likely to choose owner- 
occupation than social renting, when considering moving. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, there are also a number of privately rented houses located in rural 
areas of Scotland. Thus, it could be difficult to tell the sign in terms of the dwelling 
type and the choice between private renting and owner-occupation. With respect to 
the location variable, as discussed in the last section, the over-simple definition of the 
urban/rural indicator would not be suitable to interpret the relationship between tenure 
and location. 
Households who live in a high quality neighbourhood such as the area predominated 
by affluent owners is expected to be more likely to choose owner-occupation than the 
other two tenures, when they consider moving. In contrast, households in a poor 
quality council housing neighbourhood would be more likely to stay in the social 
rented sector and it is very often the case that those households may not be able to 
afford to choose other tenures. It would be difficult to anticipate those households in 
the private rented inner city neighbourhoods who would choose social renting or 
owner-occupation. 
Household income would have an important impact on tenure choice when making 
moving decisions. It is expected that when long term income increases, households 
would be more likely to choose owner-occupation than the other two tenures, when 
they consider moving. In addition, if households are rationed from mortgages, they 
could be forced to choose between social renting and private renting. On the other 
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hand, if households were constrained from the social rented sector, they would choose 
between owner-occupation and private renting when considering moving. 
In summary, the variables of the NMNL mobility and tenure choice model are drawn 
from the MNL tenure choice model. The nested logit model requires the explanatory 
variables to be interacted with four possible choices - stay, owner-occupation, social 
renting and private renting in order to estimate the coefficients of these choices. The 
user cost in this model is treated as an attribute across tenure. It is measured by the 
average cost across tenures and across all 32 unitary authorities in Scotland. Since the 
mobility decision and tenure choice are interdependent, this thesis expects that some 
variables such as the household's age, sex, marital status, the number of dependent 
children, employment, income and neighbourhood quality would have influences on 
both mobility decision and tenure choice. The model results will be shown in the next 
chapter. 
5.4 The Properties of the Data 
This section discusses the properties of the data and variables applied to the two 
tenure choice models. The first part of this section discusses the selection of the 
explanatory variables of the two tenure choice models; the second part is the 
correlation analysis of these explanatory variables. 
5.4.1 The Selection of the Explanatory Variables 
As discussed in the second section, most explanatory variables of the two tenure 
choice models are recoded or imputed from the original variables of the 1996 SHCS. 
The development of some important variables including household long term income, 
the user cost, economic subsidies and rationing variables has been discussed in the 
second section. This part emphasises the process of selecting the explanatory 
variables recoded from the original variables of the 1996 SHCS data. Among these 
explanatory variables, household demographic variables such as household age, 
gender, marital status and the number of dependent children, can adopt the original 
variables in the 1996 SHCS data with only a slightly recoding. 14 It is noted that the 
14 The recoding process involves a simply change of codes of the variable into dummy code (0 or 1) and 
a recode of invalid data into missing value data. 
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original variables here mean that the variables listed in the 1996 SHCS data set are 
used without any recoding or imputation by this thesis. Some dummy variables like 
dwelling type (house or flat), location (urban or rural) and likelihood of moving within 
2 years can also be directly recoded from the original variables of the 1996 SHCS data. 
However, some variables such as employment status, previous tenure status, and 
neighbourhood quality variables involve some complicated recoding exercises. The 
selection of these variables is discussed as follows. 
" Employment Status 
The employment status variables are recoded from the ESHOH96 variable of the 1996 
SHCS data. The ESHOH96 contains seven conditions of employment status as shown 
in Table 5.15. The first four conditions are the most common conditions describing 
the household head's employment status which have been adopted by some tenure 
choice studies (see for example Struyk and Marshall 1974, Clark and Dieleman 1996). 
The condition of households with long term sickness or disability is included in the 
development of the social housing rationing variable, therefore, it will not be repeated 
in the employment status variables. Under this circumstance, this thesis recodes the 
most common four conditions-full time paid work, part time paid work, unemployed 
and retire into four separate dummy variables. These four dummy variables describe 
whether or not the household head has/is (1) full time paid work (FULLWORK=1), (2) 
part time paid work (PARTWORK=1), (3) unemployed (LJNEMPLOY=1), and (4) 
retired (RETIRE=1). The frequency table of these four dummy variables are shown in 
Table 5.16. 









1. Full time paid work 8499 46.8 46.8 46.8 
2. Part time paid work 801 4.4 4.4 51.2 
3. Unemployed 1097 6.0 6.0 57.3 
4. Retire 4957 27.3 27.3 84.6 
5. Long term sick/disabled 1348 7.4 7.4 92.0 
6. Looking after home 1023 5.6 5.6 97.6 
7. Other 433 2.4 2.4 100.0 
Total 18158 100.0 100.0 
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Table 5.16 Frequency Table of the Four Dummy Variables of Employment 
Status-FULLWORK, PARTWORK, UNEMPLOY and RETIRE 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
(No. ) (0/0) (0/0) Percent 
FULL WOR 
0 No 9659 53.2 53.2 53.2 
1 Yes 8499 46.8 46.8 100.0 
Total 18158 100.0 100.0 
ARTWORK 
0 No 17357 95.6 95.6 95.6 
1 Yes 801 4.4 4.4 100.0 
Total 18158 100.0 100.0 
UNEMPLOY 
0 No 17061 94.0 94.0 94.0 
1 Yes 1097 6.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 18158 100.0 100.0 
TIRE 
0 No 13201 72.7 72.7 72.7 
1 Yes 4957 27.3 27.3 100.0 
Total 18158 100.0 100.0 
" Previous Tenure Status 
Previous tenure status variables are recoded from the variable of PREVTEN in the 
1996 SHCS data. The frequency table of the PREVTEN variable is shown as Table 
5.17. Then PREVTEN variable is recoded into three separate dummy variables based 
on the three main tenures adopted in this thesis. These three dummy variables are (1) 
previous owner-occupiers (PREVOWN=1), (2) previous social tenants 
(PREVSOC=1), and (3) previous private tenants (PREVPRV=1). The frequency 
tables of these three dummy variables are shown in Table 5.18. 
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1. Owner occupier 5327 29.3 29.5 29.5 
2. LA/NT/SH/Other public 6248 34.4 34.6 64.1 
3. HA/Housing coop 315 1.7 1.7 65.8 
4. Private renter 2666 14.1 14.8 80.6 
5. Other 2932 16.1 16.3 96.9 
-9. Not applicable 555 3.1 3.1 100.0 
Subtotal 18043 99.4 100.0 
Missing Value 115 0.6 
Total 18158 100.0 
Table 5.18 Frequency Table of Three Dummy Variables of Previous Tenure- 
PREVOWN, PREVSOC and PREVPRV 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
(No. ) % % Percent 
REVOWN 
0 No 12161 67.0 69.5 69.5 
1 Yes 5327 29.3 30.5 100.0 
Subtotal 17488 96.3 100.0 
Missing Value 670 3.7 
Total 18158 100.0 
REVSOC 
0 No 10925 60.2 62.5 62.5 
1 Yes 6563 36.1 37.5 100.0 
Subtotal 17488 96.3 100.0 
Missing Value 670 3.7 
Total 18158 100.0 
REVPRV 
0 No 14822 81.6 84.8 84.8 
1 Yes 2666 14.7 15.2 100.0 
Subtotal 17488 96.3 100.0 
Missing Value 670 3.7 
Total 18158 
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" Neighbourhood Quality 
Neighbourhood quality variables are recoded from the ACORN group variable in the 
1996 SHCS data. As discussed in the second section, the ACORN group variable is 
the best alternative variable to proxy the neighbourhood quality in the 1996 SHCS 
data. The ACORN group variable divides neighbourhood quality into eight different 
groups associated with different tenure types as shown in Table 5.19. The explanation 
of these groups in the ACORN group variable describes whether or not the 
neighbourhood is predominated by (1) affluent owners or by seven other different 
groups listed in Table 5.19. 
Table 5.19 Frequency Table of ACORN Group Variable 
Frequency 
o. 
Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
1. Affluent owners 2132 . 
11.7 11.7 11.7 
2. Prosperous owners 3237 17.8 17.8 29.6 
3. Agricultural 801 4.4 4.4 34.0 
4. Private inner city tenant 2049 11.3 11.3 45.3 
5. Better off council tenants 3611 19.9 19.9 65.2 
6. Less well off council tenants 2774 15.3 15.3 80.4 
7. Older council tenants 1816 10.0 10.0 90.4 
8. Poorest council tenants 1735 9.6 9.6 100.0 
9. Unallocated 2 0.0001 0.0 100.0 
Subtotal 18157 100.0 100.0 
Missing Value 1 0.00006 
Total 18158 100.0 
Because of a lack of clear description of these neighbourhood conditions in the 
ACORN group variable, it is difficult for this thesis to distinguish a significant quality 
difference between these neighbourhood conditions. " Therefore, this thesis adopts 
three dummy variables-whether or not the neighbourhood is predominated by (1) 
affluent owners (AFFOWN=1), (2) private inner city tenants (PRVTCITY=1), and (3) 
poorest council tenants (POORCNL=1), as shown in Table 5.20. These three dummy 
variables present a clear and significantly different neighbourhood quality, 
respectively, and also are associated with different tenure types. Thus, it is significant 
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to examine the household's tenure choice behaviour when facing these three 
extremely different neighbourhood qualities. 
Table 5.20 Frequency Table of Three Dummy Variables of Neighbourhood 
Quality-AFFOWN, PRVTCITY and POORCNL 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
(No. ) % (%) Percent 
FOWN 
0 No 16023 88.3 88.3 88.3 
1 Yes 2132 11.7 11.7 100.0 
Subtotal 18155 100.0 100.0 
Missing Value 3 0.0002 
Total 18158 100.0 
PR VTCIT 
0 No 16106 88.7 88.7 88.7 
1 Yes 2049 11.3 11.3 100.0 
Subtotal 18155 100.0 100.0 
Missing Value 3 0.0002 
Total 18158 100.0 
OORCNL 
0 No 16420 90.4 90.4 90.4 
1 Yes 1735 9.6 9.6 100.0 
Subtotal 18155 100.0 100.0 
Missing Value 3 0.0002 
Total 18158 100.0 
Based on above analysis and the discussion in the second section, a total of 23 
explanatory variables are initially selected for the two tenure choice models. The 
descriptive statistics of these explanatory variables are shown in Table 5.21. It is 
noted that the figures in Table 5.21 present row descriptive statistics of these variables 
where each variable has its different number of valid observations. The bottom of the 
second column shows the total valid observations of the sample are 13114. This 
means that after knocking out all missing value cases of each household in the sample, 
13 For example, it is difficult to draw a clear line between affluent owners and prosperous owners and 
also between better off council tenants and less well off council tenants. 
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there are 13114 observations containing full valid values of these explanatory 
variables. This figure is also the total sample cases of the two tenure choice models. 
Table 5.21 Descriptive Statistics of Initial Explanatory Variables of the Tenure 
Choice Models 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
GE 18064 16.00 102.00 50.9779 17.6175 
GESQ 18064 256.00 10404.00 2909.1003 1889.6365 
EPCH 18158 0 7 . 58 . 97 
MARRY 18158 . 00 1.00 . 5752 . 4943 
MALE 18158 . 00 1.00 . 6967 . 4597 
FULLWORK 18158 . 00 1.00 . 4681 . 4990 
ARTWORK 18158 . 00 1.00 4.411 E-02 . 2054 
UNEMPLOY 18158 . 00 1.00 6.04111-02 . 2383 
TIRE 18158 . 00 1.00 . 2730 . 4455 
REVOWN 17488 . 00 1.00 . 2952 . 4562 
REVSOC 17488 . 00 1.00 . 3637 . 4811 
REVPRV 17488 . 00 1.00 . 1478 . 3549 
OUSE 17705 . 00 1.00 . 6249 . 
4842 
1KMOV2 18158 . 00 1.00 . 1290 . 3352 
URBAN 18158 . 00 1.00 . 7935 . 4048 
FOWN 18155 . 00 1.00 . 1174 . 3219 
RVTC1TY 18155 . 00 1.00 . 1128 . 3164 
OORCNL 18155 . 00 1.00 9.556E-02 . 2940 
NPERINC 18040 7.73 10.43 9.2038 . 4628 
LNUCC-1 15037 5.34 9.55 7.9589 . 3654 
LNUCN-1 13847 4.82 9.55 7.6562 . 3994 
TMORT 14450 . 00 1.00 . 4487 . 4974 
TSOC 18158 . 00 1.00 . 6398 . 4801 
alid N (listwise) 13114 
5.4.2 Correlation Analysis 
It is common to fmd that explanatory variables such as those shown above have some 
degree of correlation. If some explanatory variables are highly correlated, then it is 
very difficult to separate the individual effects of these variables (Greene 2000). In 
this case, the multicollinearity problem becomes severe and the estimation results of 
the tenure choice models are spurious. As Green (2000) states, since 
nonexperminental data will never be completely orthogonal (no correlation between 
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variables), to some extent multicollinearity will always exist. To cope with the 
multicollinearity problem, one remedy is to obtain more data and another is to drop 
variables suspected of causing the multicollinearity problem (ibid. ). Due to data 
limitations, the approach used in this thesis to improve multicollinearity of the tenure 
choice models is to drop variables which are highly correlated. A correlation analysis 
of these explanatory variables can help us to point out some suspected variables. 
In a correlation analysis, the correlation coefficient itself has the following range of 
values: (1) +1.0 denotes a perfect positive correlation, (2) 0.0 denotes no correlation, 
(3) -1.0 denotes perfect negative correlation (Williams 1992). With respect to the 
degree of correlation between variables, Guilford (1956) suggests a rough guide of the 
correlation coefficients as follows: (quoted from Williams 1992, p. 137) 
0.20< slight; almost negligible relationship 
0.20-0.40 low correlation; definite but small relationship 
0.40-0.70 moderate correlation; substantial relationship 
0.70-0.90 high correlation; marked relationship 
>0.90 very high correlation; very dependable relationship 
Table 5.22 Correlation Analysis of Some Explanatory Variables with Moderate to 
High Correlation 
Age Marry Male Fullwork Retire Lnperinc 
Fullwork -0.503* 0.402* 0.358* 1.00 -0.575* 0.599* 
Retire 0.743* -0.201 * -0.176* -0.575* 1.00 -0.461* 
Lnperinc -0.489* 0.797* 0.586* 0.599* -0.461* 1.00 
Ratsoc -0.417* 0.323* 0.253* 0.603* -0.518* 0.516* 
Ratmort -0.008 -0.404* -0.291 * -0.241 * 0.028* -0.421 * 
Notes: the correlation coefficient is the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation 
Coefficient. 
* significant at 5% level. 
Table 5.22 shows the correlation analysis of some explanatory variables, which are 
moderately or highly correlated. A full correlation table of all explanatory variables is 
shown in Appendix A. 5.3. Apparently, the household head's age and retired 
household heads are highly correlated. The correlation between married household 
head and household long term income is remarkably high. It is reasonable to see that 
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household long term income has a moderate correlation to some of the household 
head's demographic variables and employment variables since the estimation of 
household long term income is based on these variables as discussed in the second 
section. In the meantime, the social housing rationing variable is derived from 
household income and employment variables. As a result, the social housing rationing 
variable has a moderate degree of correlation to these variables. 
As Green (2000) suggests, when some explanatory variables are perfectly or highly 
correlated, multicollinearity becomes a serious problem to the model. Therefore, the 
focus is on explanatory variables with high correlation. In this sense, there are four 
explanatory variables: the household head's age, marital status, retired household 
heads and household long term income, all of which could possibly be dropped in 
order to cope with a severe problem of multicollinearity in the specification. Among 
these four variables, the household head's age and marital status are the basic 
determinants of tenure choice and also household long term income is an important 
determinant. Under this circumstance, the dummy variable of whether the household 
head is retired or not is dropped out of the tenure choice models to minimise the 
multicollinearity problem. However, it should be noted that multicollinearity can still 
be a problem distorting the estimation results of the tenure choice models, since it still 
exhibits a high degree of correlation between household long term income and the 
household head's marital status. 
Finally, after dropping the dummy variable of retired household heads, a total of 22 
explanatory variables are selected to estimate their influences on households' tenure 
choice behaviour. The descriptive statistics of these explanatory variables are 
reported in Table 5.23. 
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Table 5.23 Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables of the Tenure Choice 
Models 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
GE 13114 16.00 97.00 51.2778 17.7229 
GESQ 13114 256.00 9409.00 2943.4499 1898.4888 
EPCH 13114 0 7 . 58 . 96 
MARRY 13114 . 00 1.00 . 5778 . 4939 
MALE 13114 . 00 1.00 . 6925 . 4615 
FULLWORK 13114 . 00 1.00 . 4455 . 4970 
ARTWORK 13114 . 00 1.00 4.598E-02 . 2095 
UNEMPLOY 13114 . 00 1.00 6.001E-02 . 2375 
OUSE 13114 . 00 1.00 . 6257 . 4839 
REVOWN 13114 . 00 1.00 . 2926 . 4550 
REVSOC 13114 . 00 1.00 . 3730 . 4836 
REVPRV 13114 . 00 1.00 . 1462 . 3533 
IKMOV2 13114 . 00 1.00 . 1246 . 3303 
URBAN 13114 . 00 1.00 . 7989 . 4008 
AFFOWN 13114 . 00 1.00 . 1150 . 3190 
RVTCITY 13114 . 00 1.00 . 1071 . 3093 
OORCNL 13114 . 00 1.00 9.989E-02 . 2999 
NPERINC 13114 7.81 10.43 9.1981 . 4568 
NUCC 1 13114 5.34 9.49 7.9451 . 3596 
NUCCN 1 13114 4.82 9.49 7.6690 . 3796 
PLATMORT 13114 . 00 1.00 . 4502 . 4975 
TSOC 13114 . 00 1.00 . 6222 . 4848 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter discusses the empirical data and variables used in the two different 
structures of tenure choice models. The 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey data 
set contains large samples and rich information about households' socio-economic 
characteristics and dwelling conditions, which are useful to estimate the Scottish 
households' tenure choice behaviour. Inevitably, the 1996 SHCS data set does not 
contain all the variables needed for the two tenure choice models. Some important 
variables are constructed in this chapter. 
In the MNL tenure choice model, the dependent variable is the household's current 
tenure status including owner-occupation, social renting and private renting. The 
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explanatory variables come from several categories including the household's 
demographic characteristics, employment status, previous tenure status, location, 
expected mobility, dwelling type and neighbourhood quality variables. These 
variables are expected to have important impacts on tenure choice. This thesis also 
constructs household long-term income, the user cost, housing (economic) subsidy 
and rationing variables to estimate households' tenure decisions. The use of long term 
income implies the household's tenure decision is based on long term and multiple 
periods instead of the current and single period. The housing user cost presents the 
relative cost of owning, social renting and private renting. The economic subsidy 
reduces the user cost, thus the effect can be expressed by estimating the difference 
between the user cost and the net user cost. The mortgage rationing and social 
housing rationing variables are developed by simulating households' access 
constraints into the owner-occupied sector and the social rented sector respectively. 
In the NMNL mobility and tenure choice model, the dependent variable is the 
household's move-stay and tenure status including stay, owner-occupation, social 
renting and private renting. If a household has moved within two years, the household 
is defined as a recent mover and is assigned to its current tenure status. The 
explanatory variables of the mobility and tenure choice model are drawn from the first 
tenure choice model. As a requirement of the nested logit model, the explanatory 
variables need to be interacted with four possible choices in order to estimate the 
interactive coefficients of these four alternative choices. One exception is the user 
cost variable which is treated as an attribute across tenures. To emphasise the area 
variation, the user cost in the model is measured by the average cost across tenures 
and across all 32 unitary authorities in Scotland. 
The household's mobility decision and tenure choice are interdependent. Hence, it is 
expected that some variables such as the household's age, sex, marital status, the 
number of dependent children, employment, household long-term income and 
neighbourhood quality would have influences on both mobility decision and tenure 
choice. These variables will be examined in the next chapter. Moreover, in the 
discussion of the properties of the data, this thesis explains the process of selecting the 
explanatory variables, in particular the employment status variables, previous tenure 
status variables and the neighbourhood quality variables which are recoded from the 
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original variables in the 1996 SHCS. A correlation analysis of these explanatory 
variables is also discussed in this chapter. In order to minimise the multicollinearity 
problem, this thesis drops some improper variables which involve a high degree of 
correlation. Thus, it would help to select appropriate explanatory variables applied to 
the two tenure choice models. Finally, it would be of interest to analyse the influences 
of these appropriate explanatory variables on the household's tenure choice and also 
to compare the estimation results of the two tenure choice models. The next chapter is 
the analysis of model results. 
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CHAPTER SIX ANALYSIS OF MODEL RESULTS 
This chapter analyses the estimation results of the two tenure choice models. There 
are three sections in this chapter. The first section interprets the estimation results of 
the multinomial logit form of tenure choice model. The second section analyses the 
estimation results of the nested multinomial logit form of mobility and tenure choice 
model. The last section is an overall analysis of the two model results. 
6.1 Estimation Results of the Tenure Choice Model 
The multinomial logit form of the tenure choice model is run by the LIMDEP 
software programme. " As discussed in Chapter Four, the multinomial logit model is 
estimated by the maximum likelihood approach. In order to analyse the economic 
subsidy effect and the rationing effect, this thesis examines three separate models 
containing different combinations of explanatory variables. Model One is the basic 
model without economic subsidy and rationing variables. Model Two estimates the 
economic (housing) subsidy effect and contains all the variables in the first model 
except for the net user cost variable. As discussed in the last chapter, the economic 
subsidy effect is expressed as the difference between the user cost and the net user 
cost. Model Three estimates both the economic subsidy effect and the rationing effect, 
and contains all the variables of the second model and adds mortgage rationing and 
social housing rationing variables. The estimation results of these three models are 
discussed below. The full estimation results of these three models run by LIMDEP 
programme are reported in Appendix A. 6.1. 
6.1.1 Model One 
The estimation results of model one are reported in Table 6.1. The default tenure in 
the MNL tenure choice model is owner-occupation, the coefficient estimates in the 
second column and the fourth column of Table 6.1 are the probabilities of choosing 
social renting and private renting, compared to owner-occupation respectively. It is 
important to note that the coefficient estimates are the comparative coefficients, which 
16 LIMDEP is a flexible computer programme for estimating a variety of models. Specifically it is very 
powerful for discrete choice models, such as the MNL model and the NMNL model. 
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are compared to the default tenure - owner-occupation. Table 6.1 shows that most 
coefficient estimates in model one are statistically significant at 1% level, which 
means that most explanatory variables have statistically significant influences (in the 
99% confidence interval) on households' tenure decisions. The model's overall 
predicted level (goodness-of-fit) is nearly 80%, indicating that the model is quite 
reliable and the explanatory variables have good predictions on tenure choice. 
Table 6.1 Estimation Results of the MNL Tenure Choice Model-Model One. 
Dependent Variable = Tenure 
Default tenure = Owner-Occupation 
00 = Owner-Occupation; SR = Social Renting; PR = Private Renting 
SROO PROO 




Constant 50.25 *** 27.32 *** 
Age 0.047 *** -0.098. *** 
Agesq -0.0008 *** 0.0005 *** 
Ndepch 0.617 *** 0.270 *** 
Marry 1.093 *** -0.378 ** 
Male -0.103 Insig 0.296 
Fullwork -1.007 *** -0.886 *** 
Partwork -0.136 Insig -0.868 *** 
Unemploy 0.986 *** 0.809 *** 
House -0.483 *** 0.160 Insig 
Prevown -1.228 *** -0.405 *** 
Prevsoc 0.722 *** 0.489 *** 
Prevprv 0.289 *** 1.124 *** 
Likmov2 0.197 ** 1.310 *** 
Urban 0.066 Insig -0.808 *** 
Affown -1.712 *** 0.274 
Prvtcity -1.775 *** 0.573 *** 
Poorcnl 1.145 *** 0.307 Insig 
LnPerinc -3.201 *** -1.169 *** 
LnUcc 1 -2.710 *** -1.921 *** 
Log Likelihood -6703.9 
Predicted Level 79.2% 
"N 13114 
Notes: Sigr iticant at 1 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 per cent level. 
* Significant at 10 per cent level. 
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Insig : Insignificant. 
With regard to the choice between social renting and owner-occupation, it is 
surprising to see that the household head's age has a positive effect on social renting 
compared to owner-occupation. The coefficient of the household head's age is 
interpreted as when the household head's age increases, say one year, the probability 
of the household head choosing social renting increases 5%, compared to owner- 
occupation, holding other variables constant. Similar interpretation applies to other 
explanatory variables. The negative effect of the age-square of household heads 
explains that the probability of choosing social renting increases at a slower rate. 
However, it is not expected that households who have more dependent children are 
more likely to choose social renting rather than owner-occupation. Nor is it expected 
that married household heads are more likely to choose social renting than owner- 
occupation. To some degree, the positive effects of the household head's age, marital 
status and number of dependent children on choosing social renting suggest that, in 
this sample, older and matured households are more likely to stay in the social rented 
sector, compared to owner-occupation. According to the 1996 SHCS main report, 
published by Scottish Homes (1997), more than 40% of older households and single 
pensioners stay in the social rented sector. In contrast, more than 40% of single and 
small adult households are homeowners. 
With respect to the household head's employment status, the results show that 
household heads who have full-time jobs have a strongly negative coefficient of 
choosing social renting compared to owner-occupation. In other words, households 
having full time jobs are much more likely to choose owner-occupation rather than 
social renting. In contrast, unemployed household heads have a strongly positive 
coefficient of choosing social renting than owner-occupation. In general, unemployed 
household heads have lower incomes, thus they are more likely to choose lower costs 
of social housing than owner-occupation. 
As expected, the model results show that households who live in houses are more 
likely to choose owner-occupation than social renting. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
most houses in Scotland are owner-occupied. Therefore, it is most likely the case that 
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households who live in or want to live in houses could only be owner-occupiers. With 
respect to previous tenure status, the results show that the household's previous tenure 
status has statistically and numerically significant influences on tenure decision. 
Household heads who were previously homeowners have a strongly negative 
coefficient of choosing social renting compared to owner-occupation. In contrast, 
household heads who were previously social tenants are more likely to continue to 
stay in social housing. These results together suggest that households are more likely 
to continue to choose the same tenure as their previous one when making their tenure 
decisions. In the choice between social renting and owner-occupation, the results 
show that households who were previously private tenants are more likely to choose 
social renting compared to owner-occupation. 
With regard to expected mobility, it was found that households who expect to move 
within two years are more likely to choose social renting compared to owner- 
occupation. This implies that owner-occupiers could be less mobile than social 
tenants in Scotland. In addition, the results show that the urban/rural indicator does 
not have a statistically significant influence on households' choice between social 
renting and owner-occupation. As discussed in Chapter Four, the simple definition of 
the urban/rural indicator in the 1996 SHCS cannot present the spatial concentration of 
certain tenure type of dwellings in Scotland. For instance, the spatial concentration of 
owner-occupied dwellings in the suburbs and social rented dwellings in the inner city 
and periphery could all be defined as in the urban area in this urban/rural indicator. 
Thus, it does not show a clear relationship between location and households' tenure 
decisions. 
Neighbourhood quality is also found to have a significant influence (numerically and 
statistically) on the household's tenure decision. As discussed in Chapter Five, since 
the neighbourhood quality variables are associated with tenure types, it is not 
surprising to see that households in high quality neighbourhoods predominated by 
affluent owners have a strongly negative coefficient of choosing social renting, 
compared to owner-occupation. In general, households living in the neighbourhood 
predominated by owner-occupied dwellings may not have choices to other two tenures. 
In this sense, households in the poorest council housing neighbourhood may not have 
choices or may not afford to other two tenures. Therefore, the results show that 
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households in poor quality neighbourhoods which are predominated by the poorest 
council tenants have a strongly positive likelihood of choosing social renting 
compared to owner-occupation. More importantly, it is of interest to examine the 
effect of the neighbourhood quality variable on other tenures, which are not the 
predominant tenure in the neighbourhood. The results show that households in 
medium quality inner city neighbourhood predominated by private tenants are more 
likely to choose owner-occupation rather than social renting. 
It was found that household long-term income has the most substantively negative 
impact on choosing social renting compared to owner-occupation, and its coefficient 
magnitude is the biggest among the explanatory variables. In other words, when 
income increases, households have the strongest probability of choosing owner- 
occupation than social renting. The user cost, as expected, has a strongly negative 
coefficient of choosing social renting compared to owner-occupation. Although each 
household has its individual user costs associated with its current tenure, the results of 
the user cost can generally be interpreted as in the choice between social renting and 
owner-occupation, households in all three tenures are more likely to choose owner- 
occupation when the household's individual user costs increase. Moreover, if we look 
at the coefficient magnitudes of these two explanatory variables, the results indicate 
that household long-term income and the user cost are the most important 
determinants of tenure choice in Scotland. 
Regarding the choice between private renting and owner-occupation, the results show 
that the probability of choosing private renting declines with an increase in the age of 
the household head. Married household heads are less likely to choose private renting 
compared to owner-occupation. These results together suggest that younger and 
single households are more likely to choose private renting rather than owner- 
occupation. As Scottish Homes (1997) indicate, younger and single households have 
shorter length of occupancy and have higher propensity to move than older and large 
family households. In this sense, younger and single households are more likely to 
choose the lower transaction costs of private renting rather than owner-occupation. 
However, it is not expected that male household heads and households having more 
dependent children are more likely to choose private renting than owner-occupation. 
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The causes of incorrect effects are complicated. " The multicollinearity problem, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, could be the primary cause of these incorrect effect. 
The results show that household heads who have full time or part time jobs are less 
likely to choose private renting compared to owner-occupation. In contrast, 
unemployed household heads are more likely to choose private renting rather than 
owner-occupation. In general, households in better employment status have higher 
incomes, thus it is more likely for them to choose secure tenure like owner-occupation 
rather than private renting. In this sense, unemployed households are more likely to 
choose the lower costs of private renting than owner-occupation. 
In respect of the household's previous tenure status, the results suggest that 
households are more likely to choose the same tenure as their previous one when 
making a tenure decision. Households who were previously private tenants have a 
numerically and statistically strong probability of staying in private renting. The 
results also show that households who are likely to move within two years have a 
strong probability of choosing private renting rather than owner-occupation. This 
result also supports an earlier interpretation that younger and single household heads 
are more mobile. Therefore, they are more likely to choose likely to choose lower 
transaction costs of private renting rather than owner-occupation. 
With regard to the urban/rural location, the results show that households living in 
urban areas are less likely to choose private renting compared to owner-occupation. 
According to Scottish Homes (1997), there is a substantial number of privately rented 
dwellings located in rural areas of Scotland, thus households in rural areas would have 
higher propensity to live in private renting dwellings. As expected, households who 
live in neighbourhoods which are predominated by inner city private tenants are more 
likely to choose private renting than owner-occupation. In general, households in the 
neighbourhood dominated by private renting dwelling may not have many choices to 
other tenures. However, it is not expected that households living in neighbourhoods 
predominated by affluent owners have a positive coefficient of choosing private 
renting rather than owner-occupation. However, the coefficient is barely statistically 
17 In addition to the multicollinearity problem, this thesis found that the Limdep computer programme is 
very sensitive in specification of the discrete choice models. Therefore, a smaller sample size such as 
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significant (at the 10% level). Households living in the poorest council housing 
neighbourhoods are found to have statistically insignificant coefficient of choosing 
owner-occupation or private renting. As discussed above, the poorest council tenants 
may not have any choices or afford to other tenures. 
The household long-term income and the user cost are found to have strongly negative 
coefficients of choosing private renting compared to owner-occupation. The results 
suggest that when income increases, households are more likely to choose owner- 
occupation than private renting. To some extent, the strongly negative effect of the 
user costs on private renting implies that households in the private rented sector are 
more sensitive to increases in the user costs than owner-occupiers. In this sense, when 
the user cost increases, households are more likely to choose owner-occupation 
compared to private renting. Again, if the coefficient magnitude is examined, the 
results suggest that household long-term income and the user cost are the most 
important determinants of tenure choice. 
6.1.2 Model Two 
Model Two aims to estimate the economic (housing) subsidy effect on households' 
tenure decisions. In model Two, the user cost variable is replaced by the net user cost. 
As stated in Chapter Five, the net user cost is derived by the user cost subtracting the 
economic subsidy. Other explanatory variables are the same as Model One. The 
goodness-of-fit of Model Two is better than model one indicating that the economic 
subsidy effect has a significant influence on the household's tenure decision. 
Furthermore, since the only one variable to be replaced in Model Two is the net user 
cost, the change in the user cost would alter coefficients of some other explanatory 
variables in the model. This indicates that the changes in coefficient estimates of 
other explanatory variables are affected by the economic subsidy. The estimation 
results of Model Two are reported in Table 6.2. 
private tenants or a small piece of difference in sample could derive a significantly different result. 
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Table 6.2 Estimation Results of the MNL Tenure Choice Model-Model One and 
Model Two. 
Dependent Variable = Tenure 
Reference tenure = Owner-Occupation 
00 = Owner-Occupation; SR = Social Renting; PR = Private Renting 
Model One Model Two 
SR: OO PROD SR: OO PR: OO 








Constant 50.25 *** 27.32 *** 56.31 *** 14.489 *** 
Age 0.047 *** -0.098 *** 0.016 Innig -0.098 *** 
Agesq -0.0008 *** 0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** 
Ndepch 0.617 *** 0.270 *** 0.620 *** 0.226 *** 
Marry 1.093 *** -0.378 1.113 *** -0.253 ** 
Male -0.103 Innig 0.296 -0.159 * 0.232 
Fullwork -1.007 *** -0.886 *** -0.890 *** -0.671 *** 
Partwork -0.136 Insig -0.868 *** -0.128 Innig -0.720 *** 
Unemploy 0.986 *** 0.809 *** 1.067 *** 0.911 *** 
House -0.483 *** 0.160 Innig -0.606 *** -0.221 
Prevown -1.228 *** -0.405 *** -1.053 *** -0.577 *** 
Prevsoc 0.722 *** 0.489 *** 0.793 *** 0.484 *** 
Prevprv 0.289 *** 1.125 *** 0.300 *** 0.972 *** 
Likmov2 0.197 1.310 *** 0.159 1.167 *** 
Urban 0.066 Innig -0.808 *** 0.016 Innig -0.917 *** 
Affown -1.712 *** 0.274 -1.662 *** 0.052 Insig 
Prvtcity -1.775 *** 0.572 *** -1.764 *** 0.300 
Poorcnl 1.145 *** 0.308 Innig 1.361 *** 0.435 
LnPerinc -3.201 *** -1.169 *** -3.142 *** -1.401 *** 
LnUcc 1 -2.710 *** -1.921 *** 
LnUccn 1 -3.583 *** -0.831 Innig 
Log Likelihood -6703.9 -6366.5 
Predicted Level 79.2% 81.8% 
N 13114 13114 
Notes: *** : Significant at 1 per cent level. 
** : Significant at 5 per cent level. 
*: Significant at 10 per cent level. 
Insig . Insignificant. 
Affecting by the economic subsidy effect, several variables have changed their 
statistical significance. The household head's age has become statistically 
insignificant in choosing between social renting and owner-occupation. Compared to 
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Model One, female household heads have stronger positive coefficient of choosing 
social renting than owner-occupation but the coefficient is barely significant. In 
general, low-income households and vulnerable groups are more likely to choose the 
lower cost of social renting rather than to be homeowner. According to Scottish 
Homes (1997), female household heads have lower incomes than male household 
heads. In this sense, female household heads are more likely to choose social renting 
than owner-occupation. 
It was found that economic subsidy has a (statistically and numerically) significant 
influence on the user cost. After subsidy, the net user cost turns out to have a stronger 
negative coefficient when choosing social renting than the user cost does. Moreover, 
influenced by the economic subsidy effect, more than half of explanatory variables in 
Model Two have increased their coefficient magnitudes. These results together 
indicate that economic subsidy has a substantive effect on the user cost as well as on 
the household's choice between social renting and owner-occupation. 
Regarding the household's choice between private renting and owner-occupation, 
Influenced by the economic subsidy effect, male household heads have less statistical 
and numerical effects on choosing private renting compared to owner-occupation. 
After the subsidy effect, households who live in houses have increased their 
probability of choosing owner-occupation compared to private renting but the 
coefficient is barely statistically significant. The results show that the net user cost 
has become statistically insignificant in choosing between private renting and owner- 
occupation. As discussed in Chapter Five, after subsidy, the net user cost for private 
tenants is higher than the net user cost for owner-occupiers (see Table 5.9). This 
dramatic change has impacts on reducing the statistical and numerical effect of the net 
user cost on choosing between private renting and owner-occupation. 
6.1.3 Model Three 
Model Three examines both the economic subsidy effect and the rationing effect on 
households' tenure decisions. The mortgage rationing and the social housing 
rationing variables are included in this model, other explanatory variables are the 
same as Model Two. The goodness-of-fit in Model Three is better than Model Two, 
which suggests that Model Three has a better prediction on tenure choice than Model 
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Two. This also suggests that the two rationing factors have statistically significant 
influences on tenure choice. The estimation results of Model Three are reported in 
Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Estimation Results of the MNL Tenure Choice Models-Model Two 
and Model Three. 
Dependent Variable = Tenure 
Reference tenure = Owner-Occupation 
00 = Owner-Occupation; SR = Social Renting; PR = Private Renting 
Model Two Model Three 
SR: OO PROO SROO PR: OO 








Constant 56.31 *** 14.489 *** 43.87 *** 8.709 *** 
Age 0.016 Insig -0.098 *** 0.049 *** -0.065 *** 
Agesq -0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** -0.0006 *** 0.0004 ** 
Ndepch 0.620 *** 0.226 *** 0.649 *** 0.263 *** 
Marry 1.113 *** -0.253 1.361 *** 0.128 Insig 
Male -0.159 * 0.232 * -0.229 0.212 Insig 
Fullwork -0.890 *** -0.671 *** -0.280 *** -0.514 *** 
Partwork -0.128 Insig -0.720 *** 0.430 * -0.410 Insig 
Uneniploy 1.067 *** 0.911 *** 1.178 *** 1.033 *** 
House -0.606 *** -0.221 * -0.812 *** -0.336 ** 
Prevown -1.053 *** -0.577 *** -1.299 *** -0.979 *** 
Prevsoc 0.793 *** 0.484 *** 0.656 *** 0.279 ** 
Prevprv 0.300 *** 0.972 *** 0.117 Insig 0.762 *** 
Likmov2 0.159 1.167 *** 0.339 *** 1.428 *** 
Urban 0.016 Insig -0.917 *** -0.185 -1.077 
Affown -1.662 *** 0.052 Insig -1.848 *** -0.165 Insig 
Prvtcity -1.764 *** 0.300 -1.913 *** 0.202 Insig 
Poorcnl 1.361 *** 0.435 1.462 *** 0.557 
LnPerinc -3.142 *** -1.401 *** -1.486 *** -0.352 Insig 
LnUcc_1 
LnUccn 1 -3.583 *** -0.831 Insig -4.248 *** -0.801 *** 
Ratmort 3.289 *** 2.920 *** 
Ratsoc -0.713 *** -0.261 * 
Log Likelihood -6366.5 -5022.8 
Predicted Level 81.8% 86.4% 
N 13114 13114 
Notes: *** : Significant at 1 per cent level. 
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** : Significant at 5 per cent level. 
*: Significant at 10 per cent level. 
Insig.: Insignificant. 
With respect to the choice between social renting and owner-occupation, once the 
mortgage rationing and social rationing variables have been included, most 
explanatory variables have increased their coefficient magnitudes. This suggests that 
the two rationing variables have substantive influences on other explanatory variables, 
which strengthen their influences on tenure choice. In particular, influenced by the 
rationing effect, the coefficient magnitude of the net user cost has significantly 
increased, which turns out to have a stronger negative probability of choosing social 
renting compared to owner-occupation. Two variables, male household heads and 
households in urban areas also have significantly increased their coefficient 
magnitudes and statistical significance after the rationing effect. 
Some variables, however, have significantly reduced their coefficient magnitudes and 
the statistical significance level after the rationing effect. Influenced by the rationing 
effect, household heads having full time jobs have a less negative probability of 
choosing social renting compared to owner-occupation. Households who have part 
time jobs turns to have a barely significant effect on choosing social renting after the 
rationing effect. Households who were previously private tenants have also become 
statistically insignificant in choosing between social renting and owner-occupation 
after the rationing effect. In particular, household long-term income has significantly 
reduced its coefficient magnitude after the rationing effect. To some extent, the 
changes in coefficients of the employment status and the household long-term income 
are probably affected by the mortgage rationing variable rather than by social housing 
rationing. As discussed in Chapter Four, the mortgage rationing variable is primarily 
derived from household income and hedonic house prices. Further, there is a 
moderate degree of correlation between household income and the employment status 
variables as discussed in Chapter Five. 
More importantly, the two rationing variables are found to have statistically and 
numerically significant influences on tenure choice. Mortgage rationing has a strong 
and significant role in constraining households who are potentially not qualified for 
mortgages. In this sense, households who are constrained from mortgages are more 
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likely to choose social renting. On the other hand, social housing rationing plays an 
opposite role in filtering out households with higher income and better economic 
status thus enabling low-income households and vulnerable groups to enter the social 
rented sector. In this sense, households who are potentially constrained from the 
social housing sector are more likely to choose owner-occupation. 
Regarding the choice between private renting and owner-occupation, the results show 
that because of the influence of the rationing effect, several variables have 
significantly reduced their coefficient magnitudes and also the statistical significance 
level. The household head's gender and marital status and household heads having 
part time jobs have become statistically insignificant in determining whether private 
renting or owner-occupation after the rationing effect. In contrast, households living 
in houses have become more significant and have stronger negative coefficient of 
choosing private renting than owner-occupation after the rationing effect. Further, the 
two rationing variables also significantly affect the neighbourhood quality variables. 
Households living in medium quality inner city neighbourhoods predominated by 
private tenants have become statistically insignificant in choosing between private 
renting and owner-occupation. However, households in the poorest council housing 
neighbourhoods have a stronger probability of choosing private renting compared to 
owner-occupation after the rationing effect. As discussed earlier, influenced by the 
two rationing variables (primarily the mortgage rationing variable), household long- 
term income has reduced its coefficient magnitude and statistical significance level of 
choosing between private renting and owner-occupation. 
As stated earlier, the mortgage rationing plays a strong role in filtering out households 
who could potentially not obtain mortgages. In this case, households who are 
potentially constrained from mortgages have a statistically significant and strong 
probability of choosing private renting. However, households who are potentially 
constrained from the social rented sector are more likely to choose owner-occupation 




Among these three models, Model Three provides the best prediction on the 
household's tenure choice behaviour. Most explanatory variables in these three 
models have statistically significant influences on tenure choice, indicating that tenure 
choice is influenced not only by households' demographic and socio-economic 
attributes but also by housing attributes such as dwelling type, location and 
neighbourhood quality. In particular, the household long-term income and the user 
cost are the most important determinants of tenure choice since the coefficient 
magnitudes of these two variables are bigger than other explanatory variables. When 
income increases, households have a statistically significant and strong likelihood of 
choosing owner-occupation rather than social renting or private renting. As the user 
cost increases, households have a strongly negative likelihood of choosing social 
renting or private renting, compared to owner-occupation. To some extent, this 
implies that social tenants and private tenants are more sensitive to increases in the 
user cost than owner-occupiers. 
Housing subsidy in economic terms is found to have important influences on tenure 
choice. After subsidy, the net user cost turns to have a stronger negative likelihood of 
choosing social housing compared to owner-occupation. In contrast, after subsidy, the 
net user cost for private tenants is higher than that for owner-occupiers. This change 
has reduced the influence (the coefficient magnitude and statistical significance level) 
of the net user cost on households' choosing between private renting and owner- 
occupation. Furthermore, the two rationing factors have significant effects on 
households' tenure decisions. Mortgage rationing and social housing rationing play 
an important role in filtering ineligible households from becoming homeowners and 
social tenants respectively. 
The multinomial logit form of tenure choice model however, has its limitations in 
terms of violating the HA assumption. As a result, the MNL model results should be 
treated with caution as discussed in Chapter Four. Unlike the NML model, the nested 
multinomial logit model holds the RA assumption. The next section will analyse the 
results of the NMNL form of mobility and tenure choice model. 
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6.2 Estimation Results of the Mobility and Tenure Choice Model 
The nested multinomial logit form of mobility and tenure choice model is estimated 
by the full information maximum likelihood approach, as stated in Chapter Four. Like 
the last section, three separate models containing different combinations of 
explanatory variables are examined in this section in order to estimate the economic 
subsidy effect and the rationing effect on the household's mobility and tenure decision. 
The estimation results of these three models are discussed in turn. The full estimation 
results run by the LIMDEP programme are listed in Appendix A. 6.2. 
6.2.1 Model One 
Model One is the basic model without subsidy and rationing variables. The estimation 
results of Model One are reported in Table 6.4. The mobility and tenure choice model 
contains a two-level decision tree. The default tenure in the tenure choice level is 
owner-occupation, and in the mobility decision level is stay. The overall prediction 
level of the model is 81.69%, indicating the model has a good prediction percentage 
on the household's mobility and tenure choice behaviour. The coefficient estimates 
shown in the second column of Table 6.4 are the probabilities of the household being 
influenced by the explanatory variables to choose social renting (the variable 
interacting with social renting) and private renting (the variable interacting with 
private renting), compared to owner-occupation. Greene (1998) states that the 
interpretation of the NMNL model results is complicated since the explanatory 
variables are interacted with different possible choices. As a result, the interpretation 
of the model results focuses on the `sign' (does it have a negative or a positive impact 
on the relevant probability) and the statistical significance of the explanatory variables. 
The analysis of the model results begins at the lower level of the model - the tenure 
choice level. Before analysing the coefficient estimates of explanatory variables, the 
IIA property in the tenure choice level is firstly examined. As stated in Chapter Four, 
if the inclusive value parameter lies between 0 and 1 and is statistically significant, the 
IIA property holds in this branch. In our model, the inclusive value parameter in the 
mover branch (tenure choice branch) is 0.24 and is statistically significant, which 
indicates that the IIA property holds in the tenure choice level. Moreover, this thesis 
also applies the Hausman-McFadden's statistical test for the IIA property to the tenure 
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choice level. The results show that the chi-square value of the Hausman-McFadden's 
test is 429.6 and is statistically significant, which means that the IIA property holds in 
the tenure choice branch. The full results of the IIA test are also listed in Appendix 
A. 6.2. 
Table 6.4 Estimation Results of the NMNL Mobility and Tenure Choice Model- 
Model One 
Dependent Variable = Achoice 
Default Tenure = "Owner-occupation" in the tenure choice level; "stay" in the 
mobility decision level 
Lower Level-Tenure Choice 
Variable Coefficient Significant 
Level 
Constant -10.505 *** 
Lntcost -0.494 *** 
Agehsoc -0.011 
Agehprv -0.055 *** 
Ndepchsoc 0.312 *** 
Ndepchprv 0.176 
Marrysoc -0.802 *** 
Marryprv -0.582 *** 
Malesoc -0.411 
Maleprv 0.377 Insig 
Fullsoc -1.759 *** 
Fullprv -1.584 *** 
Partsoc -1.217 *** 
Partprv -2.237 *"* 
Unempsoc 0.781 
Unempprv 0.681 Insig 
Pvownsoc -1.142 *** 
Pvownprv -0.153 Insig 
Pvsocsoc 1.604 *** 
Pvsocprv 0.314 Insig 
Pvprvsoc 0.688 
Pvprvprv 1.218 *** 
Houssoc -1.480 *** 
Housprv -0.102 Insig 
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Urbansoc -0.501 ** 
Urbanprv -0.876 *** 
Afownsoc -1.086 *** 
Afownprv 0.050 Insig 
Pvctysoc -1.676 *** 
Pvctyprv 1.133 *** 
Pocnlsoc 1.484 *** 
Pocnlprv -0.231 Insig 
Lnincsoc -0.312 *** 
Lnincprv -0.850 *** 
Upper Level-Mobility Decision 
Variables Coefficients Significant 
Level 
Ageheads 0.055 *** 
Marrys -0.156 Insig 
Ndepchs 0.196 *** 
Males -0.145 Insig 
Unemps 0.115 Insig 
Lnincs 0.534 *** 
Affowns -0.017 Insig 
Pvcitys -0.197 
Porcnls 0.272 ** 
Inclusive values I! 
(Stayer) 
1.00 fixed 
Inclusive values IZ 
(Mover) 
0.243 *** 




No. Obs 52048 
Notes: '"' : Signthcant at 1 per cent level. 
** : Significant at 5 per cent level. 
*: Significant at 10 per cent level. 
Insig.: Insignificant. 
With regard to the coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables in the tenure 
choice level, the user cost, as expected, has a negative effect on tenure choice. This 
indicates that, when an increase in the user cost of certain tenure, households are less 
likely to choose that tenure. As discussed in Chapter Five, the user cost in this model 
is measured by the average cost between tenures across all 32 unitary authorities. The 
results suggest that the user cost is significantly different between tenures and across 
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unitary authorities. The age of the household head has a negative coefficient of 
choosing social renting and private renting compared to owner-occupation. This 
suggests that the probability of the household's choosing owner-occupation increases 
with the household head's age. 
The results show that the probability of choosing social renting increases with the 
number of dependent children. According the 1996 SHCS sample, households having 
less than three dependent children have a higher percentage of staying owner- 
occupation than in social renting. In contrast, households having four and more 
dependent children have a higher percentage of staying in social renting than in 
owner-occupation. In this case, it is reasonable to see the model results showing that 
households having more dependent children are more likely to choose social renting 
than owner-occupation. However, it is not expected that households having more 
dependent children are more likely to choose private renting than owner-occupation 
but the coefficient is barely statistically significant at the 10% level. The results show 
that married household heads are more likely to choose owner-occupation rather than 
social renting or private renting. In addition, female household heads are likely to 
choose social renting but the coefficient is barely statistically significant. If the 
influences of the household's demographic variables on tenure choice are examined, it 
is clear to see that older households, married couples and adult-only households are 
more likely to choose owner-occupation rather than social renting or private renting. 
Household heads who have full time or part time jobs have strongly negative 
coefficients of choosing social renting or private renting compared to owner- 
occupation. In other words, household heads having full time or part time jobs are 
much more likely to choose owner-occupation rather than other tenures. In contrast, 
unemployed household heads are more likely to choose social renting but the 
coefficient is barely statistically significant. Households' previous tenure status is 
found to have an important impact on tenure choice. The results show that households 
have a statistically significant and strong coefficient of choosing the same tenure as 
their previous one when making a moving and tenure decision. 
Households living in houses also have a statistically significant and strong coefficient 
of choosing owner-occupation rather than social renting but the coefficient is 
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statistically insignificant in choosing between private renting and owner-occupation. 
As discussed in the last section, houses are the dominant dwelling type in the owner- 
occupied sector. As a result, in many cases, households who live in or want to live in 
houses could only be owner-occupiers than tenants. Scottish Homes (1997) also 
indicate that there is a substantial number of private rented houses located in the rural 
areas of Scotland. In this case, households living in houses may not have a 
statistically significant effect on choosing between private renting and owner- 
occupation. Regarding the urban/rural location, the results show that households 
living in urban areas are more likely to choose owner-occupation than social renting 
or private renting. As stated in the last section, the simple urban/rural location 
variable cannot reflect the spatial concentration of social rented and owner-occupied 
dwellings in the inner city, periphery and suburban areas. As expected, households in 
rural areas are more likely to choose private renting than owner-occupation. As stated 
above, there is a substantial number of private rented dwellings located in rural areas, 
compared to owner-occupied dwellings. 
Neighbourhood quality is found to have an important influence on tenure choice. 
Since the neighbourhood quality variables in this thesis connect to tenure types, it is 
not surprising to see the results that households living in high quality neighbourhoods 
predominated by affluent owners are more likely to choose owner-occupation than 
social renting. Households living in medium quality inner city neighbourhoods 
predominated by private tenants are more likely to choose private renting than owner- 
occupation. More importantly, households living in inner city neighbourhoods have a 
statistically significant and strong coefficient of choosing owner-occupation rather 
than social renting. On the other hand, households living in the poorest council 
housing neighbourhoods are expected to have a strong likelihood of choosing social 
renting. The household long-term income is found to have a statistically significant 
effect on tenure choice. When income increases, households are more likely to 
choose owner-occupation than social renting or private renting. 
It is noteworthy that the household's tenure choice and mobility decision are 
interdependent. This indicates that some variables could influence both mobility 
decision and tenure choice. In the mobility decision level, the results show that the 
household head's age and the number of dependent children have statistically 
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significant effects on households' mobility decisions. The results suggest that older 
household heads and households having more dependent children are more likely to 
stay. Moreover, the household long-term income also has a remarkable impact on 
mobility decision. When income increases, households are more likely to stay. As 
expected, households living in the inner city neighbourhood predominated by private 
tenants are more likely to move than to stay. In contrast, households living in the 
poorest council housing neighbourhoods are more likely to stay. In general, private 
renting has lower transaction costs and shorter term of tenancy than social renting or 
owner-occupation. These characteristics are more likely to attract lower income 
households, and younger and single households who are more mobile. Households in 
the social rented sector are usually bounded by the allocation system, therefore, it is 
difficult for social tenants to relocate, compared with private tenants. 
6.2.2 Model Two 
Model Two aims to estimate the economic subsidy effect. In this model, the only one 
variable replaced from Model One is the net user cost. The estimation results are 
reported in Table 6.5. In the tenure choice level, the net user cost in Model Two has a 
stronger negative coefficient than the user cost in Model One. This indicates that 
economic subsidy has a significant effect on the user cost as well as on tenure choice. 
A couple of variables have their statistical significance level altered once the 
economic subsidy variable is included. Influenced by the economic subsidy effect, 
married household heads have less statistically significant likelihood of choosing 
owner-occupation rather than social renting after the economic subsidy effect. In 
contrast, unemployed household heads turn out to have stronger coefficient of 
choosing private renting than owner-occupation. Besides that, other explanatory 
variables do not have significant changes in their coefficient magnitudes after the 
economic subsidy effect. This is probably because the net user cost is an attribute 
measured for tenures not measured for the individual household like other explanatory 
variables do. Therefore, the change in the user cost may not have a significant impact 
on other explanatory variables. 
173 
Table 6.5 Estimation Results of the NMNL Mobility and Tenure Choice Model- 
Model One and Model Two 
Dependent Variable = Achoice 
Default Tenure = "Owner-occupation" in the tenure choice level; "stay" in the 
mobility decision level 
Lower Level-Tenure Choice 
Model One Model Two 




Constant -10.505 *** -12.962 *** 
Lntcost -0.494 *** 
Lnatcost -0.830 *** 
Agehsoc -0.011 * -0.011 
Agehprv -0.055 *** -0.055 *** 
Ndepchsoc 0.312 *** 0.308 *** 
Ndepchprv 0.176 * 0.186 
Marrysoc -0.802 *** -0.786 *** 
Marryprv -0.582 ** -0.429 
Malesoc -0.411 * -0.411 
Maleprv 0.377 Insig 0.376 Insig 
Fullsoc -1.759 *** -1.761 *** 
Fullprv -1.584 *** -1.519 *** 
Partsoc -1.217 *** -1.196 *** 
Partprv -2.237 *** -2.212 *** 
Unempsoc 0.781 * 0.811 ** 
Unempprv 0.681 Insig 0.719 
Pvownsoc -1.142 *** -1.134 *** 
Pvownprv -0.153 Insig -0.114 Insig 
Pvsocsoc 1.604 *** 1.609 *** 
Pvsocprv 0.314 Insig 0.305 Insig 
Pvprvsoc 0.688 *** 0.680 *** 
Pvprvprv 1.218 *** 1.197 *** 
Houssoc -1.480 *** -1.476 *** 
Housprv -0.102 Insig -0.090 Insig 
Urbansoc -0.501 ** -0.488 
Urbanprv -0.876 *** -0.865 *** 
Afownsoc -1.086 *** -1.090 *** 
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Afownprv 0.050 Insig 0.075 Insig 
Pvctysoc -1.676 *** -1.754 *** 
Pvctyprv 1.133 *** 1.054 *** 
Pocnlsoc 1.484 *** 1.442 *** 
Pocnlprv -0.231 Insig -0.309 Insig 
Lnincsoc -0.312 *** -0.295 *** 
Lnincprv -0.850 *** -1.111 *** 
Upper Level-Mobility Decision 
Model One Model Two 




Ageheads 0.055 *** 0.054 *** 
Marrys -0.156 Insig -0.152 Insig 
Ndepchs 0.196 *** 0.192 *** 
Males -0.145 Insig -0.139 Insig 
Unemps 0.115 Insig 0.137 Insig 
Lnincs 0.534 *** 0.510 *** 
Affowns -0.017 Insig 0.018 Insig 
Pvcitys -0.197 * -0.153 Insig 
Porcnls 0.272 0.242 
Inclusive values Il 
(Stayer) 
1.00 fixed 1.00 Fixed 
Inclusive values I2 
(Mover) 
0.243 *** 0.274 *** 




No. Obs 52048 52048 
Notes: *** : Significant at 1 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 per cent level. 
* Significant at 10 per cent level. 
Innig.: Insignificant. 
In the mobility decision level, influenced by the economic subsidy effect, households 
living in the inner city neighbourhood predominated by private tenants have become 
statistically insignificant in the mobility decision. Households living in the poorest 
council housing neighbourhoods have become less statistically significant in choosing 
stay. As discussed earlier, the explanatory variables in the mobility decision level are 
interrelated to the variables in the tenure choice level. Therefore, the changes in the 
coefficient magnitude and statistical significance level of the explanatory variables in 
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the mobility level could be affected by both the net user cost and the changes of other 
explanatory variables in the tenure choice level. 
6.2.3 Model Three 
Model Three estimates both the economic subsidy effect and the rationing effect. The 
mortgage rationing and social housing rationing variables are included in this model. 
Other explanatory variables are the same as in Model Two. The estimation results of 
model three are reported in Table 6.6. The goodness-of-fit of this model still remains 
at a good prediction level (81.74%), and is slightly better than Model Two. In the 
tenure choice level, a few variables have their statistical significance altered after the 
two rationing variables are included. The age of the household head has become 
statistically insignificant in choosing between social renting and owner-occupation but 
it still remains a significantly negative effect on choosing private renting. The 
household head's marital status also turns out to be statistically insignificant in 
choosing three tenure alternatives. In addition, the two rationing variables have 
substantial influences on the household head's employment status. Influenced by the 
rationing effect, household heads who have full time or part time jobs have a stronger 
coefficient of choosing owner-occupation rather than private renting. Unemployed 
household heads have a stronger and more significant likelihood of choosing private 
renting rather than owner-occupation. 
The household long-term income still has a negative effect on social renting, 
compared with owner-occupation but the coefficient magnitude reduces after the 
rationing effect. More importantly, the results show that mortgage rationing and 
social housing rationing have statistically and numerically significant effects on tenure 
choice. Households who are potentially constrained from mortgages have a strong 
coefficient of choosing private renting or social renting. On the other hand, 
households who are potentially constrained from social housing are more likely to 
choose private renting than owner-occupation. 
With regard to the mobility decision level, household long-term income becomes 
statistically insignificant in the mobility decision after the rationing effect. As stated 
earlier, the changes in household long-term income's statistical significance level and 
the coefficient magnitude in the mobility decision level could be influenced by both 
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the two rationing variables and the changes in other explanatory variables in the 
tenure choice level. 
Table 6.6 Estimation Results of the NMNL Mobility and Tenure Choice Model- 
Model Two and Model Three 
Dependent Variable = Achoice 
Default Tenure = "Owner-occupation" in the tenure choice level; "stay" in the 
mobility decision level 
Lower Level-Tenure Choice 
Model Two Model Three 




Constant -12.962 *** -6.182 *** 
Lntcost 
Lnatcost -0.830 *** -0.892 *** 
Agehsoc -0.011 -0.006 Insig 
Agehprv -0.055 *** -0.044 *** 
Ndepchsoc 0.308 *** 0.297 *** 
Ndepchprv 0.186 * 0.184 
Marrysoc -0.786 *** -0.251 Insig 
Manyprv -0.429 * -0.322 Insig 
Malesoc -0.411 * -0.381 Insig 
Maleprv 0.376 Insig 0.303 Insig 
Fullsoc -1.761 *** -1.631 *** 
Fullprv -1.519 *** -1.938 *** 
Partsoc -1.196 *** -1.119 *** 
Partprv -2.212 *** -2.523 *** 
Unempsoc 0.811 ** 0.925 
Unempprv 0.719 * 0.967 
Pvownsoc -1.134 *** -1.150 *** 
Pvownprv -0.114 Insig -0.301 Insig 
Pvsocsoc 1.609 *** 1.481 *** 
Pvsocprv 0.305 Insig 0.239 Insig 
Pvprvsoc 0.680 *** 0.626 *** 
Pvprvprv 1.197 *** 1.131 *** 
Houssoc -1.476 *** -1.510 *** 
Housprv -0.090 Insig -0.204 Insig 
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Urbansoc -0.488 ** -0.524 *** 
Urbanprv -0.865 *** -0.924 *** 
Afownsoc -1.090 *** -1.116 *** 
Afownprv 0.075 Insig -0.053 Insig 
Pvctysoc -1.754 *** -1.705 *** 
Pvctyprv 1.054 *** 0.998 *** 
Pocnlsoc 1.442 *** 1.348 *** 
Pocnlprv -0.309 Insig -0.335 Insig 
Lnincsoc -0.295 *** -0.185 *** 
Lnincprv -1.111 *1* -0.496 ** 
Mratsoc 1.037 *** 
Mratprv 1.141 *** 
Sratprv 0.718 *** 
Upper Level-Mobility Decision 
Model Two Model Three 




Ageheads 0.054 *** 0.051 *** 
Marrys -0.152 Insig 0.110 Insig 
Ndepchs 0.192 *** 0.225 *** 
Males -0.139 Insig -0.125 Insig 
Unemps 0.137 Insig 0.217 Insig 
Lnincs 0.510 *** -0.051 Insig 
Affowns 0.018 Insig 0.044 Insig 
Pvcitys -0.153 Insig -0.141 Insig 
Porcnls 0.242 * 0.286 
Inclusive values Il 
(Stayer) 
1.00 Fixed 1.00 Fixed 
Inclusive values 12 
(Mover) 
0.274 *** 0.334 *** 




No. Obs 52048 52048 
Notes: bigmticant at 1 per cent level 
** Significant at 5 per cent level. 




Although the goodness-of-fit of the three models is very close, the third model is 
slightly better than other two models. In the tenure choice level, some variables have 
significant and determining influences. As expected, the user cost has a negative 
effect on tenure choice, indicating that the probability of choosing a certain tenure 
reduces with an increase in the user cost of that tenure. Moreover, a statistically 
significant coefficient of the user cost also indicates that the user cost in our sample is 
significantly different between tenures and across unitary authority areas. Economic 
subsidy plays an important role in reducing the housing user cost and also has a 
substantive influence on tenure choice. The employment variables have the most 
determining influences on tenure choice since their coefficient magnitudes are the 
biggest among the explanatory variables. Household heads who have full time or part 
time jobs have the strongest likelihood of choosing owner-occupation. In contrast, 
unemployed household heads are much more likely to choose social renting or private 
renting. 
The household long-term income also has an important influence on tenure choice. 
When income increases, households are more likely to choose owner-occupation than 
social renting or private renting. As expected, the mortgage rationing and the social 
housing rationing have robust effects on tenure choice. Households who are 
potentially constrained from mortgages are forced to choose private renting or social 
renting. Households who are potentially constrained from the social rented sector are 
more likely to choose private renting rather than owner-occupation. 
In the mobility decision level, the results show that the household head's age and the 
number of dependent children are two important determinants. The results suggest 
that older households and households having more dependent children are more likely 
to stay. The household long-term income also plays an important role in the mobility 
decision. When their incomes increase, households are more likely to stay. 
Households living in poor council housing neighbourhoods are more likely to stay and, 
in many cases, these households may not afford to move. In fact, above variables not 
only play an important role in determining the household's mobility but also have 
statistically and numerically significant influences on tenure choice. 
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6.3 Overall Analysis 
This chapter analyses the estimation results of the two tenure choice models. The 
MNL tenure choice model provides a basic analysis of the determinants of tenure 
choice and the household's tenure choice behaviour. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
due to the rejection of the IIA assumption, the MNL tenure choice model should be 
treated with caution. In this thesis, the MNL model can be treated as a pilot model to 
test the initial influences of the explanatory variables on the household's tenure choice 
behaviour. Unlike the NMNL model which requires complicated data arrangement 
and variable interactions, the MNL model provides a simple approach to estimate the 
influences of the explanatory variables on the three tenure alternatives. With respect 
to the model results, the MNL model has a good prediction level and most explanatory 
variables are statistically significant. This indicates that these explanatory variables 
have substantial influences on the household's tenure choice behaviour in Scotland, 
and also these explanatory variables are examined in the NMNL model to estimate the 
household's tenure choice and mobility decision behaviour. 
Compared to the MNL model, the NMNL model provides robust results in estimating 
Scottish households' tenure decisions. Due to its two level hierarchical structure, the 
NMNL model not only interprets the relationship between mobility decision and 
tenure choice but also examines the household's tenure choice behaviour once its 
mobility decision is made. As a result, Scottish households' tenure choice behaviour 
can be concluded as follows. 
The household demographic variables have substantial influences on tenure choice. 
The results show that older and married households are more likely to choose owner- 
occupation, while younger and single households are likely to choose private renting. 
Households having more dependent children are found to have a statistically 
significant likelihood of choosing social renting. Female household heads are likely 
to choose social renting. In addition, the household head's employment variables 
have determining impacts on tenure choice. Household heads who have full time or 
part time jobs are strongly likely to choose owner-occupation, while unemployed 
household heads are more likely to choose social renting. These results draw a clear 
picture that households in better socio-economic positions are more likely to be 
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homeowners, while households with socio-economic disadvantages are more likely to 
choose social renting. 
Furthermore, households' previous tenure has a statistically and numerically 
significant influence on their current tenure decision. It is more likely the see that 
households will choose the same tenure as their previous one when making a tenure 
decision. Similar results also apply to the neighbourhood quality variables. As 
expected, households' tenure decisions are strongly influenced by their current 
neighbourhood environments. Therefore they are more likely to choose the dominant 
tenure in the neighbourhood. In particular, it is of interest to see that households 
living in inner city neighbourhoods have a stronger coefficient of choosing owner- 
occupation rather than social renting. 
Dwelling type and location are usually associated with tenure. In Scotland, most 
houses are owner-occupied. Therefore, households who live in or want to live in 
houses could only be homeowners. In this sense, it is not surprising to see that 
households living in houses are more likely to choose owner-occupation than social 
renting or private renting. Moreover, as Scottish Homes (1997) indicate, there is a 
substantial number of private renting dwellings located in rural Scotland. In this case, 
the model results show that households living in rural areas are more likely to choose 
private renting rather than owner-occupation. However, it would be difficult to 
estimate the household's decision on whether social renting or owner-occupation 
based on the simple definition of the urban area in the 1996 SHCS. It needs more 
specific location variables to present the spatial concentration of social housing and 
owner-occupied housing in the inner city, the periphery and the suburban areas. 
The household long-term income and the user cost has determining influences on the 
household's tenure decisions. When income rises, the household is more likely to 
choose owner-occupation than social renting or private renting. The user cost has a 
significantly negative impact on the household's tenure choice which indicates that 
when the user cost of a certain tenure increases, households are less likely to choose 
that tenure. Further, the statistically significant of the user cost in the NMNL model 
also suggests that the user cost is significantly different between tenures and across 32 
unitary authorities. Meanwhile, the economic subsidy plays a distinct role in reducing 
181 
the housing user cost and also has a substantial effect on tenure choice. As expected, 
mortgage rationing and social housing rationing variables have statistically and 
numerically significant effects on tenure choice. Mortgage rationing and social 
rationing play an important role as gatekeeper, filtering the household's access to the 
owner-occupied sector and to the social rented sector. 
In addition to tenure decision, the household head's age, the number of dependent 
children and the household long-term income have the most determining influences on 
the household's mobility decision. Older households and households having more 
dependent children are more likely to stay at the current status. When income rises, 
households are more likely to stay rather than to move. It is noted that these variables 
not only have significant impacts on mobility decision but also have remarkable 
influences on tenure choice. 
Finally, the two models provide us with a good simulation of Scottish households' 
tenure choice behaviour. More importantly, the NMNL model presents robust results 
in estimating households' mobility decisions and tenure choice. The NMNL model 
results also provide solid answers to the main research questions of this thesis: what 
are the important determinants of tenure choice in Scotland, and to what extent do 
these determinants influence Scottish households' tenure decisions? Furthermore, the 
model results, to a certain extent, imply some issues related to housing policy 
development. The next chapter will discuss the policy issues and implications 
emerging from the tenure choice model results. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN POLICY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 
The last chapter presents the robust results of Scottish households' tenure choice 
behaviour. This chapter analyses some policy issues and implications emerging from 
the results of the tenure choice models. This chapter is organised into four sections. 
The first section discusses some simulations regarding the influences of changes in the 
income tax rate and changes in the mortgage rationing criteria on the household's 
tenure choice behaviour. The second section *analyses the outcome of tenure choice 
and income distribution emphasising income inequality and tenure polarisation. The 
third section analyses the distribution of housing subsidy arising from the outcome of 
tenure choice addressing the balance of housing subsidies between tenures and income 
levels. The last section discusses some implications of these issues for current 
housing policy development. 
7.1 Simulations 
The results of the two tenure choice models provide clear and detailed information 
about the important determinants of tenure choice and their influences on Scottish 
households' tenure decisions. From a policy perspective, it is equally important to 
discuss an issue concerning the influence of a change in policy or scheme, such as the 
tax policy and the mortgage finance scheme, on the household's tenure choice 
behaviour. To discuss this issue, this section emphasises two changes in policy or 
schemes and simulates their influences on tenure choice. The first simulation analyses 
the effect of altering income tax rate on tenure choice; the second simulation examines 
the effect of changes in the mortgage rationing criteria on tenure choice. To some 
extent, the simulations can be used to examine the robustness or sensitivity of the two 
tenure choice models. 
7.1.1 Altering the Income Tax Rate 
A number of studies have indicated that the income tax effect plays an important role 
in tenure choice, especially in the homeownership decision (see for example, Englund 
and Persson 1982, Linneman 1985, Capone 1995). Englund and Persson (1982) 
suggest that a change in the income tax schedule affects housing demand in two ways. 
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First, an income tax change directly affects disposable income. Second, the income 
tax change also alters the marginal tax rate, therefore it affects the user cost of housing. 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the user cost of housing has a statistically and 
numerically significant impact on the household's tenure decision. Thus, a change in 
the user cost, for example, due to a change in the income tax rate, would have an 
impact on tenure choice. As a result, a simulation in this section analyses the effect of 
altering income tax schedule on the user cost of housing and also on tenure choice. 
As stated in Chapter Five, a change in the income tax rate has a direct impact on the 
user cost of owner-occupiers (see Equation 35). The user cost of social renting or 
private renting is based on the economic rent. Therefore, this thesis assumes that a 
change in the income tax rate does not have a direct impact on the user cost of these 
two tenures. Under this circumstance, the influence of a change in the income tax rate 
focuses on the user cost of owner-occupiers. With respect to the user cost of owner- 
occupiers, as discussed in Chapter Five, the marginal income tax rate is set to be zero 
because this thesis assumes that mortgage interest tax relief is treated as a lump sum 
tax relief, which does not affect the user cost but only affects disposable income for 
mortgaged homeowners. Therefore, a simulation in this section applies a different 
income tax rate, 24%-the benchmark income tax rate in 1996, then to analyse the 
influences of applying a different income tax rate on the user cost of housing and on 
tenure decision. The equation of the new user cost of owner-occupiers is shown in 
Equation (40): 
UC, =[(1-0.24)*i+d+a-g]*Ph (40) 
where the household's marginal tax rate now is changed to 0.24, i is the nominal 
mortgage interest rate, d is the depreciation rate, a is the property tax rate, g is the 
expected annual rate of nominal house price increase and P' is the current market 
value of the property. The figures of i, d, c, g and P' are same in Chapter Five. 
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Table 7.1 User Costs by Tenures-Before and After Applying 24% of the Income 
Tax Rate 
Before App. 24% ITR After A. 24% ITR 














Owner-occupiers 3,531 6.7 2,689 5.1 
Social tenants 2,237 7.0 2,237 7.0 
Private tenants 3,161 7.4 3,161 7.4 
Table 7.1 shows the user cost of owner-occupiers before and after applying 24% of 
income tax rate. After applying 24% of income tax rate, the user cost of owner- 
occupiers reduces from £3,531 to £2,689 per annum. A part of the user cost of owner- 
occupiers has been deducted by the increase in the marginal income tax rate. The new 
user cost of owner-occupiers after applying 24% of income tax rate is lower than the 
user cost of private renting and is close to the user cost of social renting. In this sense, 
the reduction in the user cost of owner-occupiers could lead to homeownership 
becoming more attractive. Moreover, if we take account of economic subsidies within 
the user cost, the net user cost of owner-occupier after applying 24% of income tax 
rate is very close to the net user cost of social renting. In contrast, the cost gap 
between owner-occupiers and private tenants becomes wider (see Table 7.2). These 
changes in the user cost between tenures are examined in the tenure choice models. 
Table 7.2 Net User Costs by Tenures-Before and After Applying 24% of the 
Income Tax Rate 















Owner-occupiers 3,531 834 2,697 2,689 834 1,855 
Social tenants 2,237 638 1,735 2,237 638 1,735 
Private tenants 3,161 21 3,140 3,161 21 3,140 
Theoretically, it is expected that a reduction in the user cost of owner-occupier due to 
an increase in the marginal income tax rate would lead to households preferring 
owner-occupation. Unfortunately, the MNL model does not provide expected results 
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in estimating the effect of the change in the user cost on tenure choice. In a simulation 
of the MNL model, the user cost of housing and some important explanatory variables, 
such as household long term income and employment variables, have either become 
statistically insignificant or have presented a wrong sign. Again, this indicates that the 
MNL model does not provides robust results in estimating tenure choice in this thesis. 
The non-robust results in the MNL model may be driven by the multicollinearity 
problem or by the IIIA problem as discussed in previous chapters. Under this 
circumstance, the NMNL model is the best alternative. 
Table 7.3 shows two simulation results of the NMNL model of mobility and tenure 
choice. The first simulation estimates the effect of changes in the user cost, which are 
affected by a change in the marginal income tax rate, on tenure choice and mobility 
decisions. The second simulation emphasises the effect of changes in the net user cost 
on tenure choice and mobility decisions. Model One is the same basic model as in 
Chapter Six. The full estimation results of these simulation models run by the 
LIlVIDEP programme are reported in Appendix A. 7.1. In the first simulation, the user 
cost of housing shows statistically significant effects on tenure choice but the 
magnitude of the coefficient becomes smaller than that in the original model one. 
This suggests that after applying a different income tax rate (24%) to the user cost of 
owner-occupiers, the new user cost of housing has become a less significant influence 
(statistically and numerically) on the household's tenure decision. The new user cost 
terms between tenures and across 32 unitary authorities are also reported in Appendix 
A. 5.2. 
The simulation results are unlikely to fit into our expectation that owner-occupation 
would become more attractive since an increase in the income tax rate reduces the 
user cost of owner-occupiers. One should note that the user cost of housing in the 
NMNL model is an attribute of tenure which is estimated on the basis of tenures, not 
on the individual household. Therefore, the effect of the user cost in the NMNL 
model is more likely to reflect the general influence on tenure choice (whether or not 
the user cost is statistically and numerically significant between three tenures) rather 
than to show the household's preference for a specific tenure (i. e. either owner- 
occupation or social renting). In this case, one reasonable explanation is that an 
increase in the income tax rate reduces the user cost of owner-occupiers. The 
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reduction in the user cost of owner-occupiers has decreased the cost difference among 
three tenures, particularly between owner-occupiers and social tenants. As a result, 
the new user cost of housing has less statistically and numerically significant effects 
on tenure decision than that in the original Model One. 
In the second simulation, the net user cost of housing remains a statistically significant 
influence on tenure choice, and the coefficient magnitude becomes bigger than the 
first simulation. It seems that the increase in the magnitude of the coefficient is more 
likely to be driven by an economic subsidy effect rather than the effect of a change in 
the income tax rate. Moreover, in both simulations, the coefficient estimates of other 
explanatory variables do not show significant changes in terms of their statistical 
significance level and their coefficient magnitudes. This suggests that the changes in 
the user cost of housing due to the subsidy effect or the effect of a change in income 
tax rate have minimum influences on other explanatory variables in the NMNL model. 
Table 7.3 The NMNL Mobility and Tenure Choice Model Results-Simulations 
of the User Cost and the Net User Cost 
Dependent Variable = Achoice 
Default Tenure = "Owner-occupation" in the tenure choice level; "stay" in the 
mobility decision level 
Lower Level-Tenure Choice 
Model One Simulation One Simulation Two 
Variable Coefficient Sig. 
Level 
Coefficient Coefficient Sig. 
Level 
Constant -10.505 *** -9.181 *** . 10.427 *** 
Lntcost -0.494 *** -0.181 ** 
Lnatcost -0.290 
Agehsoc -0.011 * -0.011 * -0.011 
Agehprv -0.055 *** -0.054 *** -0.055 *** 
Ndepchsoc 0.312 *** 0.307 *** 0.308 *** 
Ndepchprv 0.176 * 0.167 Insig 0.175 
Marrysoc -0.802 *** -0.764 *** -0.744 *** 
Marryprv -0.582 ** -0.632 -0.553 
Malesoc -0.411 * -0.411 * -0.411 
Maleprv 0.377 Insig 0.371 Insig 0.373 Insig 
Fullsoc -1.759 *** -1.760 *** -1.764 *** 
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Fullprv -1.584 *** -1.616 *** -1.592 *** 
Partsoc -1.217 *** -1.224 *** -1.210 *** 
Partprv -2.237 *** -2.250 *** -2.228 *** 
Unempsoc 0.781 * 0.755 * 0.760 
Unempprv 0.681 Insig 0.655 Insig 0.670 Insig 
Pvownsoc -1.142 *** -1.129 *** -1.119 *** 
Pvownprv -0.153 Insig -0.162 Insig -0.143 Insig 
Pvsocsoc 1.604 *** 1.588 *** 1.578 *** 
Pvsocprv 0.314 Insig 0.320 Insig 0.309 Insig 
Pvprvsoc 0.688 *** 0.695 *** 0.695 *** 
Pvprvprv 1.218 *** 1.224 *** 1.222 *** 
Houssoc -1.480 *** -1.503 *** -1.505 *** 
Housprv -0.102 Insig -0.114 Insig -0.111 Insig 
Urbansoc -0.501 0.457 ** -0.447 ** 
Urbanprv -0.876 *** -0.860 *** -0.850 *** 
Afownsoc -1.086 *** -1.092 *** -1.090 *** 
Afownprv 0.050 Insig 0.042 Insig 0.052 Insig 
Pvctysoc -1.676 *** -1.602 *** -1.619 *** 
Pvctyprv 1.133 *** 1.126 *** 1.101 *** 
Pocnlsoc 1.484 *** 1.487 *** 1.461 *** 
Pocnlprv -0.231 Insig -0.238 Insig -0.280 Insig 
Lnincsoc -0.312 *** -0.296 *** -0.283 *** 
Lnincprv -0.850 *** -0.719 *** -0.860 *** 
Upper Level-Mobility Decision 
Model One Simulation One Simulation Two 






Ageheads 0.055 *** 0.056 *** 0.055 *** 
Marrys -0.156 Insig -0.185 Insig -0.192 Insig 
Ndepchs 0.196 *** 0.191 *** 0.187 *** 
Males -0.145 Insig -0.147 Insig -0.145 Insig 
Unemps 0.115 Insig 0.098 Insig 0.102 Insig 
Lnincs 0.534 *** 0.620 *** 0.641 *** 
Affowns -0.017 Insig 0.012 Insig 0.038 Insig 
Pvcitys -0.197 * -0.178 * -0.151 Insig 
Porcnls 0.272 ** 0.318 ** 0.310 ** 
Inclusive values 
II(Stayer) 




0.243 *** 0.257 *** 0.276 *** 
Log Likelihood -4893.7 -4899.5 -4897.3 
Predicted 
Level 
81.69% 81.66% 81.69% 
No. Obs 52048 52048 52048 
Notes: Significant at 1 per cent level. 
** : Significant at 5 per cent level. 
*: Significant at 10 per cent level. 
Insig.: Insignificant. 
In this simulation, an increase in the income tax rate reduces the user cost of owner- 
occupiers, and it thus reduces the cost difference between tenures, particularly 
between owner-occupiers and social tenants. In the NMNL model, the decreased user 
cost between tenures has a less statistical and numerical influence on tenure choice 
than the original user cost. On the other hand, it is expected that a reverse situation 
with a decrease in the income tax rate, would increase the user cost of owner- 
occupiers and thus also enlarge the cost difference between tenures. As a result, the 
increased user cost between tenures would have a stronger influence on tenure choice. 
7.1.2 Altering Mortgage Rationing Criteria 
As discussed in Chapter Six, mortgage rationing has a statistically and numerically 
significant influence on tenure choice. This part of the section aims to simulate the 
effect of changes in mortgage rationing criteria on the household's tenure decision. 
The construction of mortgage rationing criteria in Chapter Five is based on three ratios: 
price-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio, and loan-to-income ratio. This thesis 
reduces 20% of these three mortgage rationing ratios and then examines the effect of 
these changes on tenure choice. The original three mortgage rationing ratios and a 
20% reduction in mortgage rationing ratios are shown in Table 7.4. Based on these 
new mortgage rationing ratios, the new mortgage rationing assumptions are as follows. 
For mortgaged. homeowners, if they have qualified for more than two of these new 
mortgage rationing ratios (in Table 7.4), they may find it difficult to obtain a mortgage. 
For social tenants or private tenants, if their price to income ratio is greater than 2.4, 
they could potentially be constrained by mortgages. Outright owners are assumed not 
to be constrained by mortgage rationing. 
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Table 7.4 Mortgage Rationing Ratios and 20% Release of Mortgage Rationing 
Ratios 
Mortgage Rationing Ratios 20% Reduction in Mortgage Rationing 
Ratios 
PTI > 3.0 PTI > 2.4 
LTV > 0.9 LTV>0.72 
LTI > 2.23 LTI > 1.78 
Table 7.5 Mortgage Rationing by Tenures-A Simulation of 20% Release of 
Mortgage Rationing Ratios 
Original MRR 20% Reduction in MRR 
Tenures Rationed Not Rationed Not Total 
Rationed Rationed 
Owner-occupiers 1,121 5,708 1,856 4,973 6,829 
(16.4%) (83.6%) (27.2%) (72.8%) 100% 
Social Tenants 4,228 1,350 5,063 515 5,578 
(75.8%) (24.2%) (90.8%) (9.2%) (100%) 
Private Tenants 555 152 645 62 707 
(78.5%) (21.5%) (91.2%) (8.8%) (100%) 
Total 5,904 7,210 7,564 5,550 13,114 
(45%) (55%) (57.7%) (42.3%) 100% 
Based on the new mortgage rationing assumptions, a simulation of the mortgage 
constraint broken down by tenures is shown in Table 7.5. It is clear that a 20% 
reduction in the three mortgage rationing ratios leads more households to be 
constrained by mortgages. After applying the new mortgage rationing ratios, the 
percentage of owner-occupiers who could find it difficult to get a mortgage increases 
from 16.4% to 27.2%. Meanwhile, more than 90% of social tenants and private 
tenants would potentially be constrained by mortgages after applying the new 
mortgage rationing ratios. Moreover, it is expected that the changes in the mortgage 
rationing ratios would have substantive impacts on the household's tenure choice 
behaviour. The simulation results of the NMNL mobility and tenure choice model are 
reported in Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.6 The NMNL Mobility and Tenure Choice Model Results-Simulation 
of Mortgage Rationing Effect 
Dependent Variable = Achoice 
Default Tenure = "Owner-occupation" in the tenure choice level; "stay" in the 
mobility decision level 
Lower Level-Tenure Choice 
Model Three Simulation Three 




Constant -6.182 *** -6.151 *** 
Lnatcost -0.892 *** -0.885 *** 
Agehsoc -0.006 Insig 0.0003 Insig 
Agehprv -0.044 *** -0.037 *** 
Ndepchsoc 0.297 *** 0.337 *** 
Ndepchprv 0.184 * 0.216 
Marrysoc -0.251 Insig -0.268 Insig 
Marryprv -0.322 Insig -0.474 
Malesoc -0.381 Insig -0.358 Insig 
Maleprv 0.303 Insig 0.338 Insig 
Fullsoc -1.631 *** -1.743 *** 
Fullprv -1.938 *** -2.117 *** 
Partsoc -1.119 *** -1.119 *** 
Partprv -2.523 *** -2.569 *** 
Unempsoc 0.925 ** 0.950 
Unempprv 0.967 ** 1.004 ** 
Pvownsoc -1.150 *** -1.163 *** 
Pvownprv -0.301 Insig -0.274 Insig 
Pvsocsoc 1.481 *** 1.540 *** 
Pvsocprv 0.239 Insig 0.289 Insig 
Pvprvsoc 0.626 *** 0.613 ** 
Pvprvprv 1.131 *** 1.101 *** 
Houssoc -1.510 *** -1.586 *** 
Housprv -0.204 Insig -0.249 Insig 
Urbansoc -0.524 *** -0.652 *** 
Urbanprv -0.924 *** -1.041 *** 
Afownsoc -1.116 *** -1.070 ** 
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Afownprv -0.053 Insig -0.038 Insig 
Pvctysoc -1.705 *** -1.768 *** 
Pvctyprv 0.998 *** 0.950 *** 
Pocnlsoc 1.348 *** 1.396 *** 
Pocnlprv -0.335 Insig -0.304 Insig 
Lnincsoc -0.185 *** -0.091 
Lnincprv -0.496 ** -0.567 *** 
Mratsoc 1.037 *** 1.856 *** 
Mratprv 1.141 *** 1.707 *** 
Sratprv 0.718 *** 0.786 *** 
Upper Level-Mobility Decision 
Model Three Simulation Three 




Ageheads 0.051 *** 0.051 *** 
Marrys 0.110 Insig 0.127 Insig 
Ndepchs 0.225 *** 0.227 *** 
Males -0.125 Insig -0.108 Insig 
Unemps 0.217 Insig 0.205 Insig 
Lnincs -0.051 Insig -0.061 Insig 
Affowns 0.044 Insig 0.048 Insig 
Pvcitys -0.141 Insig -0.156 Insig 
Porcnls 0.286 * 0.249 
Inclusive values Il 
(Stayer) 
1.00 Fixed 1.00 Fixed 
Inclusive values I2 
over 
0.334 *** 0.300 *** 




No. Obs 52048 52048 
Notes: *** : Significant at 1 per cent level. 
Significant at 5 per cent level. 
* Significant at 10 per cent level. 
Innig.: Insignificant. 
In Table 7.6, Model Three adds two rationing variables as in Chapter Six. Simulation 
Three presents the estimation results of the effect of changes in mortgage rationing 
criteria on tenure choice and mobility decisions. In the simulation model, the 
coefficient magnitudes of two mortgage rationing variables have significantly 
increased, compared to Model Three. This suggests that a 20% reduction in the 
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mortgage rationing ratios has squeezed the mortgage constraint conditions to the 
households. As a result, it leads to mortgage rationing having stronger (numerical) 
effects on the household's tenure choice. 
Moreover, the changes in the mortgage rationing criteria have substantive influences 
on other explanatory variables. Given the influence of the new mortgage rationing 
variables, the coefficient magnitudes of most explanatory variables have increased. 
This means that most explanatory variables have stronger numerical influences on 
tenure choice under the effect of applying tighter mortgage rationing conditions to 
households. In contrast, household long term income has a less influence (statistical 
and numerical) on the choice between owner-occupation and social tenants. This 
could be affected by the multicollinearity problem. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
there is some moderate degree of correlation between the mortgage rationing variable 
and household long term income. Furthermore, in the mobility decision level, most 
explanatory variables do not have significant changes in their coefficient magnitudes 
and the statistical significance level under the effect of changes in mortgage rationing 
criteria. 
In summary, this section has discussed two simulations works in the tenure choice 
model. The first simulation has examined the effect of applying a different income 
tax rate to the user cost of owner-occupiers on the household's tenure choice. The 
second simulation has analysed the effect of changes in the mortgage rationing criteria 
on the household's tenure decision. It was found that an increase in the marginal 
income tax rate reduces the user cost of owner-occupiers. The reduction in the user 
cost of owner-occupiers has decreased the cost differences between tenures (especially 
between social renting and owner-occupation). As a result, the influence of the user 
cost of housing becomes less significant (statistically and numerically) on tenure 
choice. Moreover, a 20% reduction in the mortgage rationing ratios presses more 
constraints on households, thus it leads to the mortgage rationing having a stronger 
numerical influence on the household's tenure choice. From a policy perspective, the 
first simulation implies that a change in the income tax schedule would have 
substantial influences on the user cost of housing, thus affecting the household's 
tenure choice. The simulation results provide a direction of these influences on the 
user cost of housing and tenure choice. The results in the second simulation also 
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imply a clear direction of a change in the mortgage finance condition (tighten or 
loosen) in affecting (increase or decrease the mortgage rationing effect) the 
household's tenure decision behaviour. 
7.2 Income Inequality and Tenure Polarisation 
In the last chapter, our model results show that household income is one of the most 
determinants of tenure choice. While income rises, a household is more likely to 
choose owner-occupation than renting. This implies that households with higher 
incomes would favour owner-occupation, while low-income households are more 
likely to choose renting, especially social renting. From a policy perspective, it is of 
interest to discuss the tenure preferences of households in different income levels, and 
to explore some issues related to tenure choice and income distribution. One 
important issue is the growth of income inequality between tenures and tenure 
polarisation, which has been discussed by many studies over the last two decades (see 
for example, Bentham 1986, Atkinson 1993, and Hills 1995,1998). 
The first part of this section discusses income inequality between tenures and the 
second part analyses tenure polarisation between income levels. The analysis is 
primarily based on the whole Scottish average and it also looks at the urban level by 
comparing the differences between four major cities - Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh 
and Glasgow. 
7.2.1 Income Inequality between Tenures 
The analysis of income inequality starts with the definition and measurement of 
income for individuals or for households. The classic definition of individual income 
is by Simons (1938)'$, which includes non-pecuniary incomes and expected future 
incomes. A simple definition of lifetime consumption is that "income in a given 
period is the amount a person could have spent while maintaining his wealth intact" 
(Atkinson 1983, p. 39). These income definitions involve the unrealised capital gains, 
imputed rents, the long run incomes and expected expenditures. All of these items are 
t8 The Simons, also called Haig-Simons definition of individual income is that "personal income may 
be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the 
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the period" 
(Simons 1938, p. 50). 
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important and are connected with housing consumption. However, it is unlikely to 
use unrealised and expected incomes as the measuring resources to examine the 
current problem of income inequality. Therefore, it is appropriate to adopt the current 
monetary income as the measuring resource. 
The above income definitions focus on individual income. Due to data limitations, the 
income used in this chapter is household income drawn from the 1996 Scottish House 
Condition Survey (SHCS), which is defined as "weekly net income received by the 
head of household and spouse/partner (where relevant) received from wages and 
salaries, from benefit payments and from other sources such as non-state pensions, 
alimony or maintenance payments" (Scottish Homes 1997, p. 346). In measuring the 
household income distribution, it is necessary to consider households' different 
income patterns drawn from their different household sizes and age-consumption. 
Equivalence scales are commonly used to "calculate ratios of incomes required by 
different household types to achieve a similar standard of living, taking into account 
the economies possible in the larger households from sharing of facilities such as 
heating and lighting" (Central Statistics Office 1987, p. 112). The approach taken is, 
given the information about the number of people living in the household together 
with the numbers and ages of dependent children, to calculate the number of 
`equivalent adults' in the household and to work with measures of income per 
equivalent adult (Hancock 1993). 
In Britain, there are commonly three sets of equivalence scales to be applied in 
examining the extent of poverty and income inequality (Central Statistics Office 1987). 
The McClements scale is one of the three scales and is applied to this chapter The 
McClements' equivalence ratios for different members of the household are listed in 
Appendix A. 7.2. Equivalent income is obtained by dividing the household income by 
the equivalence scale. A comparison table of the average household income and the 
equivalent household income broken down into income quintiles and into tenures is 
reported in Appendix A. 7.3. 
7.2.1.1 Income Quintile Shares between Tenures 
In the analysis of income inequality, a simple way is to look at the percentage of 
income distribution in quantile groups, called quantile shares (Marsh 1988). The 
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quantile shares conventionally considered are the quartiles, the quintiles and the 
deciles (ibid. ). This thesis adopts the quintile group since it is adopted by most 
government statistical reports (see Central Statistics Office 1987). Table 7.7 shows 
the quintile shares of the equivalent household income broken down into five different 
tenures in Scotland, 1996. It is clear that, for all tenures, the income shares rise with 
income quintile groups. This means that the income distribution was concentrated on 
higher income quintile groups, especially the top income quintile group in Scotland. 
On the other hand, it shows a significant income inequality in the bottom quintile 
group, where the income shares were not more than 10 per cent for all tenures. 
Between owner-occupiers, outright owners had wider ranges of income shares than 
mortgaged owners. This explains that income inequality in outright owners was 
greater than in mortgaged owners, especially between the fourth and the top quintile 
groups. This implies that there exists a wider income inequality in older age of 
outright owners since many outright owners are elderly people. Further, between 
renters, income inequality in private tenants was greater than in social tenants. In the 
social rented sector, there was no significant difference of income inequality between 
local authority tenants and housing association tenants. Nevertheless, in the top 
income quintile group, the income share of housing association tenants was slightly 
higher than that of local authority tenants. 
Table 7.7 Quintile Shares of Equivalent Household Income by Tenures in 
Scotland, 1996 
Percentage of total income received by the quintile 
Quintile Outright Mortgaged LA HA Private 
Owners Owners Tenants Tenants Tenants 
Bottom 6.9 8.2 10.0 9.7 6.6 
2°" 11.0 13.6 15.0 14.1 12.4 
3rd 15.5 18.1 18.5 17.9 17.0 
4'h 22.2 23.4 22.5 22.1 23.3 
Top 44.3 36.8 34.0 36.2 40.7 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Notes: LA: Local Authority; HA: Housing Association 
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The above discussion presents the results of income inequality on the basis of the 
Scottish average. In fact, the results of income and tenure distribution based on the 
average figures of the whole Scotland cannot reflect the local differences. Therefore, 
it is of interest to compare the income inequality between tenures at the city level, 
especially in Scotland's four major cities - Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and 
Glasgow. Table 7.8 shows the quintile shares of the equivalent household income by 
tenures in the four cities. It is noted that in Table 7.8, social tenants are not split into 
local authority tenants and housing association tenants because the sample cases of 
housing association tenants are too small in Aberdeen City and Dundee City. 
Table 7.8 Quintile Shares of Equivalent Household Income by Tenures in Four 
Cities of Scotland, 1996 
Percentage of total income received by the quintile 
Quintile Outright Mortgaged Social Private 
group Owners Owners Tenants Tenants 
%) % %) 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 7.6 8.6 9.9 4.5 
2°d 11.2 14.0 15.7 9.4 
3`d 15.0 18.3 18.7 16.0 
4`h 22.4 22.4 23.0 25.1 
Top 43.8 36.7 32.7 45.0 
Dundee 
Bottom 7.1 7.1 9.6 4.6 
2°' 11.1 13.3 15.1 10.3 
3'd 17.1 18.7 18.3 18.7 
4`h 23.0 23.8 22.6 24.0 
Top 41.7 37.1 34.4 42.4 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 7.2 7.5 10.0 4.8 
2" 11.1 12.8 15.4 10.6 
3rd 15.2 17.4 19.1 16.3 
4th 22.5 22.4 22.9 24.0 
Top 44.0 39.9 32.6 44.3 
Glasgow 
Bottom 6.9 6.7 9.5 5.0 
2"' 11.5 13.0 14.5 12.0 
3rd 15.7 17.2 18.4 17.7 
4`h 23.2 24.1 22.7 23.2 
Top 42.7 39.0 34.9 42.1 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
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Similar to the results in the Scottish average, income shares rose with income quintile 
groups in all four cities. Again, this implies that the income distribution is 
concentrated in higher income quintile groups and that there exists a significant 
income inequality in the bottom income quintile group in each tenure of all four cities. 
Between tenures, income inequality in outright owners was greater than in mortgaged 
owners, while income inequality in private tenants was greater than in social tenants. 
The income shares in each tenure were similar between the four cities. This indicates 
that the four cities could have a similar problem of income inequality between tenures, 
although the average income by tenures is different between the four cities (see 
Appendix A. 7.3). However, the results need careful consideration. Since the results 
are drawn from the tenure-base income distribution, it could raise the question: what 
other household characteristics, such as household type or the household head's age, 
are shaping the distribution of income across cities? In addition, the housing policy 
and the allocation system could have substantial impacts on the tenure-base 
distribution of income across cities. All of these need further investigation. 
7.2.1.2 Gini Coefficients between Tenures 
Another measurement of income inequality emphasises the cumulative income shares. 
The results of cumulative income distribution are usually displayed by a graphical 
form known as a Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient is a summary measure of income 
inequality, expressed on the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient is one of the most 
important measures of income and wealth distributions in Britain (Atkinson 1983). 
The Gini coefficient lies between 0 (prefect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality), 
although it is sometimes multiplied by 100 to express the coefficient in percentage 
form. In other words, the greater the Gini coefficient is, the larger amount of 
inequality. Table 7.9 shows the Gini coefficients for equivalent household income 
between tenures in Scotland. 
The Gini coefficient for all households in Scotland in 1996 is 0.33. For owner- 
occupiers only, the Gini coefficient is 0.32, which is not altogether different from the 
all household average. This suggests that the income distribution of owner-occupiers 
is similar to that of the all household average. In the owner-occupied sector, the Gini 
coefficient for outright owners is greater than for mortgaged owners, which indicates 
that outright owners have greater inequality of income distribution than mortgaged 
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owners. As mentioned earlier, this is probably because many outright owners are 
elderly people who could have wider ranges of income distribution than mortgaged 
owners. For example, many older outright owners' income sources primarily depend 
upon their pensions, while some outright owners are very rich to be in the top income 
group. Social tenants have the lowest Gini coefficient, compared to owner-occupiers 
and private tenants. On one hand, this explains that social tenants have the least 
income inequality. On the other hand, social tenants have the lowest average 
household income and the smallest income ranges. These together reflect the fact that 
more uniformly poor households are in social housing, compared to private renting. 
In the social rented sector, housing association tenants have a greater Gini coefficient 
than local authority tenants, although the quintile shares of income are not much 
different between these two tenures. This implies that housing association tenants 
have wider ranges of income distribution than local authority tenants. 
Table 7.9 Gini Coefficients for Equivalent Household Income by Tenures in 
Scotland, 1996 
Tenures Equiv. Household Income 
(Gini Coefficients) 
All Households 0.33 
Owner-Occupiers 0.32 
Outright Owners 0.37 
Mortgaged Owners 0.29 
Social Tenants 0.24 
LA Tenants 0.24 
HA Tenants 0.27 
Private Tenants 0.34 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Notes: LA: Local Authority; HA: Housing Association 
At the four city level, private tenants have much higher Gini coefficients than the 
Scottish average (see Table 7.10). This explains that the income inequality for private 
tenants is very significant at the city level, particularly in Aberdeen City where the 
Gini coefficient for private tenants is the highest in the four cities. On the other hand, 
this may reflect the fact that households in the private rented sector are more 
heterogeneous at the urban level in terms of the income distribution and other 
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household characteristics. Among the four cities, Edinburgh City have the highest 
Gini coefficient for all household average and also for owner-occupiers. This reveals 
that income inequality in the City of Edinburgh is more significant than the other three 
cities. In the last two decades, Edinburgh has experienced a steady growth of 
population and socio-economic activities making it one of the most prosperous cities 
in Britain (Bailey et al. 1999). Together, these draw a picture that Edinburgh City 
could have more diverse development in terms of tenure and income distributions than 
the other three cities. 
Table 7.10 Gini Coefficients for Equivalent Household Income by Tenures in Four 
Cities of Scotland, 1996 
Cities and Tenures Equiv. Household Income 
(Gini Coefficients) 
Aberdeen 
All Households 0.34 
Outright Owners 0.36 
Mortgaged Owners 0.28 
Social Tenants 0.23 
Private Tenants 0.43 
Dundee 
All Households 0.33 
Outright Owners 0.36 
Mortgaged Owners 0.31 
Social Tenants 0.25 
Private Tenants 0.40 
Edinburgh 
All Households 0.37 
Outright Owners 0.37 
Mortgaged Owners 0.33 
Social Tenants 0.23 
Private Tenants 0.40 
Glasgow 
All Households 0.33 
Outright Owners 0.37 
Mortgaged Owners 0.32 
Social Tenants 0.25 
Private Tenants 0.37 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
7.2.2 Tenure Polarisation 
The above analysis of income inequality has addressed the income distribution 
between tenures. Another angle in the interpretation of tenure and income 
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relationship is to look at the tenure distribution between and within income groups, 
emphasising the issue of tenure polarisation. 
The concept of tenure polarisation is derived from social polarisation. Hamnett's 
(1996) definition of social polarisation" can be used to interpret tenure polarisation. 
Tenure polarisation can simply be referred to as a change in tenure distribution where 
there is growth of the bottom and top ends of income groups concentrating in certain 
tenures, compared to middle income groups. Based on the above interpretation, a 
comparison of multiple periods of tenure distribution in different income groups 
would be the best way to analyse tenure polarisation (see for example, Bentham 1986, 
Hills 1998). Due to data limitations, this thesis can only use single year (1996) 
household survey data. Thus, the analysis of tenure polarisation in this part focuses on 
tenure distribution between and within income quintile groups. 
Table 7.11 Tenure Distributions between Equivalent Income Quintile Groups in 

















Bottom 26 8 27 23 28 
2nd 19 10 31 27 20 
3'd 17 16 25 26 18 
4`h 17 28 13 18 20 
Top 21 38 4 7 14 
Total Obs. 3,288 6,312 5,911 1,222 1,297 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table 7.11 shows the tenure distributions between equivalent income quintile groups 
in Scotland, 1996. The equivalent income ranges in each quintile are reported in 
Appendix A. 7.3. In the owner-occupied sector, outright owners are relatively 
concentrated in the bottom quintile groups and in the top quintile group. Mortgaged 
owners are significantly concentrated in the top two quintile groups, accounting for 66 
19 According to Hamnett's interpretation, social polarisation can be referred as `a change in certain 
social distributions such that there is a shift away from a statistically normal or egg-shaped distribution 
towards a distribution where the bottom and top ends of the distribution are growing, relatively and 
possibly absolutely, at the expense of the middle' (1996, p. 1407). 
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per cent of total mortgaged owners. In contrast, only 8 per cent of mortgaged owners 
are located in the bottom quintile group. 
Social tenants have apparently different patterns of income polarisation from 
mortgaged owners. Nearly 60 per cent of local authority tenants and a half of housing 
association tenants are located in the bottom two quintile groups, and there also is a 
quarter of social tenants distributed in the third quintile group. In contrast, only 4 per 
of local authority tenants and 7 per cent of housing association tenants are located in 
the top quintile group respectively. Compared to social tenants, private tenants did 
not show a significant income polarisation. 
Furthermore, if the tenure distributions within income quintile groups are examined, 
the pattern of tenure polarisation would be more significant. Figure 7.1 shows a clear 
picture of tenure polarisation, specifically for mortgaged owners and social tenants, 
within income quintile groups. The annex table to Figure 7.1 is listed in Appendix 
A. 7.4. Social tenants, especially local authority tenants, are significantly concentrated 
in the bottom two quintile groups and the percentage rapidly reduces in the upper 
income quintile groups. In contrast to social tenants, mortgaged owners are 
apparently concentrated in the top two quintile groups and the percentage rapidly 
declines in the lower income quintile groups. 
Figure 7.1 Tenure Polarisation in Scotland, 1996 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
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At the city level, the patterns of income and tenure polarisation are slightly different 
from the Scottish average, partly because of the sample selection and partly reflecting 
the local differences, as stated earlier. Table 7.12 shows the tenure distributions 
between income quintiles in four cities. For all four cities, it shows a clear pattern that 
mortgaged owners are significantly concentrated in the top two income quintile 
groups, while social tenants are concentrated in the bottom two quintile groups. In 
addition, there is a substantial proportion of local authority tenants distributed in the 
third quintile group, particularly in Dundee City and Edinburgh City. 
Table 7.12 Tenure Distributions between Equivalent Income Quintile Groups in 
Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 (Percentage of households) 
Income Outright Mortgaged LA HA Private 
quintile group Owners Owners Tenants Tenants Tenants 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 21 6 30 21 38 
2nd 17 5 35 38 19 
3'd 28 18 22 17 9 
4th 11 33 13 17 13 
To 23 39 1 8 21 
TotalObs. 87 210 211 24 47 
Dundee 
Bottom 16 14 24 21 35 
2" 16 13 24 37 14 
3'd 14 12 30 21 14 
4th 23 28 13 13 24 
Top 32 32 9 8 14 
Total Obs. 57 157 165 52 37 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 24 8 20 26 43 
2nd 22 10 35 34 17 
3`d 20 16 31 24 15 
4th 17 30 12 12 15 
Top 18 37 2 4 10 
Total Obs. 301 477 209 134 170 
Glasgow 
Bottom 21 11 26 17 28 
2nd 17 7 28 25 15 
3rd 22 11 23 23 21 
4th 17 24 17 22 21 
Top_ 1 24 47 6 13 15 
Total Obs. 215 485 739 386 130 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
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Notes: LA: Local Authority; HA: Housing Association 
In both Aberdeen City and Glasgow City, outright owners do not have significant 
income polarisation between tenures. In Dundee City and Edinburgh City, the pattern 
is the opposite. Outright owners in Dundee City are relatively concentrated in the top 
two quintile groups. In contrast, outright owners in Edinburgh City are concentrated 
in the lower quintile groups. The interpretation of this result is complicated, and it is 
related to the demographic structure and socio-economic development between these 
two cities. Simply stated, the result may reflect the fact that outright owners in 
Edinburgh City have lower incomes than the other tenures in the city. In contrast, 
outright owners in Dundee City have higher incomes than the other tenures. Further, 
in all four cities, there are substantial private tenants in the bottom income quintile. In 
particular, in Edinburgh City, 43 per cent of private tenants are in the bottom quintile. 
Moreover, Figure 7.2 shows a clear picture of tenure polarisation between the four 
cities. The annex table to Figure 7.2 is listed in Appendix A. 7.4. In all four cities, 
mortgaged owners are significantly concentrated in the top two quintile groups. For 
social tenants, the pattern of polarisation varies by cities. In Aberdeen and Dundee, 
social tenants are significantly concentrated in the bottom three quintile groups. But 
in Edinburgh, social tenants are relatively concentrated in the second and the third 
quintile groups, while many outright owners are distributed in the bottom quintile 
group. In Glasgow, social tenants are significantly distributed in all quintile groups 
except the top quintile group. As stated earlier, the city's demographic structure, 
socio-economic development and housing policy have substantial influences on 
households' tenure and income distribution. For example, Edinburgh City experienced 
a steady growth of population and economic activities in the last twenty years, and it 
is the result of having more heterogeneous tenure and income distribution as well as 
other household characteristics in the city. Glasgow City has a historically strong 
social housing sector. Also, this city has experienced a decline of population and a 
change in economic development from manufacturing industries to service-oriented 
activities in the last three decades (Bailey et al. 1999). The characteristics and 
changes in demographic and economic developments have had significant impacts on 
the household's tenure and income distribution in Glasgow City. 
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In summary, this section analyses the income inequality between tenures and the 
tenure polarisation in Scotland and the four major cities. The results show that 
income inequality in mortgaged owners is relatively smaller than in outright owners. 
Income inequality in social tenants is smaller than in private tenants. However, if 
tenure distributions between and within income quintile groups are examined, a 
significant tenure polarisation is identified in that mortgaged owners are concentrated 
in the upper income quintile groups, while social tenants are concentrated in the lower 
income groups. Together, these indicate that higher income households are most 
likely to be owner-occupiers with mortgages, while low-income households are 
concentrated in the social rented sector. In addition, it implies a big income gap 
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7.3 The Balance of Housing Subsidies between Tenures 
This section analyses the distribution of housing subsidies between tenures. From a 
policy perspective, the distribution of housing subsidies between tenures is not a new 
issue. As discussed in Chapter Three, a large number of studies have addressed this 
issue in the last two decades. However, housing policy and subsidy schemes have 
been changed since the 1990s. These changes should have substantial influences on 
the distribution of housing subsidies between tenures, compared to the 1980s. 
The definition of housing subsidy, as discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, is 
based on a tenure-neutral framework, that is to say, where the household has to shape 
the choice, the assistance including tax advantages and subsidies in economic or in 
cash terms, has to be neutral across tenures (Hancock and Munro 1992). Based on this 
concept, this section considers that housing subsidy should ensure relative equality at 
any given income level across tenures. As a result, the focus of this section is not only 
to compare housing subsidies between tenures but also to compare subsidies between 
income levels in Scotland and the four major cities. 
In analysing the distribution of housing subsidies between tenures, this section first 
compares the housing subsidies between owner-occupiers and renters. It then 
compares the subsidies between outright owners and mortgaged owners. The third 
part of this section compares the subsidies among local authority tenants, housing 
association tenants and private tenants. The final part simulates the impact of MIRAS 
withdrawal on the distribution of housing subsidies between tenures. Since the 
termination of MIRAS in April 2000, academic researchers and policy makers have 
been interested in its withdrawal effect. Therefore, the simulation work (using the 
1996 SHCS data) in this section would give some insights to current housing policy. 
7.3.1 Housing Subsidies between Owner-Occupiers and Renters 
As discussed in Chapter Five, housing subsidies to owner-occupiers primarily come 
from tax advantages. The untaxed capital gains and imputed rental incomes can be 
seen as the housing subsidies in economic terms to owner-occupiers. The mortgage 
interest relief at source (MIRAS) used to be a significant tax advantage to mortgaged 
owners. In addition, the income support to mortgage interest (ISMI) has increasingly 
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become an important subsidy to low-income and unemployed mortgaged owners, as 
discussed in Chapter Three. Unfortunately, the SHCS does not contain the ISMI 
information. " Therefore, this chapter will not include ISMI in the analysis. 
In economic terms, housing subsidies to tenants primarily come from the rent gap 
between market rents and actual rents paid by tenants. For social tenants, the rent gap 
subsidies exist from the differences between estimated market rents and social rents. 
For private tenants with regulated tenancy, the rent gap subsidies come from the 
differences between estimated market rents and fair rents. In addition to rent gap 
subsidies, Housing Benefit also plays an important role in the housing subsidy to 
tenants. These housing subsidies are included in our analysis. 
Table 7.13 shows the housing subsidies to owner-occupiers by income quintiles in 
Scotland in 1996. The tax advantages are apparently progressive. In the bottom 
quintile, economic subsidies account for 21 per cent of the average income, while the 
subsidies account for 3 per cent in the top quintile. MIRAS was also progressive, 
however it only accounted for a small proportion of household income, and the 
average value was not much different between income quintiles. The results, however, 
suggest that the effect of MI AS was significantly limited. 
Table 7.13 Housing Subsidies to Owner-Occupiers in Scotland, 1996 (Weekly £) 
Equivalent Mean Economic % of E. Sub. Average % of MIRAS % of Total 
income Income Subsidies to Mean MIR. AS ` to Mean Sub. to 
quintile Income Income Mean Income 
Bottom 88.88 18.55 20.9% 3.44 3.9% 24.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (1368) (962) (350) 
2nd 145.43 17.05 11.7% 3.64 2.5% 14.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (1226) (887) (437) 
3rd 195.11 15.75 8.1% 3.91 2.0% 10.1% 
o. of obs. (1589) (1118) (768) 
4th 270.73 14.78 5.5% 4.35 1.6% 7.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (2359) (1667) (1388) 
Top 482.70 15.62 3.2% 4.88 1.0% 4.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (3058) (2214) (1952) 
Total Avg 283.82 16.03 5.6% 4.36 1.5% 7.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (9600) (6848) (4895) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Note a: for mortgaged owners only 
20 According to Wilcox (2000), there were about 3% of mortgaged owners in Scotland who received 
ISMI, and the average weekly ISMI was about £26.73 in 1996. 
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Economic subsidies to tenants are also progressive (see Table 7.14). The rent gap 
subsidies account for about 15 per cent of average income in the bottom quintile, 
while the subsidies are reduced to less than 2 per cent of average income in the top 
income quintile. Housing Benefit is the most significant subsidy to tenants, especially 
in lower income levels. In Table 7.14, Housing Benefit accounts for about 30.8 per 
cent and 19.2 per cent of household income in the bottom and the second quintiles 
respectively, while in the top income quintile, Housing Benefit only accounts for 8.3 
per cent of average housing income. Although the amount of Housing Benefit rises 
with income quintiles, the number of benefit recipients significantly reduces in the 
upper income quintiles. 
Table 7.14 Housing Subsidies to Tenants in Scotland, 1996 (Weekly £) 
Equivalent Mean Economic % of E. Sub Average % of HB % of Total 
Income Income Subsidies to Mean HB to Mean Sub. to 
Quintile Income Income Mean Income 
Bottom 90.57 13.37 14.8% 27.90 30.8% 45.6% 
o. of obs. (2225) (1821) (1163) 
2nd 144.61 12.94 8.9% 27.75 19.2% 28.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (2398) (1987) (1454) 
3rd 190.61 11.50 6.0% 29.94 15.7% 21.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (2013) (1688) (1134) 
4th 262.73 9.79 3.7% 34.00 12.9% 16.7% 
o. of obs. 1266 (1010) (417) 
Top 434.03 7.68 1.8% 36.00 8.3% 10.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (528) (419) (115) 
Total Avg 177.20 12.11 6.8% 29.20 16.5% 23.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (8430) (6925) (4283) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
In a comparison of subsidies between owner-occupiers and tenants, Figure 7.3 shows 
that the economic subsidies to tenants are lower than owner-occupiers in lower 
quintile groups but are very close in upper quintile groups. After adding MI AS to 
owner-occupiers (mortgaged owners only) and Housing Benefit to tenants, the 
subsidies gap is widened between the two tenures, especially in lower income quintile 
groups. Apparently, Housing Benefit has a significant effect on subsidising low- 
income tenants and, in a certain aspect, it plays an important role in reducing income 
inequality (Gibbs and Kemp 1993), while the effect of MIRAS was no longer 
significant to owners (mortgaged owners). Counting on the total subsidies, tenants in 
the bottom quintile group receive the highest proportion of subsidies accounting for 46 
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per cent of their average income, while owner-occupiers in the bottom quintile receive 







Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top 
Equ. Income Quintile 
--Owner --E-Owner+MIRAS -A -Renter -K-Renter+HB 
Figure 7.3 Housing Subsidies to Owners and Tenants in Scotland, 1996 (Percentage 
to mean income) 
Note: the subsidy base is the economic subsidy 
At the city level, the patterns of subsidies to owners and tenants are similar to the 
Scottish average (see Figure 7.4, and annex tables are presented in Appendix A. 7.5). 
It is clear that Housing Benefit plays a great role in subsidising low-income tenants at 
the city level. In the bottom income quintile, tenants received a higher proportion of 
subsidies than owner-occupiers. Among the four cities, economic subsidies to tenants 
in Edinburgh City are significantly lower than in the other three cities. This may reveal 
the fact that the social rent level and the fair rent level in Edinburgh City are catching 
up with the market rent level. In Aberdeen City, the subsidies to tenants show a big 
gap between income quintile groups. Tenants in the bottom quintile of this city 
receive the highest subsidies accounting for 53 per cent of their average household 
income, while there is no subsidy to tenants in the top quintile group. The result could 
be affected by sample selection, as there are only seven valid observations of renter 
households in the top quintile group in Aberdeen City (see annex table in Appendix 
A. 7.5). On the other hand, it reveals a concentration of tenants in lower income 
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7.3.2 Subsidies between Outright Owners and Mortgaged Owners 
In the previous section, we have seen that there are significantly different tenure and 
income distributions between outright owners and mortgaged owners because of their 
different household characteristics. For instance, many outright owners are elderly 
people and their income mainly depends upon their pensions. In fact, subsidies to 
outright owners and to mortgaged owners are different, which is primarily because of 
the capital value and user costs of their properties. Table 7.15 shows the housing 
subsidies to outright owners and mortgaged owners in Scotland. For outright owners, 
the economic subsidies are progressive. The economic subsidies are significant in the 
bottom income quintile group, accounting for 23 per cent of their average household 
incomes. The percentage of economic subsidies reduces to 4.8 per cent in the top 
quintile group. 
Table 7.15 Housing Subsidies to Outright Owners and Mortgaged Owners in 
Ccntland_ 1996 (Weekly £) 
Equivalent Mean Econ. Subsidies % of E Sub Average of MIRAS % of Total 
Income Income CGT IRT to Mean MIRAS to Mean Sub. to M 
Quintile Income Income Income 
Outright Owners 
Bottom 90.86 5.88 15.04 23.0% - 23.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (862) (674) (674) 
2nd 143.50 5.70 14.58 14.1% - - 14.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (617) (511) (511) 
3rd 193.85 5.94 15.21 10.9% - - 10.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (551) (451) (451) 
4th 266.33 6.17 15.80 8.2% - - 8.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (573) (491) (491) 
Top 519.63 7.02 17.97 4.8% - - 4.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (685) (566) (566) 
Total Avg 237.90 6.15 15.74 9.2% - - 9.2% 
(No. ofobs. ) (3288) (2693) (2693) 
Mortgaged Owners 
Bottom 85.51 5.76 7.37 15.4% 3.44 4.0% 19. % 
(No. of obs. ) (506) (288) (288) (350) 
2nd 147.38 5.62 7.07 8.6% 3.64 2.5% 1 1.1 
(No. of obs. ) (609) (376) (376) (437) 
3rd 195.78 5.63 6.52 6.2% 3.91 2.0% 8 '°.. 
(No. of obs. ) (1038) (667) (667) (768) 
4th 272.15 5.87 6.01 4.4% 4.35 1.6% 6.0°x, 
(No. of obs. ) (1786) (1176) (1176) (1388) 
Top 472.04 6.60 5.85 2.6% 4.88 1.0% 3.7% 
(No. ofobs. ) (2373) (1648) (1648) (1952) 
Total Avg 307.74 6.07 6.22 4.0% 4.36 1.41/, 5.4% 
(No. ofobs. ) (6312) (4155) (4155) (4895) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Notes: CGT: untaxed capital gains; IRT: untaxed imputed rents. 
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The results show that mortgaged owners receive less economic subsidies than outright 
owners. This is because outright owners have higher imputed rental incomes than 
mortgaged owners. For mortgaged owners, part of their imputed rental incomes is 
deducted by mortgaged debts. Between income quintiles, the subsidy effect is 
significant in the bottom quintile group, accounting for 15 per cent of average 
household income, while the percentage reduces to less than 3 per cent in the top 
quintile group. In addition to economic subsidies, mortgaged owners also receive 
mortgage interest tax relief but outright owners did not. As shown in Table 7.15, the 
average MIRAS is £4.36 per week, accounting for 1.4 per cent of the average 
household income for mortgaged owners. Therefore, as shown in Figure 7.5, after 
adding MIRAS to mortgaged owners, the total subsidies to mortgaged owners are less 






Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top 
Equ. Income Quintile 
-f-Outright -a -Mortgaged -h--Mortgaged+MIRAS 
Figure 7.5 Housing Subsidies to Outright Owners and Mortgaged Owners in Scotland, 
1996 (Percentage to mean income) 
Note: The subsidy base in the economic subsidy 
Moreover, Figure 7.6 shows a comparison of subsidies to outright owners and to 
mortgaged owners between the four cities (the annex tables are shown in Appendix 
A. 7.5). In both Edinburgh City and Glasgow City, housing subsidies to outright 
owners and to mortgaged owners are similar to the Scottish level, while the subsidy 
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pattern is dramatically different between Aberdeen City and Dundee City. For 
outright owners in Aberdeen City, the subsidy gap between income quintiles is the 
smallest among the four cities. This suggests that the housing subsidies are not 
significantly different between outright owners and mortgaged owners and between 
income levels in Aberdeen City. In contrast, there exists the biggest subsidy gap for 
outright owners between income quintiles in Dundee City. In this city, outright 
owners in the bottom quintile receive the highest subsidies accounting for about 30 per 
cent of their average household incomes, while in the top quintile group, the subsidies 
only account for less than 5 per cent of their average household incomes (also see 
Appendix Table A. 7.5.3). The results imply that there could be a big gap for outright 
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7.3.3 Subsidies between Social Tenants and Private Tenants 
In the social rented sector, as stated earlier, economic subsidies come from the rent 
gap between estimated market rents and social rents charged by social landlords. In 
fact, rent gap subsidies between local authority tenants and housing association tenants 
are different because of their property quality and social rent levels. Table 7.16 shows 
that the economic subsidies to both local authority tenants and housing association 
tenants are progressive with income rises. However, economic subsidies to local 
authority tenants are slightly higher than the subsidies to housing association tenants in 
terms of the average value and the proportion to average household income. These 
results can be explained from several aspects. Firstly, the average quality and property 
value of housing association dwellings could be higher than council houses because 
there have been many new dwellings in the housing association sector since 1989. 
Hence, this implies that average estimate market rents for housing association 
dwellings could be higher than the estimated market rents for council houses. 
Secondly, housing associations are free to set up their rents after 1989 and since then 
the rent level in the housing association sector has risen rapidly, compared to the rent 
level in the local authority rented sector. Based on the conditions above, housing 
association tenants receive less rent gap subsidies than local authority tenants. Thirdly, 
the average household income of local authority tenants is lower than that of housing 
association tenants and, as a result, the rent gap subsidy has more influence on local 
authority tenants than housing association tenants, particularly in lower income 
quintile groups. 
Housing Benefit has become the most important subsidy to social tenants. Table 7.16 
shows that more than half of tenants in both the local authority sector and the housing 
association sector are in receipt of Housing Benefit. It also shows that tenants in lower 
income groups depend heavily upon this state benefit. For both local authority tenants 
and housing association tenants in the bottom quintile and the second quintile groups, 
the average amount of Housing Benefit accounts for about 30 per cent and 20 per cent 
of their average household income respectively. In addition, the average Housing 
Benefit received by housing association tenants is slightly higher than that received by 
local authority tenants. This is probably because the average rent level in the housing 
association sector is higher than that in the local authority rented sector so that housing 
association tenants would receive more benefits to cover their rents. 
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Table 7.16 Housing Subsidies to Local Authority Tenants and Housing 
Association Tenants in Scotland, 1996 (Weekly £) 
Equivalent Mean Economic % of E. Average % of HB % of Total 
income Income Subsidies Sub. to HB to Mean Sub. to 
Quintile Mean Income Mean 
income income 
LA Tenants 
Bottom 92.22 15.74 17.1% 26.79 29.0% 46.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (1589) (1325) (935) 
2nd 144.55 14.40 10.0% 26.34 18.2% 28.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (1812) (1530) (1140) 
3rd 189.93 13.66 7.2% 27.90 14.7% 21.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (1464) (1236) (856) 
4th 262.63 13.55 5.2% 28.40 10.8% 16.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (787) (645) (272) 
Top 396.06 12.59 3.2% 30.29 7.6% 10.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (259) (217) (72) 
Total Avg 168.46 14.38 8.5% 27.13 16.1% 24.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (5911) (4962) (3275) 
HA Tenants 
Bottom 94.63 14.43 15.2% 29.63 31.3% 46.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (278) (226) (164) 
2nd 144.09 13.10 9.1% 28.18 19.6% 28.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (327) (275) (223) 
3rd 192.00 9.69 5.0% 30.68 16.0% 21.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (316) (274) (204) 
4th 260.98 8.17 3.1% 36.04 13.8% 16.9% 
(No. ofobs. ) (218) (178) (99) 
Top 477.00 10.09 2.1% 43.21 9.1% 11.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (83) (65) (35) 
Total Avg 188.69 11.42 6.1% 31.01 16.4% 22.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (1222) (1018) (725) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
As defined in Chapter Five, private tenants receive rent gap subsidies only if they are 
in regulated tenancy and pay fair rents. Private tenants in the non-regulated tenancy 
are supposed to pay market rents so that they do not receive any rent gap subsidies. 
Table 7.17 presents the housing subsidies to private regulated tenants and to non- 
regulated tenants. Derived from Chapter Five, there are 57 private tenants in the 
sample who were possibly in the regulated tenancy. Most of these regulated tenants 
are concentrated in lower income quintile groups and only two of them are distributed 
in the top income quintile group. Therefore, the effect of fair rent subsidies is much 
more significant in lower income groups. The average economic subsidies to private 
regulated tenants account for about 17 per cent of household income in the bottom 
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quintile group and about 14 per cent in the second quintile group, while the percentage 
reduces to less than 1 per cent in the top quintile group. 
Table 7.17 Housing Subsidies to Private Tenants in Scotland, 1996 (Weekly £) 
Equivalent Mean Economic % of E. Average % of % of Total 
income Income Subsidies Sub. to HB HB to Sub. To 
Quintile Mean Mean Mean 
Income Income Income 
Private Reg. Ten. 
Bottom 83.56 14.13 16.9% 20.31 24.3% 41.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (16) (16) (7) 
2nd 144.66 20.33 14.1% 25.41 17.6% 31.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (18) (18) (9) 
3rd 191.93 15.30 8.0% 13.06 6.8% 14.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (11) (11) (4) 
4th 253.16 14.99 5.9% 44.31 17.5% 23.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (10) (10) (2) 
Top 427.90 0.67 0.2% 0.00 0.0% 0.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (2) (2) (0) 
Total Avg 165.61 16.22 9.8% 23.32 14.1% 23.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (57) (57) (22) 
Pry. Non-Reg. 
Ten. 
Bottom 76.04 - - 42.05 55.3% 55.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (254) (56) 
2nd 146.40 - - 47.39 32.4% 32.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (164) (78) 
3rd 192.75 - - 53.32 27.7% 27.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (167) (64) 
4th 264.01 - - 65.22 24.7% 24.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (168) (40) 
Top 475.86 - - 55.86 11.7% 11.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (135) (8) 
Total Avg 207.33 - - 50.89 24.5% 24.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (888) (246) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table 7.17 shows that about one third of private tenants are in receipt of Housing 
Benefit. Apparently, private tenants in lower income quintiles depend heavily upon 
this state benefit. For private non-regulated tenants, the average amount of Housing 
Benefit accounts for 55 per cent of their average household income in the bottom 
quintile, and accounted for 32 per cent of their average household income in the 
second quintile. In addition, the average Housing Benefit received by regulated 
tenants is less than half of the amount received by non-regulated tenants. This is 
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probably because the fair rent level is much lower than the market level, thus regulated 
tenants receive fewer benefits to cover their rents than non-regulated tenants do. 
Figure 7.7 shows a comparison of housing subsidies to social tenants (including local 
authority tenants and housing association tenants) and private tenants. With regard to 
economic subsidies, private regulated tenants in lower income quintiles apparently 
receive slightly higher rent gap subsidies than local authority tenants and housing 
association tenants. In the social rented sector, local authority tenants receive slightly 
higher rent gap subsidies than housing association tenants receive in all income 
quintiles except the top quintile. Housing Benefit plays a significant role in 
subsidising tenants in lower income quintile groups. After adding Housing Benefit, 
the total subsidy to local authority tenants and housing association tenants is about the 
same between income quintiles. On the other hand, private tenants in the third and the 
fourth quintile groups receive a slightly higher proportion of housing subsidies 








Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top 
Equ. Income Quintile 
#-LA -a-LA+HB --ý-HA -_HA+HB -APR REG e PR+HB 
Figure 7.7 Housing Subsidies to LA Tenants, HA Tenants and Private Tenants in 
Scotland, 1996 (Percentage to mean income) 
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Notes: the subsidy base in the economic subsidy; LA: local authority; HA housing 
association; PR: private renting; PR-REG: private renting in regulated tenancy; 
HB: Housing Benefit 
At the city level, the results of housing subsidies to private tenants would not be as 
reliable as at the whole Scotland level because of a lack of sufficient observations. 
Therefore, in Figure 7.8, subsidies to private tenants are presented by broken lines (the 
annex tables are listed in Appendix A. 7.5). In spite of unreliable results, it can be 
identified that private regulated tenants are concentrated in Edinburgh City and 
Glasgow City. Of the estimated total 57 private regulated tenants in the sample of 
Scotland, 34 of them are located in Edinburgh City and Glasgow City. 
The patterns of housing subsidies to social tenants are slightly different between the 
four cities. In Edinburgh City, the average economic subsidies to social tenants are the 
lowest among the four cities. It also shows that social tenants in Edinburgh City have 
the biggest gap between total subsidies (economic subsidies plus Housing Benefit) and 
economic subsidies, particularly in lower income quintiles. The results may reveal the 
fact that the social rent level in Edinburgh City is close to the market rent level. In 
contrast, social tenants in Aberdeen City have the smallest difference between total 
subsidies and economic subsidies. Also, social tenants receive the highest amount of 
economic subsidies among the four cities. 
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7.3.4 The Impacts of MIRAS Abolition 
The mortgage interest relief at source (MIRAS) was terminated in April 2000. Before 
its abolition, MIRAS was an important tax advantage for mortgaged owners during the 
1980s. In the 1990s, the changes in policy made it clear that the long-term policy aim 
was to abolish the tax relief. Therefore, the ceiling of £30,000 was maintained and the 
basic rate of tax relief was steadily cut back till termination. The abolition of MIRAS 
would have impacts directly on mortgaged owners and on house price and other 
housing market activities. From a housing subsidy viewpoint, it would be interesting 
to see the impact of MIRAS abolition on mortgaged owners, especially on their 
incomes and user costs. This part of the section simulates the impact of MIRAS 
abolition on mortgaged owners' income and user costs by using the 1996 Scottish 
House Condition Survey, although MIRAS was still in existence during that period. 
As discussed in the second part of this section, MI AS only accounted for a small 
proportion of the average household incomes for mortgaged owners and the 
distributional effect was not significant between income quintiles. Therefore, as 
shown in Table 7.15, if MIRAS were abolished in Scotland in 1996, mortgaged 
owners would lose the tax advantages accounting for average 1.4 per cent of their 
household incomes. In the bottom quintile group, the effect of MIRAS abolition 
would be slightly significant. As shown in Table 7.15, the amount of MIRAS only 
accounts for 4 per cent of the average household incomes for mortgaged owners in the 
bottom income quintile, while it falls to 1 per cent in the top income quintile. 
Apparently, the changes in MIRAS policy such as the ceiling setting and the cut back 
of basic rate in the 1990s had limited the MIRAS effect on mortgaged owners. 
Furthermore, the abolition of MIRAS would have impacts on the user costs of 
mortgaged owners. Table 7.18 shows that the average MIRAS for mortgaged owners 
amounts to £4.36 per week, and only accounts for 6.4 per cent of the average user 
costs for mortgaged owners. Compared to economic subsidies, accounting for about 
18 per cent of the average user costs, the MIRAS was not a significant subsidy to 
mortgaged owners. In addition, when examining the distribution of MIRAS between 
income quintiles, MIRAS accounts for 5.3 per cent to 5.8 per cent of the average user 
costs from the bottom quintile to the top quintile. The distributional effect of MIRAS 
is also not significant between income quintiles. As a result, if MIRAS were abolished 
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in 1996, the impact would be very limited on the user costs for mortgaged owners in 
any given income quintile. 
Compared to outright owners, the abolition of MIRAS would have impacts on 
increasing the gap of actual net user costs between mortgaged owners and outright 
owners. Table 7.18 shows that the average user costs for mortgaged owners are not 
much different to outright owners but outright owners receive more economic 
subsidies than mortgaged owners do. Therefore, net user costs for mortgaged owners 
are higher than for outright owners in each income quintile. Mortgaged owners, 
however, receive MIRAS so it narrows the gap of user costs between these two 
tenures. With MIRAS subsidy, the average actual user costs for mortgaged owners 
(see Column g in Table 7.18) are about 10 per cent higher than the user costs for 
outright owners. Without MIRAS subsidy, the average net user costs for mortgaged 
owners are about 20 per cent higher than the user costs for outright owners. 
At the city level, as shown in Figure 7.6, MI AS only accounts for a small proportion 
of household income and there is no significant difference between the four cities. 
This suggests that the abolition of MIRAS would not have much effect on mortgaged 
owners between income levels in the four cities? ' With respect to the impact on user 
costs, mortgaged owners in Glasgow City would face higher impacts of MIRAS 
abolition on their user costs among the four cities and this is probably because 
mortgaged owners in Glasgow City have the lowest average user costs (see Table 
7.19). On the other hand, the lowest user costs for mortgaged owners in Glasgow City 
indicate that mortgaged owners in the city could have lower average property values 
compared to the other three cities. Finally, the abolition of MIRAS increases the gap 
of actual net user costs between mortgaged owners and outright owners. However, the 
gap is not significant between the four cities, although the average level of user costs 
for owner-occupiers is significantly different between the four cities (the user costs 
and subsidies for outright owners are reported in Appendix A. 7.5). 
In summary, this section analyses the distribution of housing subsidies between 
tenures and income levels. At both the whole of Scotland level and the city level, the 
223 
results indicate that housing subsidies are progressive with income rises. Households 
in lower income groups receive a greater proportion of housing subsidies to their 
income than households in upper income groups. Compared to 1980s, the focus of 
housing subsidy is switched from owner-occupiers to tenants, particularly to social 
tenants. Housing Benefit is the most significant subsidy to tenants in both the social 
rented and the private rented sectors. The average amount of Housing Benefit 
received by tenants is much higher than the rent gap subsidy to tenants. In the owner- 
occupied sector, the difference of economic subsidies between outright owners and 
mortgaged owners primarily comes from the imputed rental income where part of 
mortgaged owners' imputed rental income is deducted by their mortgage debts. 
MIRAS only accounts for a very small proportion of household income for mortgaged 
owners, thus the abolition of this tax relief would not have significant impacts on the 
household income and the user costs of mortgaged owners at any income level. 
21 It is noted that, in the four cities, the figures in each income quintiles may not be reliable because of a 
lack of sufficient observations between income quintiles. Thus, I refer to the figures in total average of 
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7.4 Summary and Implications 
Three issues have been discussed in this chapter. The first issue has concerned some 
simulations regarding the effects of changes in the income tax rate and the mortgage 
rationing criteria on the household's tenure decision behaviour. The simulation results 
suggest that an increase in the marginal income tax rate (24%) reduces the user cost of 
owner-occupiers. The reduction in the user cost of owner-occupiers reduces the cost 
difference between tenures. Therefore, the influence of the new user cost of housing 
becomes less statistically and numerically significant on tenure choice. The 
simulation results also indicate that a 20% reduction in the mortgage rationing ratios 
creates more constraints on households, therefore, it leads to the new mortgage 
rationing variable having a stronger numerical effect on tenure choice. 
From a policy perspective, the simulation results provide a clear indication of the 
influences of changes in policy or schemes on households' tenure decisions. In 
particular, the government's housing proposals aim to continue to encourage 
homeownership in Scotland. To some extent, the research findings imply that an 
increase in the income tax rate reduces the user cost of owner-occupiers, thus giving 
advantages to increase the homeownership rate. Moreover, an increase in the 
mortgage rationing ratios creates fewer mortgage constraints on homebuyers and thus 
promotes the owner-occupied sector. 
The second issue has concerned the outcome of tenure choice and income distribution, 
emphasising income inequality and tenure polarisation. The results show clearly that 
mortgaged owners have a smaller income inequality than outright owners. Income 
inequality in social tenants is lower than in private tenants. However, there is a 
significant concentration of mortgaged owners in upper income quintile groups and a 
polarisation of social tenants in lower income quintile groups. For social tenants, the 
results imply that more uniformly poor households are concentrated in the social 
rented sector. In fact, the concentration of unemployed and economically inactive 
people in social housing could not only cause a problem of social exclusion but also a 
problem of failure to meet what social tenants want and their aspirations (Hills 2000). 
As stated in Chapter Six, many low-income council tenants may not be able to afford 
to move or to choose their council dwellings. 
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To some degree, the sale of council housing via the Right to Buy scheme could be 
associated with residualisation and income polarisation in the social rented sector. It 
is the higher income tenants who would be in a better position to buy council houses 
thereby leaving the local authority sector increasingly concentrated by low-income 
households (Bentham 1986). Furthermore, the rigid allocation system is associated 
with tenure polarisation. Social tenants receive a rationed allocation of housing with a 
fixed quality and price. Ability to move between areas is highly constrained except 
through very occasional transfers, or through leaving and losing the subsidy from the 
social tenancy, or through exercising the Right to Buy and then selling at a later date 
(Hills 2000). In this sense, tenure polarisation exists in the way that social tenants can 
not make choices over their housing and location. 
Therefore, the policy proposal to reform the allocation system would address a strong 
customer focus with an emphasis on the supply of proper information to social tenants 
as stated in the DETR Housing Green Paper (DETR 2000). As Smith (2000) indicates, 
the concept of choice is the core of new allocation and letting proposals where social 
landlords should provide better information to applicants, and where the application 
system should be simple and accessible in order to ensure that applicants should have 
an opportunity to express their opinions when seeking housing. 
In addition to the social rented sector, the income and tenure polarisation in the 
owner-occupied sector implies a lack of choice for people who are owners or want to 
be owners. Hills (2000) indicates that, for people who want to be owners, the 
polarisation of choice exists in that the only way for people to get into the owner- 
occupied housing market is by buying the whole property except for a small number 
of shared ownership schemes. Compared with the level of Housing Benefit offered to 
tenants, there is little support for low-income owners to help them with their housing 
costs. Furthermore, it is difficult for elderly owners to realise part of their housing 
equity to provide either regular incomes or to pay for care costs (ibid. ). Thus, for poor 
elderly owners, the only way to get someone to care and organise repairs for them is 
by becoming a tenant. As a result, the policy to assist low income or elderly owners 
would set out towards providing a flexible tenure which allows households with 
shared ownership or allows elderly owners on low incomes with houses in poor 
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condition to become tenants or shared owners with a housing association, as stated in 
the Scottish House Green Paper (Scottish Office 1999). 
Moreover, the problem of tenure polarisation is associated with the small size of the 
private rented sector. As Holmans (1978) indicates, the diminishing size of the 
private rented sector has resulted in the housing market becoming polarised between 
the owner-occupied and social rented sectors. The logic of the argument is that the 
private rented housing market is so small that it is less effective in meeting people's 
particular life cycle needs (Hills 2000). For example, there is a great need for younger 
people who are in insecure incomes and employment to look for shorter term private 
rented housing rather than owner-occupation or social housing. However, the small 
size of the private rented housing market may not meet the housing needs of younger 
people. As a result, it pushes more people into marginal owner-occupation and 
increases the pressure on the social rented sector. The long-term policy would set out 
to promote the private rented sector through capital and tax incentives. As proposed 
by the Housing Green Paper, a 100 per cent capital allowance for creating flats over 
shops for letting and a reform for VAT to encourage additional conversion of 
properties for residential use would be possible approaches. 
In the third section, the results show that the housing subsidy effect is progressive. 
Households in lower income groups receive more subsidies than households in upper 
income groups do. With respect to the distribution of housing subsidies between 
tenures, social tenants receive greater amount of subsidies than owner-occupiers. This 
result is significantly different from that in the 1980s, when owner-occupiers were 
favoured by the government's housing policy, and a series of policy and subsidy 
schemes were set up to promote homeownership (see Hills 1991). 
The housing policy and subsidy schemes have been changed dramatically in the 1990s. 
One of most significant changes for subsidy schemes was phasing out the mortgaged 
interest tax relief. It has been seen that the government's expenditures on mortgaged 
interest tax relief was cut back sharply in the 1990s and the scheme abolished in April 
2000. As a result, subsidies to owner-occupiers, particularly to mortgaged owners 
have reduced sharply. The results also show that the total amount of subsidies to 
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mortgaged owners is less than that outright owners receive in each income quintile 
group. 
Another important change for housing subsidy in the 1990s was a rapid increase in 
Housing Benefit expenditures (see Wilcox 1999). As discussed in Chapter Three, a 
rapid increase in rents in the social rented sector, particularly the housing association 
sector after 1989, has resulted in increasing the number of social tenants depending 
upon Housing Benefit to cover their rents, thus enhancing a sharp increase in Housing 
Benefit expenditures. The results in the third section show that about two thirds of 
social tenants in Scotland in 1996 were in receipt of Housing Benefit. In particular, 
social tenants in lower income groups depended heavily upon this state benefit. As 
discussed earlier, under the current system, Housing Benefit covering 100 per cent of 
rents gives tenants, especially private tenants, no shopping incentives to look for 
cheaper accommodation. This could be one of major reasons why the average amount 
of Housing Benefit rises with income. The introduction of a local reference rent limit 
in the Housing Benefit scheme since January 1996 has allegedly had substantial 
effects on reducing the number of Housing Benefit claimants, particularly private 
tenants, in upper income levels (see Wilcox et al. 1998). In addition, some academic 
researchers suggest that the long term reform approach to enhance the shopping 
incentive to Housing Benefit receipts should set out to reduce the 65 per cent rent 
taper and to introduce a flat rate of contribution based on 20 per cent of average local 
rents (see for example Hill 1991, Kemp 1994,2000). 
Another concern arising from the results in the third section is housing subsidies to 
low-income homeowners. The results in the third section show that the distribution of 
housing subsidies to owner-occupiers is progressive between income levels. Owner- 
occupiers in lower income groups receive more subsidies than those in upper income 
groups. Although the results in the third section do not contain the Income Support 
for Mortgage Interest (ISMI) data, as discussed in Chapter Three, ISMI has played an 
increasingly important role in subsidising low income mortgaged owners in 
unemployment (see for example Gibb et. al 1999, Pryce and Keoghan 1999, Wilcox 
2000). However, the ISMI subsidy declined sharply in the late 1990s, partly because 
of falling interest rates and lower levels of unemployment but also because of a series 
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of restrictions on this scheme ' (Burrows, Ford and Wilcox 2000). On the other hand, 
there is no scheme in the UK to provide a means tested subsidy to low-income 
homeowners in employment. If we consider the equity of subsidy, low-income 
owners in employment or in unemployment should be included in the subsidy 
programme. This should be an agenda in the government's housing subsidy reform in 
the future. 
The final concern is the impact of MIRAS abolition. The results of the third section 
indicate that the termination of MIRAS would not have significant impact on 
mortgaged owners in terms of their user costs. However, the abolition of MIRAS 
could have influences on other things such as mortgaged interest rate, housing price, 
and the dynamics of the housing market. These need to be investigated in the future. 
In summary, the simulation results have suggested a direction of changes in the 
income tax rate and the mortgage rationing ratios in supporting homeownership. The 
results of the distribution of income and housing subsidies between tenures also have 
implications for current housing policy reform. For Housing Benefit reform, the 
emphasises are not only to provide work incentives to working welfare recipients but 
also to provide more shopping incentives to benefit recipients to look for cheaper 
accommodation. In the social rented sector, the implication addresses the allocation 
system which should provide more choices to tenants and should encourage cross 
boundary and cross tenure applications. In the owner-occupied sector, the focus is to 
assist low-income and elderly homeowners either to secure their homeownership or to 
offer flexible options to share ownership or to sell properties to repay their housing 
costs. Finally, in the private rented sector, the reform addresses provision of tax 
concessions to encourage new investment and the conversion of properties for rented 
residential uses. 
I After October 1995, existing mortgage borrowers who make a new claim for ISMI receive no support 
for 2 months before moving onto 16 weeks of 50 per cent support (and full support thereafter). New 
mortgage borrowers receive no support for 9 months before moving onto 50 per cent support (and a full 
support only after a further 16 weeks. Borrowers are encouraged to take out private mortgaged 
protection payment insurance (MPPI) to cover their mortgage costs over such a period. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Summary 
Over the last several decades, housing in Scotland has developed in a different pattern 
from housing in the rest of Great Britain. It has been seen that the growth of owner- 
occupied housing in Scotland is significantly faster than in England and Wales. The 
historical importance of Scotland's public rented sector is greater than in the other two 
nations. Housing associations in Scotland are relatively young and small in size 
compared to housing associations in England. The percentage of private rented 
dwellings in Scotland is the lowest among the three countries. The tenure pattern to 
some degree reflects the outcome of the household's tenure decision behaviour. 
Scotland's unique tenure pattern implies that the Scottish household's tenure decision 
behaviour is different from the household's in the rest of Britain and it also inspires 
the study of housing tenure choice in Scotland. 
To analyse the household's tenure choice in Scotland, this thesis attempts to answer 
three questions: what is the nature of tenure choice and its determinants in Scotland? 
To what extent do these determinants influence the household's tenure decision in 
Scotland? What policy issues emerge from the model results and what are 
implications for current housing policy? 
The nature of housing tenure choice can be interpreted from a variety of aspects 
depending upon who is using it and the purpose of the research. This thesis starts to 
define housing tenure choice from a broader perspective. As Barlow and Duncan 
(1988) indicated, housing tenure can be seen as a whole range of financial, social, 
political and economic relations surrounding housing. Iri the sociological perspective, 
the choice of housing tenure implies the housing class and social relations to different 
tenures (Rex and Moore 1967, and Gray 1982). In the economic perspective, housing 
tenure choice presents a consumer's choice behaviour by maximising his/her utility on 
different tenures and choosing the tenure that yields the maximum utility subject to 
the budget constraint (Fallis 1985). The interpretation of housing tenure choice in this 
thesis emphasises the economic approaches. 
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The economic theory of tenure choice is based on the consumer choice theory and 
housing demand theory. The consumer's decision for housing demand can be seen as 
a bundle of choices which, for example, include the decisions of tenure, dwelling type, 
neighbourhood quality and location. Previous studies have suggested that these 
choices are interrelated and that hierarchy is a way to organise these choices. In a 
hierarchical housing choice model, a household, for instance, may first choose tenure 
and then dwelling type and so on, to choose neighbourhood and location. However, it 
is noted that the hierarchical framework of housing choice is just an analytical device 
that reflects the relative degree of similarity among choice alternatives. Therefore, it 
does not imply that a household should necessarily follow this kind of decision tree 
while making a housing decision. Moreover, in a series of housing decisions, tenure 
choice would be more important when a household faces a choice between public and 
private housing. In the public housing sector particularly, the tenure is usually 
attached to certain dwelling type, neighbourhood and location (Clapham and Kintrea 
1986). 
In tenure choice analysis, previous studies have indicated that the household's tenure 
choice is not only influenced by the household attributes but also influenced by 
housing attributes. The household attributes generally include household demographic 
characteristics, household socio-economic characteristics and the user cost of housing. 
The household demographic characteristics generally include the household head's 
age, gender, marital status and the household size. The household socio-economic 
characteristics consist of the household income, employment status, previous tenure 
and likeliness to move. The user cost of housing presents the relative cost of owning 
or renting. The household's tenure choice is also affected by housing attributes such 
as dwelling type, location, and neighbourhood quality. In addition, as the 
government's strong intervention in the housing market, the housing subsidy and the 
rationing in the admission to owner-occupied sector and the social housing sector have 
important influences on the household's tenure decision behaviour in Scotland as well 
as the rest of Britain. This thesis, therefore, emphasises the impact of the housing 
subsidy and rationing factors on the household's tenure choice. 
234 
To examine the impact of the determining factors on the household's tenure choice, 
two simulation models with different structures are developed in the thesis. The first 
tenure choice model contains a simple one-level choice set. The tenure choice splits 
into three choice alternatives: owner-occupation, social renting and private renting. A 
multinomial logit (MNL) model is chosen to estimate the three-choice function. The 
MNL model provides a simple and convenient functional foim to estimate the choice 
probabilities. Because of its simple structure, the interpretation of the MNL model is 
more straightforward than other discrete choice models. As a result, the MNL model 
is suitable for the first model to directly interpret the influences of the determinants on 
tenure choice. However, the MNL model has a widely know weakness, which could 
easily violate the independence from irrelevant alternative (IIA) property. The 
rejection of the RA property in the MNL model implies that the estimation of tenure 
choice could be bias. As a result, the MNL model in this thesis should be treated with 
caution. 
The second model estimates the household's mobility decision and tenure choice. 
This model contains a two-level choice structure assuming that the household's tenure 
choice is followed by its decision to move. The hierarchical choice model of mobility 
and tenure choice provides an alternative approach to solve the IIA problem without 
breaking the tenure choice structure presented in the first model. Therefore, this two- 
level choice model can be seen as a substitute of the first model. A nested 
multinomial logit (NMNL) model is employed to estimate the probability of a 
household choosing to move/stay and the probability of choosing a tenure alternative 
under the influences of the determining variables. In the NMNL model, the inclusive 
value parameter is an indication of the IIA property. When the inclusive value 
parameter lies between 0 and 1, the NMNL model satisfies both the IIA property and 
the random utility function. 
The 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey is the data set used in this thesis. This 
data set contains large samples and rich information about households' socio- 
economic characteristics and dwelling conditions. These are important variables to 
estimate the Scottish households' tenure choice behaviour. In the MNL tenure choice 
model, the dependent variable is the household's current tenure status including 
owner-occupation, social renting and private renting. The explanatory variables come 
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from several categories including the household's demographic characteristics, 
employment status, previous tenure status, location, expected mobility, dwelling type 
and neighbourhood quality variables. These variables are expected to have important 
impacts on tenure choice. This thesis also constructs household long-term income, the 
user cost of housing, housing (economic) subsidy and rationing variables to estimate 
their influences on households' tenure decisions. The use of long term income implies 
the household's tenure decision is based on long term and multiple periods rather than 
a current and single period. The housing user cost presents the relative cost of owning, 
social renting and private renting. The housing (economic) subsidy reduces the user 
cost of housing and thus, its effect can be expressed by estimating the difference 
between the user cost and the net user cost. The mortgage rationing and social 
housing rationing variables are developed by simulating households' access 
constraints into the owner-occupied sector and the social rented sector respectively. 
In the NMNL mobility and tenure choice model, the dependent variable is the 
household's move-stay and tenure status including stay, move to choose owner- 
occupation, move to choose social renting and move to choose private renting. If a 
household has moved within two years, the household is defined as a recent mover 
and is assigned to its current tenure status. Otherwise, the household is defined as a 
stayer. The explanatory variables of the mobility and tenure choice model are drawn 
from the first tenure choice model. As a requirement of the nested logit model, the 
explanatory variables are interacted with four possible choices in order to estimate the 
interactive coefficients for these four alternative choices. One exception is the user 
cost variable which is treated as an attribute across tenures. Because of the 
requirement of the NMNL model structure, the user cost is measured not on the 
individual household basis but on the tenure basis. The user cost in this model is 
measured by the average cost across tenures and also across all 32 unitary authorities 
in Scotland in order to express the regional variation of the user cost. 
Due to the IIA problem in the MNL model, it was found that the NMNL model 
provides robust results in estimating households' tenure choice and mobility decisions. 
The MNL model in this thesis can be treated as a pilot model to test the initial 
influences of the explanatory variables on tenure choice. Unlike the NMNL model 
requiring specific data arrangement and variable interactions, the MNL model 
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provides a simple approach to estimate the influences of the explanatory variables on 
three tenure alternatives. With respect to the model results, it was found that most 
explanatory variables in the MNL model are statistically significant. This indicates 
that these explanatory variables have substantial influences on tenure choice in 
Scotland, and also these explanatory variables are applied to the NMNL model. 
The results of the NMNL model show that the household demographic variables have 
substantial influences on tenure choice. It was found that older and married 
households are more likely to choose owner-occupation, while younger and single 
households are more likely to choose private renting. Households having more 
dependent children have significantly positive likelihood of choosing social renting. 
Female household heads are more likely to choose social renting. In addition, the 
household head's employment variables have the most determining influences on 
tenure choice. Household heads having full time or part time jobs are strongly likely 
to choose owner-occupation, while unemployed household heads are more likely to 
choose social renting. These results draw a clear picture that households in better 
socio-economic positions are more likely to be homeowners, while households with 
socio-economic disadvantages are more likely to choose social renting. 
Households' previous tenure has a statistically and numerically significant influence 
on their current tenure decision. It is more likely the see that households will choose 
the same tenure as their previous one when making a tenure decision. Similar results 
also apply to the neighbourhood quality variables. Households' tenure decisions are 
strongly influenced by their current neighbourhood environments. Dwelling type and 
location are usually associated with tenure. As Scottish Homes (1997) indicate, in 
Scotland, most houses are owner-occupied. Therefore, households who live in or 
want to live in houses could only be homeowners. In this sense, it is not surprising 
that households living in houses are more likely to choose owner-occupation than 
social renting. Moreover, Scottish Homes (1997) also indicate that there are 
substantial private renting dwellings located in rural areas of Scotland. As a result, the 
model results show that households living in rural areas are more likely to choose 
private renting rather than owner-occupation. However, it would be difficult to 
estimate the household's decision on whether social renting or owner-occupation 
based on the simple definition of the urban area in the 1996 SHCS. It needs more 
237 
specific location variables to present the spatial concentration of social housing and 
owner-occupied housing in the inner city, the periphery and the suburban areas. 
The household long-term income and the user cost have statistically and numerically 
significant influences on the household's tenure choice. When income rises, the 
household is more likely to choose owner-occupation than social renting or private 
renting. The user cost of housing has a significantly negative impact on the 
household's tenure choice, indicating that when the user cost of a certain tenure 
increases, households are less likely to choose that tenure. The housing (economic) 
subsidy plays a distinct role in reducing the housing user cost and also has a 
substantial effect on tenure choice. Mortgage rationing and social housing rationing 
have numerically strong impacts on tenure choice, which play a role as gatekeeper, 
filtering the household's access to the owner-occupied sector and to the social rented 
sector respectively. As expected, households who are potentially constrained from 
mortgages are more likely to choose social renting or private renting. In contrast, 
households who are potentially constrained from the social renting sector are more 
likely to choose owner-occupation or private renting. 
In addition to tenure decision, the household head's age, the number of dependent 
children and household long-term income have important influences on the 
household's mobility decision. Older households and households having more 
dependent children are more likely to stay at current status. When income rises, 
households are more likely to stay than to move. It is noted that these variables not 
only have significant impacts on mobility decision but also have remarkable 
influences on tenure choice. 
The model results provide us with a better estimation of the household's tenure choice 
behaviour in Scotland. Some issues are derived from the results of the two tenure 
choice models. From a policy perspective, it is of interest to discuss the influences of 
changes in policy or schemes on the household's tenure decision. As a result, the first 
issue relates to an analysis of two simulations of the tenure choice models. The first 
simulation discusses the influences of a change in the income tax rate on the user cost 
of owner-occupiers and also on tenure choice. The second simulation analyses the 
effect of a change in the mortgage rationing criteria on tenure choice. It was found 
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that an increase in the marginal income tax rate (24%) reduces the user cost of owner- 
occupiers and thus it reduces the cost difference between tenures. Therefore, the 
simulation results show that the new user cost has become a less statistically and 
numerically influence on tenure choice. Further, a 20% reduction in the mortgage 
rationing ratios creates more constraints on households. Thus, it leads to the new 
mortgage rationing variable having a stronger influence on tenure choice. 
The second issue concerns the outcomes of tenure choice and income distribution 
emphasising income inequality and tenure polarisation in Scotland and the four major 
cities - Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow. The results show that income 
inequality in mortgaged owners is lower than in outright owners, while income 
inequality in social tenants is lower than in private tenants. However, when 
examining tenure distribution between and within income quintile groups, a 
significant tenure polarisation is shown in that mortgaged owners are concentrated in 
the upper income quintile groups, while social tenants are concentrated in the lower 
income groups. Together, these indicate that higher income households are most 
likely to be owner-occupiers with mortgages, while low-income households are 
concentrated in the social rented sector. In addition, it implies a big income gap 
between mortgaged owners and social tenants. 
The third issue concerns the distribution of housing subsidies between income levels 
across tenures. At both the whole of Scotland level and the four cities level, the 
results indicate that housing subsidies are progressive with income rise. Households 
in lower income groups receive a greater proportion of housing subsidies to their 
incomes than households in upper income groups. Compared to 1980s, the focus of 
housing subsidy has been switched from owner-occupiers to tenants, particularly to 
social tenants. Housing Benefit is the most significant subsidy to tenants in both the 
social rented and the private rented sectors. The average amount of Housing Benefit 
received by tenants is much higher than the rent gap subsidy to tenants. In the owner- 
occupied sector, the difference of economic subsidies between outright owners and 
mortgaged owners primarily comes from the imputed rental income where part of 
mortgaged owners' imputed rental income is deducted by their mortgage debts. 
MIRAS only accounts for a very small proportion of household income for mortgaged 
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owners, thus the abolition of this tax relief would not have a significant impact on 
household income and the user costs for mortgaged owners in all income levels. 
From a policy perspective, the simulation results provide us with a clear direction of 
the influences of changes in policy or schemes on households' tenure decisions. In 
particular, the government's housing proposals aim to continue to encourage 
sustainable homeownership in Scotland. To some extent, the simulation results imply 
that an increase in the income tax rate reduces the user cost of owner-occupiers, thus it 
gives advantages to increase the homeownership rate. An increase in the mortgage 
rationing ratios creates fewer mortgage constraints on homebuyers and thus, it can 
promote the owner-occupied sector. 
Moreover, the results of the distribution of income and housing subsidies between 
tenures together draw a clear picture that low-income households are significantly 
concentrated in the social housing sector and these households heavily depend upon 
Housing Benefit. The rigid need-based allocation system and the small private rented 
sector could partly be the result of tenure and income polarisation in the social rented 
sector. On the other hand, some low-income homeowners, mainly elderly and 
outright owners, may find it difficult to remain in homeownership. These results draw 
attention to policy makers regarding housing policy reform for housing benefit 
scheme, social housing allocation system, low-income homeownership and the 
promotion of the private rented sector. The implications to housing policy reform 
may not be new but I like to address again. For housing benefit reform, the 
emphasises are not only to provide work incentives to working welfare recipients but 
also to provide more shopping incentives to benefit recipients to look for cheaper 
accommodation. In the social rented sector, the implication addresses the allocation 
system, which should provide more choices to tenants and to encourage cross 
boundary and cross tenure applications. In the owner-occupied sector, the focus is to 
assist low-income and elderly homeowners either to secure their homeownership or to 
offer flexible options to share ownership or. to sell properties to repay their housing 
costs. In the private rented sector, the reform addresses on providing tax concessions 
to encourage new investment and conversion properties for rented residential uses. 
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In summary, this thesis provides a detailed analysis of the household's tenure choice 
behaviour in Scotland where few studies have been carried out on this topic. 
Moreover, the robust results of the tenure choice models and the results of income 
inequality and tenure polarisation and the distribution housing subsidies between 
tenures can be applied to many perspectives. The contributions of this thesis and 
some suggestions for further research are discussed below. 
8.2 Contributions and Further Research 
The contributions of this thesis can be classified into several categories. Theoretically, 
this thesis presents a clear and detailed review of the tenure choice theory and 
previous tenure choice studies. A detailed discussion of the theory of tenure choice 
assists with the understanding of the different characteristics of tenure choice (discrete 
choice) from other housing consumption decisions (continuous choice), and then 
clarifies the importance of tenure choice in a bundle of housing decisions. In a review 
of previous tenure choice studies, this thesis highlights the strengths and weaknesses 
of the study in terms of theoretical, methodological and empirical grounds. In 
addition, the discussion of the Scottish tenure and housing market context also helps 
to explain the changes in tenure patterns and the unique housing market conditions in 
Scotland compared to the rest of Great Britain. 
Empirically, this thesis performs the leading study of the household's tenure choice 
behaviour on the basis of the whole of Scotland. As stated earlier, Scotland has 
experienced a dramatic change in tenure structure. In particular, there has been a 
rapidly growing owner-occupied sector but a rapidly declining social rented sector 
over the last two decades. Tenure pattern, to some degree, reflects the outcome of the 
household's tenure choice. With the change in the household's tenure preference, 
academic researchers and policy makers will be interested in these questions: what are 
the determining factors of tenure choice in Scotland, and to what extent do these 
factors influence the Scottish households' tenure decisions? In this thesis, the robust 
results of the tenure choice models provide clear answers to these questions. 
Moreover, this thesis emphasises two determinants-housing subsidy and rationing 
factors that have seldom been examined in previous tenure choice studies. The 
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empirical results in this thesis demonstrate that these two determinants have 
statistically and numerically significant influences on tenure choice. 
In a comparison of the MNL model and the NMNL model, this thesis demonstrates 
that the hierarchical structure of the NMNL model is more suitable for tenure choice 
analysis. The NMNL model has robust results in the estimation of Scottish 
households' tenure decisions in this thesis. In contrast, MNL model is not a robust 
model for tenure choice analysis; especially, the model fails in estimating the 
simulations of the effect of changes in some determinants on tenure choice. 
In addition to the model results, this thesis also performs a detailed analysis of the 
issues regarding income inequality and tenure polarisation and the distribution of 
housing subsidy between tenures in Scotland and in its four main cities. This is the 
leading study which sets out to examine these issues at the Scottish and city level. In 
particular, there have been significant changes in social housing policy and housing 
subsidy schemes. It is of interest to analyse these issues in the 1990s, compared to a 
decade ago. 
Finally, there are some suggestions for further research. In this thesis, the hierarchical 
NMNL model contains a two-level tree with four choices. In the future, it would be of 
interest to develop the NMNL, model with more levels and more choice and to 
examine the household's tenure choice associated with other housing decisions such 
as the dwelling type and the location. Due to data limitations, this thesis estimates 
Scottish households' tenure decisions by using a cross-sectional data set-the 1996 
Scottish House Condition Survey. As stated in previous chapters, it has been seen that 
studies have increasingly used panel data in tenure choice analysis in recent years. 
Under this circumstance, the next step will be to connect the 1996 SHCS with the 
1991 SHCS or the forthcoming 2002 SHCS to analyse Scottish households tenure 
choice behaviour during these periods. This thesis also suggests that the forthcoming 
2002 SHCS will contain more detailed and higher quality information on location and 
neighbourhood data, thus it will be helpful to have better estimation results in the 
tenure choice or housing choice study. Moreover, some suggestions are derived from 
the analysis of policy issues and implications, such as a discussion of alternative 
approaches to measure and income inequality, an analysis of the impacts of MIRAS 
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abolition on house prices and the housing market, and a detailed discussion of housing 
policy reform related to income and housing subsidy distributions. These topics will 
be discussed in further research. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I Appendix to Chapter Five 
A. 5.1 Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Tenure The household's tenure status: 0=owner-occupation; 1=social 
renting; 2=private renting 
Age Age of the head of household 
A es Age square of the head of household 
Nedepch Number of dependent children in the household 
Marry Dummy variable if the head of household is married =1 
Male Dummy variable if the head of household is male=t 
Fullwork Dummy variable if the head of household has full time job=1 
Partwork Dummy variable if the head of household has part time 'ob=1 
Unem lo Dummy variable if the head of household is unemployment=1 
House Dummy variable if the head of household live in house=1 
Prevown Dummy variable if previous tenure is owner-oaation=1 
Prevsoc Dummy variable if previous tenure is social renting--l 
Prevprv Dummy variable if previous tenure is private renting--l 
Likmov2 Dummy variable if the household likely to move in 2 years=1 
Urban Dummy variable if the dwelling is located in urban area---l 
Affown Dummy variable if the neighbourhood is predominant of affluent 
owners=1 
Prvtcity Dummy variable if the neighbourhood is predominant of private 
inner city tenants=1 
Poorcnl Dummy variable if the neighbourhood is predominant of the 
poorest council tenants=1 
Lnperinc Log of predicted long term household income 
Lnucc 1 Log of user cost of capital 
Lnuccn 1 Log of net user cost 
Ratmort Dummy variable if the household is rationed from mortgages=1 
Ratsoc Dummy variable if the household is rationed from social housing=1 
Ethnics Dummy variable if head of the household is white=l 
Ndepchgp, Group ed number of dendent children in the household 
Sick Dummy variable if the head of household is in long term 
sickness=1 
Selfemp Dummy variable if the head of household is self-employed=1 
Prof Dummy variable if the head of household has professional and 
managerial 'ob=1 
Empman Dummy variable if the head of household is employer or 
manager--l 
Interjun Dummy variable if the head of household has intermediate/junior 
non-manual job=1 
Skill Dummy variable if the head of household is skilled manual work=1 
Semiskil Dummy variable if the head of household is semi-skilled manual 
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work=1 
Unskill Dummy variable if the head of household is unskilled manual 
work=1 
Detach Dummy variable if the dwelling is detach house=1 
Dwagel Dummy variable if the dwelling was built in pre-1 
Dwage3 Dummy variable if the dwelling was built between 1945-1964=1 
Dwage5 Dummy variable if the dwelling was built in post 1982=1 
Lntfa Log of the total floor area of the dwelling 
Fullheat Dummy variable if the dwelling has full central heating--l 
Prospown Dummy variable if neighbourhood is predominant of prosperous 
owners=1 
Graff Dummy variable if neighbourhood has graffiti and vandalism--l 
D arkin Dummy variable if neighbourhood has adequate parking space=1 
Vacsite Dummy variable if neighbourhood has vacant sites=1 
Yr94 Dummy variable if the household purchased current home in 
1994=1 
Yr95 Dummy variable if the household purchased current home in 
1995=1 
A. 5.2 The User Cost, Net User Cost and Economic Subsidy between Tenures 
and Across 32 Unitary Authorities in Scotland 
1. UA(10): Aberdeen City 






Simulation of UC of 
Owners 
(24% of ITR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 202 3482.09 2653.84 
Net User cost 202 2722.57 1894.32 
Economic subsidy 202 759.52 759.52 
Social Renting 
User cost 164 2352.39 NA 
Net user cost 164 1534.05 NA 
Economic subsidy 164 818.34 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 22 4474.65 NA 
Net user cost 22 4466.34 NA 
Economic subsidy 22 8.31 NA 
Notes: The simulation is to apply 24% of income tax rate to the user cost of owner- 
occupiers. 
NA denotes the simulation does not apply to social tenants and private tenants. 
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2. UA(11) : Aberdeenshire 




Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 251 3865.64 2937.25 
Net User cost 251 2940.22 2011.83 
Economic subsidy 251 925.42 925.42 
Social Renting 
User cost 152 2501.61 NA 
Net user cost 152 1627.92 NA 
Economic subsidy 152 873.69 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 25 3060.24 NA 
Net user cost 25 3060.24 NA 
Economic subsidy 25 0.00 NA 
3. UA(12): Angus 




Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of 171R) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 511 3701.45 2814.99 
Net User cost 511 2793.75 1907.29 
Economic subsidy 511 907.70 907.70 
Social Renting 
User cost 272 2231.46 NA 
Net user cost 272 1543.65 NA 
Economic subsidy 272 687.81 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 58 2461.69 NA 
Net user cost 58 2404.96 NA 
Economic subsidy 58 56.73 NA 
4. UA(13): Argyll and Bute 




Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of rM) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 383 3731.03 2836.16 
Net User cost 383 2782.13 1887.25 
Economic subsidy 383 948.90 948.90 
Social Renting 
User cost 231 2319.96 NA 
Net user cost 231 1855.93 NA 
Economic subsidy 231 464.03 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 64 2602.66 NA 
Net user cost 64 2602.66 NA 
Economic subsidy 64 0.00 NA 
246 
S. UA(14): the Borders 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of TTR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 114 3815.88 2899.26 
Net User cost 114 2824.01 1907.39 
Economic subsidy 114 991.87 991.87 
Social Renting 
User cost 81 2262.65 NA 
Net user cost 81 1584.40 NA 
Economic subsidy 81 678.25 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 26 2179.96 NA 
Net user cost 26 2179.96 NA 
Economic subsidy 26 0.00 NA 
6. UA(15): Clackmannan 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of rIR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 40 3595.88 2735.57 
Net User cost 40 2730.63 1870.33 
Economic subsidy 40 865.25 865.25 
Social Renting 
User cost 47 2350.50 NA 
Net user cost 47 1691.78 NA 
Economic subsidy 47 658.72 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 0 NA NA 
Net user cost 0 NA NA 
Economic subsidy 0 NA NA 
7. UA(16): Dumbarton and Clvdebank 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 78 2937.53 2250.52 
Net User cost 78 2308.77 1621.76 
Economic subsidy 78 628.76 628.76 
Social Renting 
User cost 120 2302.71 NA 
Net user cost 120 1803.11 NA 
Economic subsidy 120 499.60 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 3 3422.29 NA 
Net user cost 3 33422.29 NA 
Economic subsidy 3 0.00 NA 
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8. UA(17): Dumfries and Galloway 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of TTR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 166 3649.98 2776.12 
Net User cost 166 2719.68 1845.83 
Economic subsidy 166 930.30 930.30 
Social Renting 
User cost 126 22429.21 NA 
Net user cost 126 1786.29 NA 
Economic subsidy 126 642.93 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 20 2266.08 NA 
Net user cost 20 2266.08 NA 
Economic subsidy 20 0.00 NA 
9. UA(18): Dundee City 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of I TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 158 3234.85 2470.50 
Net User cost 158 2486.89 1722.54 
Economic subsidy 158 747.96 747.96 
Social Renting 
User cost 170 2349.91 NA 
Net user cost 170 1964.84 NA 
Economic subsidy 170 385.08 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 17 3306.13 NA 
Net user cost 17 3306.13 NA 
Economic subsidy 17 0.00 NA 
10. UA(19): East Ayrshire 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
24% of ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 103 3336.43 2546.12 
Net User cost 103 2571.17 1780.86 
Economic subsidy 103 765.26 765.26 
Social Renting 
User cost 137 2406.16 NA 
Net user cost 137 1513.62 NA 
Economic subsidy 137 892.54 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 4 2013.44 NA 
Net user cost 4 2013.44 NA 
Economic subsidy 4 0.00 NA 
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11. UA(20): East Dumbartonshire 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of rIR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 146 3981.51 3022.19 
Net User cost 146 3066.73 2107.40 
Economic subsidy 146 914.79 914.79 
Social Renting 
User cost 45 2523.39 NA 
Net user cost 45 1737.37 NA 
Economic subsidy 45 786.02. NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 8 3983.00 NA 
Net user cost 8 3983.00 NA 
Economic subsidy 8 0.00 NA 
12. UA(211: East Lothian 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of TM 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 462 3601.76 2747.67 
Net User cost 462 2793.37 1930.28 
Economic subsidy 462 817.39 817.39 
Social Renting 
User cost 278 2565.47 NA 
Net user cost 278 1590.09 NA 
Economic subsidy 278 975.38 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 30 3335.14 NA 
Net user cost 30 3321.18 NA 
Economic subsidy 30 13.97 NA 
13. UA(22): East Renfrewshire 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of rM) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 76 3960.69 3006.22 
Net User cost 76 3112.60 2158.13 
Economic subsidy 76 848.09 848.09 
Social Renting 
User cost 29 2522.42 NA 
Net user cost 29 1529.36 NA 
Economic subsidy 29 993.07 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 4 3807.05 NA 
Net user cost 4 3807.05 NA 
Economic subsidy 4 0.00 NA 
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14. UA(23): Edinburgh City 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of TTR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 569 33290.09 2509.58 
Net User cost 569 2533.99 1753.49 
Economic subsidy 569 756.10 756.10 
Social Renting 
User cost 280 2222.61 NA 
Net user cost 280 2164.72 NA 
Economic subsidy 280 57.89 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 113 4403.11 NA 
Net user cost 113 4363.71 NA 
Economic subsidy 113 39.40 NA 
15. UA(24): Falkirk 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of ITR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 122 3502.43 2667.20 
Net User cost 122 2703.07 1867.84 
Economic subsidy 122 799.36 799.36 
ng Social 
_ User cost 137 2433.10 NA 
Net user cost 137 1550.34 NA 
Economic subsidy 137 882.76 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 6 2484.30 NA 
Net user cost 6 2484.30 NA 
Economic subsidy 6 0.00 NA 
16. UA(25): Fife 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of rM) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 461 3573.65 2720.26 
Net User cost 461 2715.46 1862.07 
Economic subsidy 461 858.19 858.19 
Social Renting 
User cost 300 2482.73 NA 
Net user cost 300 1631.51 NA 
Economic subsidy 300 851.22 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 37 2881.80 NA 
Net user cost 37 2881.80 NA 
Economic subsidy 37 0.00 NA 
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17. UA(26): Glasgow City 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of Mo 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 487 2965.99 2271.80 
Net User cost 487 2331.82 1637.63 
Economic subsidy 487 634.17 634.17 
Social Renting 
User cost 890 2198.30 NA 
Net user cost 890 1814.32 NA 
Economic subsidy 890 383.98 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 77 3710.67 NA 
Net user cost 77 3643.06 NA 
Economic subsidy 77 67.62 NA 
1 S. UA(27): Highland 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of I TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 479 3751.91 2858.07 
Net User cost 479 2780.37 1880.54 
Economic subsidy 479 971.54 971.54 
Social Renting 
User cost 323 2542.94 NA 
Net user cost 323 1852.71 NA 
Economic subsidy 323 690.23 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 61 2484.07 NA 
Net user cost 61 2484.07 NA 
Economic subsidy 61 0.00 NA 
19. UA(28): Inverclyde 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 62 3489.54 2659.01 
Net User cost 62 2688.81 1858.28 
Economic subsidy 62 800.73 800.73 
Social Renting 
User cost 117 2473.96 NA 
Net user cost 117 1790.54 NA 
Economic subsidy 117 683.42 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 14 2346.35 NA 
Net user cost 14 2138.91 NA 
Economic subsidy 14 207.44 NA 
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20. UA(29): Midlothian 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
24% of TTR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 85 3493.13 2661.93 
Net User cost 85 2724.10 1892.89 
Economic subsidy 85 769.03 769.03 
Social Renting 
User cost 61 2417.57 NA 
Net user cost 61 1685.56 NA 
Economic subsidy 61 732.01 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 7 2809.71 NA 
Net user cost 7 2809.71 NA 
Economic subsidy 7 0.00 NA 
21. UA(30): Moray 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of rM) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 123 3768.59 2864.82 
Net User cost 123 2786.85 1883.08 
Economic subsidy 123 981.74 981.74 
Social Renting 
User cost 61 2489.26 NA 
Net user cost 61 1583.06 NA 
Economic subsidy 61 906.20 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 17 2633.43 NA 
Net user cost 17 2633.43 NA 
Economic subsidy 17 0.00 NA 
22. UA(31): North Ayrshire 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
24% of TTR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 136 3548.52 2902.06 
Net User cost 136 2706.70 1860.24 
Economic subsidy 136 841.82 841.82 
Social Renting 
User cost 126 2672.46 NA 
Net user cost 126 1657.31 NA 
Economic subsidy 126 1015.15 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 15 2877.99 NA 
Net user cost 15 2858.32 NA 
Economic subsidy 15 19.68 NA 
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23. UA(32): North Lanarkshire 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of rIR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 389 3276.75 2502.12 
Net User cost 389 2571.73 1797.09 
Economic subsidy 389 705.03 705.03 
Social Renting 
User cost 504 2381.40 NA 
Net user cost 504 1666.16 NA 
Economic subsidy 504 715.24 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 7 1828.62 NA 
Net user cost 7 1779.59 NA 
Economic subsidy 7 49.03 NA 
24. UA(33): Orkney Islands 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
24% of I TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 34 4351.57 3294.37 
Net User cost 34 3143.65 2086.45 
Economic subsidy 34 1207.92 1207.92 
Social Renting 
User cost 12 2209.41 NA 
Net user cost 12 1841.67 NA 
Economic subsidy 12 367.74 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 3 2553.37 NA 
Net user cost 3 2553.37 NA 
Economic subsidy 3 0.00 NA 
25. UA(34): Perthshire and Kinross 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of ITR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 148 3627.76 2759.57 
Net User cost 148 2734.55 1866.36 
Economic subsidy 148 893.22 893.22 
Social Renting 
User cost 75 2381.97 NA 
Net user cost 75 1610.38 NA 
Economic subsidy 75 771.59 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 22 2642.62 NA 
Net user cost 22 2557.63 NA 
Economic subsidy 22 84.99 NA 
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26. UA(35): Refrewshire 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 182 3409.50 2599.84 
Net User cost 182 2651.80 1842.15 
Economic subsidy 182 757.69 757.69 
Social Renting 
User cost 181 2366.56 NA 
Net user cost 181 1627.89 NA 
Economic subsidy 181 738.67 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 6 2268.67 NA 
Net user cost 6 1984.76 NA 
Economic subsidy 6 238.91 NA 
27. UA(36): Shetland Islands 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of I TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 27 4390.50 3322.15 
Net User cost 27 3126.44 2058.08 
Economic subsidy 27 1264.07 1264.07 
Social Renting 
User cost 14 2758.63 NA 
Net user cost 14 1730.08 NA 
Economic subsidy 14 1028.55 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 2 3105.96 NA 
Net user cost 2 3105.96 NA 
Economic subsidy 2 0.00 NA 
28. UA(37): South Ayrshire 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of 17M) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 151 3641.27 2771.40 
Net User cost 151 2790.29 1920.41 
Economic subsidy 151 850.99 850.99 
Social Renting 
User cost 81 2428.56 NA 
Net user cost 81 1689.98 NA 
Economic subsidy 81 738.57 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 7 3227.57 NA 
Net user cost 7 3227.57 NA 
Economic subsidy 7 0.00 NA 
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29. UA(38): South Lanarkshire 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 373 3340.90 2547.91 
Net User cost 373 2580.21 1787.22 
Economic subsidy 373 760.69 760.69 
Social Renting 
User cost 333 2346.09 NA 
Net user cost 333 1774.45 NA 
Economic subsidy 333 571.64 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 16 2512.76 NA 
Net user cost 16 2466.15 NA 
Economic subsidy 16 46.61 NA 
30. UA(39): Stirling 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
24% of ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 112 3966.46 3012.15 
Net User cost 112 2987.69 2033.38 
Economic subsidy 112 978.77 978.77 
Social Renting 
User cost 61 2477.23 NA 
Net user cost 61 1863.93 NA 
Economic subsidy 61 613.31 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 9 5057.58 NA 
Net user cost 9 5057.58 NA 
Economic subsidy 9 0.00 NA 
31. UA(40): West Lothian 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of I TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 157 3444.65 2625.64 
Net User cost 157 2704.20 1885.19 
Economic subsidy 157 740.45 740.45 
Social Renting 
User cost 153 2506.06 NA 
Net user cost 153 1713.17 NA 
Economic subsidy 153 792.89 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 4 3147.04 NA 
Net user cost 4 3147.04 NA 
Economic subsidy 4 0.00 NA 
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32. UA(41): Western Isles 






Simulation of UC 
of Owners 
(24% of ITR 
Owner-Occupation 
User Cost 42 4139.38 3142.29 
Net User cost 42 2926.18 1929.08 
Economic subsidy 42 1213.21 1213.21 
Social Renting 
User cost 17 2237.10 NA 
Net user cost 17 1883.72 NA 
Economic subsidy 17 353.38 NA 
Private Renting 
User cost 3 3480.01 NA 
Net user cost 3 3480.01 NA 
Economic subsidy 3 0.00 NA 
Notes: The simulation is to apply 24% of income tax rate to the user cost of owner- 
occupiers. 
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APPENDIX II Appendix to Chapter Six 
A. 6.1-Limdep Programme Estimation Results of the MNL Tenure Choice 
Model 
1. The Results of Model One 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
Multinomial Logit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable TENURE 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 13114 
Iterations completed 7 
Log likelihood function -6703.855 
Restricted log likelihood -11289.02 
Chi-squared 9170.324 
Degrees of freedom 38 
Significance level . 0000000 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error I b/St. Er. I P[I ZI >z] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Characteristics in numerator of Prob[Y - lj 
(Social Renting: Owner-Occupation) 
Constant 50.24791211 1.6346222 30.740 . 0000 
AGE . 4671342787E-01 . 10361004E-01 4.509 . 0000 51.277795 
AGESQ -. 7582397682E-03 . 99522440E-04 -7.619 . 0000 2943.4899 
NDEPCH . 6172550926 . 36213117E-01 17.045 . 0000 . 57777947 
MARRY 1.093230475 . 11353286 9.629 . 0000 . 57777947 
MALE -. 1029865761 . 78832454E-01 -1.306 . 1914 . 69246607 
FULLWORK -1.007446959 . 76757851E-01 -13.125 . 0000 . 44547811 
PARTWORK -. 1364449811 . 13082059 -1.043 . 2970 . 45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY . 9859714088 . 13779831 7.155 . 0000 . 60012201E-01 
HOUSE -. 4826040041 . 65234123E-01 -7.398 . 0000 . 62574348 
PREVOWN -1.227903286 . 86088781E-01 -14.263 . 0000 . 29258807 
PREVSOC . 7223274604 . 70734944E-01 10.212 . 0000 . 37303645 
PREVPRV . 2887936431 . 84248806E-01 3.428 . 0006 . 14617966 
LIKMOV2 . 1969805827 . 88130799E-01 2.235 . 0254 . 12459966 
URBAN . 6591858324E-01 . 67700952E-01 . 974 . 3302 . 79891719 
AFFOWN -1.711723482 . 15164910 -11.287 . 0000 . 11499161 
PRVTCITY -1.774898297 . 10123991 -17.532 . 0000 . 10713741 
POORCNL 1.144585050 . 11792420 9.706 . 0000 . 99893244E-01 
LNPERINC -3.201038468 . 16579699 -19.307 . 0000 9.1980788 
INUCC 1 -2.709613098 . 11071091 -24.475 . 0000 7.9451288 
Characteristics in numerator of Prob[Y - 21 
(Private Renting: Owner-Occupation) 
Constant 27.32364654 2.3988646 11.390 . 0000 
AGE -. 9754385289E-01 . 16683263E-01 -5.847 . 0000 51.277795 
AGESQ . 4771151423E-03 . 16932619E-03 2.818 . 0048 2943.4899 
NDEPCH . 2695146463 . 56846912E-01 4.741 . 0000 . 57777947 
MARRY -. 3784616528 . 17553966 -2.156 . 0311 . 57777947 
MALE . 2956142576 . 12239771 2.415 . 0157 . 69246607 
FULLWORK -. 8855553865 . 13153024 -6.733 . 0000 . 44547811 
PARTWORK -. 8682822751 . 25737080 -3.374 . 0007 . 45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY . 8085016664 . 19234239 4.203 . 0000 . 60012201E-01 
HOUSE . 1604883054 . 12675101 1.266 . 2055 . 62574348 
PREVOWN -. 4046913038 . 14425203 -2.805 . 0050 . 29258807 
PREVSOC . 4886618486 . 13316360 3.670 . 0002 . 37303645 
PREVPRV 1.124812123 . 12483259 9.011 . 0000 . 14617966 LIKMOV2 1.309550231 . 10623790 12.327 . 0000 . 12459966 URBAN -. 8075052738 . 10808693 -7.471 . 0000 . 79891719 AFFOWN . 2742267606 . 14759565 1.858 . 0632 . 11499161 PRVTCITY . 5729863719 . 13495454 4.246 . 0000 . 10713741 POORCNL . 3075541916 . 24337550 1.264 . 2063 . 99893244E-01 
265 
LNPERINC -1.169294876 . 25493020 -4.587 . 0000 9.1980788" 
INUCC 1 -1.921084851 . 14332522 -13.404 . 0000 7.9451288 
2. The Results of Model Two-Estimating Subsidy Effect 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
Multinomial Logit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable TENURE 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 13114 
Iterations completed 7 
Log likelihood function -6366.545 
Restricted log likelihood -11289.02 
Chi-squared 9844.943 
Degrees of freedom 38 
Significance level . 0000000 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error I b/St. Er. I P[I ZI >z] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Characteristics in numerator of Prob[Y - 1] 
(Social Renting: Owner-Occupation) 
Constant 56.31048586 1.7096045 32.938 . 0000 
AGE . 1562259544E-01 . 10784384E-01 1.449 . 1474 51.277795 
AGESQ -. 4902808352E-03 . 10294127E-03 -4.763 . 0000 2943.4899 
NDEPCH . 6197518824 . 38532281E-01 16.084 . 0000 . 57777947 
MARRY 1.113984115 . 11804028 9.437 . 0000 . 57777947 
MALE -. 1590040432 . 81289814E-01 -1.956 . 0505 . 69246607 
FULLWORK -. 8898400202 . 79524990E-01 -11.189 . 0000 . 44547811 
PARTWORK -. 1278275909 . 13576963 -. 942 . 3464 . 45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY 1.067399303 . 14267722 7.481 . 0000 . 60012201E-01 
HOUSE -. 6057921190 . 65239202E-01 -9.286 . 0000 . 62574348 
PREVOWN -1.053098721 . 90151716E-01 -11.681 . 0000 . 29258807 
PREVSOC . 7932164063 . 73385409E-01 10.809 . 0000 . 37303645 
PREVPRV . 2997343197 . 87639992E-01 3.420 . 0006 . 14617966 
LIKMOV2 . 1592010169 . 92125467E-01 1.728 . 0840 . 12459966 
URBAN . 1581220952E-01 . 69481857E-01 . 228 . 8200 . 79891719 
AFFOWN -1.662854215 . 15910314 -10.451 . 0000 . 11499161 
PRVTCITY -1.763701191 . 10477574 -16.833 . 0000 . 10713741 
POORCNL 1.361449408 . 11996497 11.349 . 0000 . 99893244E-01 
LNPERINC -3.141525272 . 17252973 -18.209 . 0000 9.1980788 
LNUCCN 1 -3.583322618 . 11062862 -32.391 . 0000 7.6690047 
Characteristics in numerator of Prob[Y - 2] 
(Private Renting: Owner-Occupation) 
Constant 14.48925560 2.2693288 6.385 . 0000 
AGE -. 9790806785E-01 . 16750115E-01 -5.845 . 0000 51.277795 
AGESQ . 5032594857E-03 . 16909735E-03 2.976 . 0029 2943.4899 
NDEPCH . 2258412066 . 55333983E-01 4.081 . 0000 . 57777947 
MARRY -. 2533318741 . 17470696 -2.450 . 0218 . 57777947 
MALE . 2319328866 . 12393671 1.871 . 0613 . 69246607 
FULLWORK -. 6713374413 . 13263082 -5.062 . 0000 . 44547811 
PARTWORK -. 7202549701 . 25687902 -2.804 . 0050 . 45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY . 9108055083 . 19582333 4.651 . 0000 . 60012201E-01 
HOUSE -. 2217778298 . 12525185 -1.771 . 0766 . 62574348 
PREVOWN -. 5767056780 . 14462641 -3.988 . 0001 . 29258807 
PREVSOC . 4842092531 . 13378640 3.619 . 0003 . 37303645 
PREVPRV . 9718648480 . 12546803 7.746 . 0000 . 14617966 
LIKMOV2 1.167260938 . 10668854 10.941 . 0000 . 12459966 
URBAN -. 9171255931 . 10637467 -8.622 . 0000 . 79891719 
AFFOWN -. 5208250691E-01 . 14263408 -. 365 . 7150 . 11499161 PRVTCITY . 3005099892 . 13637955 2.203 . 0276 . 10713741 POORCNL . 4350125983 . 24753993 1.757 . 0789 . 99893244E-01 LNPERINC -1.401174421 . 25082309 -5.586 . 0000 9.1980788 
LNUCCN_1 -. 8313451764E-02 . 12756927 -. 065 . 9480 7.6690047 
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3. The Results of Model Three-Estimating Subsidy and Rationing Effects 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
Multinomial Logit Model ý 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable TENURE 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 13114 
Iterations completed 7 
Log likelihood function -5022.817 
Restricted log likelihood -11289.02 
Chi-squared 12532.40 
Degrees of freedom 42 
Significance level . 0000000 
+------------------------------ ---------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of X) 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Characteristics in numerator of Prob[Y i] 
(Social Renting: Owner-Occupation) 
Constant 43.86589843 1.9380401 22.634 . 0000 
AGE . 4915204208E-01 . 12548072E-01 3.917 . 0001 51.277795 
AGESQ -. 6133140354E-03 . 12230262E-03 -5.015 . 0000 2943.4899 
NDEPCH . 6488399474 . 42088865E-01 15.416 . 0000 . 57777947 
MARRY 1.360804092 . 14127043 9.633 . 0000 . 57777947 
MALE -. 2291683314 . 98268337E-01 -2.332 . 0197 . 69246607 
FULLWORK -. 2796158890 . 11316411 -2.471 . 0135 . 44547811 
PARTWORK . 4302268655 . 17846816 2.411 . 0159 . 45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY 1.178392949 . 16064336 7.335 . 0000 . 60012201E-01 
HOUSE -. 8119850990 . 77161556E-01 -10.523 . 0000 . 62574348 
PREVOWN -1.298952171 . 10699976 -12.140 . 0000 . 29258807 
PREVSOC . 6558951872 . 88011083E-01 7.452 . 0000 . 37303645 
PREVPRV . 1171167304 . 10458899 1.120 . 2628 . 14617966 
LIKMOV2 . 3390042943 . 10365967 3.270 . 0011 . 12459966 
URBAN -. 1846426242 . 82662695E-01 -2.234 . 0255 . 79891719 
AFFOWN -1.848042006 . 18529974 -9.973 . 0000 . 11499161 
PRVTCITY -1.913282730 . 12206225 -15.675 . 0000 . 10713741 
POORCNL 1.462330799 . 13449211 10.873 . 0000 . 99893244E-01 
LNPERINC -1.485537977 . 20121703 -7.383 . 0000 9.1980788 
LNUCCN_1 -4.247685508 . 12878209 -32.984 . 0000 7.6690047 
RATMORT 3.288755588 . 79970859E-01 41.124 . 0000 . 45020589 
RATSOC -. 7130610722 . 10169910 -7.011 . 0000 . 62223578 
Characteristics in numerator of Prob[Y - 2] 
(Private Renting : Owner-Occupation) 
Constant 8.709303901 2.4117683 3.611 . 0003 
AGE -. 6499297031E-01 . 17614955E-01 -3.690 . 0002 51.277795 
AGESQ . 3880798460E-03 . 17822831E-03 2.177 . 0294 2943.4899 
NDEPCH . 2631751266 . 59248216E-01 4.442 . 0000 . 57777947 
MARRY . 1278333817 . 18901879 . 676 . 4989 . 57777947 
MALE . 2115929509 . 13288850 1.592 . 1113 . 69246607 
FULLWORK -. 5141394028 . 16104829 -3.192 . 0014 . 44547811 
PARTWORK -. 4096461802 . 28178696 -1.454 . 1460 . 45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY 1.033845819 . 21104936 4.899 . 0000 . 60012201E-01 
HOUSE -. 3361272912 . 13174685 -2.551 . 0107 . 62574348 
PREVOWN -. 9786101975 . 15518544 -6.306 . 0000 . 29258807 
PREVSOC . 2792321607 . 14126232 1.977 . 0481 . 37303645 
PREVPRV . 7616582775 . 13514451 5.636 . 0000 . 14617966 
LIKMOV2 1.427788419 . 11528936 12.384 . 0000 . 12459966 
URBAN -1.077287448 . 11435923 -9.420 . 0000 . 79891719 
AFFOWN -. 1653157236 . 15623176 -1.058 . 2900 . 11499161 
PRVTCITY . 2023277886 . 14657894 1.380 . 1675 . 10713741 
POORCNL . 5568017902 . 25504231 2.183 . 0290 . 99893244E-01 LNPERINC -. 3520762219 . 26712909 -1.318 . 1875 9.1980788 LNUCCN 1 -. 8014292924 . 13624790 -5.882 . 0000 7.6690047 RATMORT 2.919903479 . 11935639 24.464 . 0000 . 45020589 RATSOC -. 2607573559 . 15399234 -1.693 . 0904 . 62223578 
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A. 6.2-Limdep Programme Estimation Results of the NMNL Mobility and 
Tenure Choice Model 
1. The Results of Model One and the IIA Test 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable ACHOICE 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 52048 
Iterations completed 73 
Log likelihood function -4893.708 
Restricted log likelihood -10584.75 
Chi-squared 11382.09 
Degrees of freedom 44 
Significance level . 0000000 
R2=1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj 
No coefficients -10584.7536 . 53766 . 53714 
Constants only -5991.4232 . 18321 . 18229 
At start values -18038.4622 . 72871 . 72840 
Response data are given as ind. choice. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
The model has 2 levels. 
Coefs. for branch level begin with M2 
Number of obs. = 13012, skipped 0 bad obs. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
The IIA Test Results 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
The model has 2 levels. 
Coefs. for branch level begin with M2 
Number of obs. - 13012, skipped 525 bad obs. 
Hausman test for IIA. Excluded choices are 
OWNER 
ChiSgrd[ 3] - 429.5991, Pr(C>c) - . 000000 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IP[IZI>zj I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Attributes in the Utility Functions 
(Tenure Choice Level) 
Ti -10.50520974 1.6984682 -6.185 . 0000 
T2 -. 4942818350 . 13556765 -3.646 . 0003 
T3 -. 1082910691E-01 . 63944974E-02 -1.694 . 0904 
T4 -. 5457003215E-01 . 74096993E-02 -7.365 . 0000 
T7 . 3117453917 . 94985968E-01 3.282 . 0010 
T8 . 1758699582 . 10579398 1.662 . 0964 
T9 -. 8024783158 . 22399644 -3.583 . 0003 
T10 -. 5818314818 . 24638937 -2.361 . 0182 
T11 -. 4112369711 . 23203113 -1.772 . 0763 
T12 . 3767932772 . 24305977 1.550 . 1211 
T13 -1.758564121 . 22984961 -7.651 . 0000 
T14 -1.583568842 . 25193406 -6.286 . 0000 
T15 -1.216913576 . 36197218 -3.362 . 0008 
T16 -2.237282128 . 55932899 -4.000 . 0001 
T17 . 7811248654 . 41013665 1.905 . 0568 
T18 . 6807148670 . 43191551 1.576 . 1150 T19 -1.142245405 . 27008193 -4.229 . 0000 
T20 -. 1526898324 . 26270186 -. 581 . 5611 
T21 1.604533558 . 22522474 7.124 . 0000 
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T22 . 3143601889 . 27123897 1.159 . 2465 
T23 . 6883681318 . 25081884 2.744 . 0061 
T24 1.218222738 . 24465756 4.979 . 0000 
T25 -1.480358238 . 19241355 -7.694 . 0000 
T26 -. 1024195795 . 24563813 -. 417 . 6767 
T27 -. 5010708269 . 21039283 -2.382 . 0172 
T28 -. 8761920017 . 22029134 -3.977 . 0001 
T29 -1.085610498 . 41524656 -2.614 . 0089 
T30 . 5039736510E-01 . 31899323 . 158 . 8745 
T31 -1.675734814 . 27986779 -5.988 . 0000 
T32 1.132860307 . 26353889 4.299 . 0000 
T33 1.483714432 . 33800031 4.390 . 0000 
T34 -. 2310384925 . 53385915 -. 433 . 6652 
T35 -. 3120831616 . 49644592E-01 -6.286 . 0000 
T36 -. 8496554334 . 19954907 -4.258 . 0000 
Attributes of Branch Choice Equations 
(Mobility Decisi on Level) 
M2 . 5470349026E-01 . 23335191E-02 23.442 . 0000 
M3 -. 1561390332 . 11752768 -1.329 . 1840 
M4 . 1962085332 . 37958956E-01 5.169 . 0000 
M5 -. 1452580814 . 92299924E-01 -1.574 . 1155 
M6 . 1146975369 . 14524579 . 790 . 4297 
M7 . 5341658909 . 13722140 3.893 . 0001 
M10 -. 1746947967E-01 . 11423254 -. 153 . 8785 
M11 . 2715749003 . 13879760 1.957 . 0504 
M12 -. 1963938506 . 93848986E-01 -2.093 . 0364 
Inclusive Value Parameters 
NOMOVE 1.000000000 ........ (Fixed Parameter) ........ 
MOVEYES . 2425680441 . 42658128E-01 5.686 . 0000 
2. The Results of Model Two-Estimating Subsidy Effect 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable ACHOICE 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 52048 
Iterations completed 76 
Log likelihood function -4881.280 
Restricted log likelihood -10584.75 
Chi-squared 11406.95 
Degrees of freedom 44 
Significance level . 0000000 
R2=1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj 
No coefficients -10584.7536 . 53884 . 53832 Constants only -5991.4232 . 18529 . 18437 At start values -18038.4622 . 72940 . 72909 
Response data are given as ind. choice. ý 
+---------------------------- -----------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
The model has 2 levels. 
Coefs. for branch level begin with M2 
Number of obs. - 13012, skipped 0 bad obs. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IP[IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Attributes in the Utility Functions 
(Tenure Choice Level) 
T1 -12.96171616 1.7990265 -7.205 . 0000 
T2 -. 8303668099 . 13528233 -6.138 . 0000 
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T3 -. 1078332811E-01 . 63572564E-02 -1.696 . 0898 
T4 -. 5474203476E-01 . 73673161E-02 -7.430 . 0000 
T7 . 3075308284 . 94483155E-01 3.255 . 0011 
T8 . 1864257299 . 10564692 1.765 . 0776 
T9 -. 7860175954 . 22234643 -3.535 . 0004 
T10 -. 4290881630 . 24870426 -1.725 . 0845 
T11 -. 4105496090 . 23083741 -1.779 . 0753 
T12 . 3755005703 . 24320038 1.544 . 1226 
T13 -1.761477845 . 22651829 -7.776 . 0000 
T14 -1.519032537 . 25084916 -6.056 . 0000 
T15 -1.195996721 . 35399604 -3.379 . 0007 
T16 -2.212307565 . 55967960 -3.953 . 0001 
T17 . 8115136186 . 40793183 1.989 . 0467 
T18 . 7191852646 . 43123773 1.668 . 0954 
T19 -1.133877946 . 26743687 -4.240 . 0000 
T20 -. 1140080817 . 26108080 -. 437 . 6623 
T21 1.609462169 . 22221535 7.243 . 0000 
T22 . 3052738982 . 26909395 1.134 . 2566 
T23 . 6799807746 . 24720655 2.751 . 0059 
T24 1.197192670 . 24210797 4.945 . 0000 
T25 -1.475725677 . 18921340 -7.799 . 0000 
T26 -. 8986971500E-01 . 24353393 -. 369 . 7121 
T27 -. 4882242192 . 20728233 -2.355 . 0185 
T28 -. 8654406382 . 21834322 -3.964 . 0001 
T29 -1.089703757 . 41314209 -2.638 . 0083 
T30 . 7464344977E-01 . 31808217 . 235 . 8145 
T31 -1.754256219 . 27840493 -6.301 . 0000 
T32 1.054125828 . 26297591 4.008 . 0001 
T33 1.441749417 . 33794497 4.266 . 0000 
T34 -. 3092952114 . 53440810 -. 579 . 5627 
T35 -. 2951246772 . 49017404E-01 -6.021 . 0000 
T36 -1.110758876 . 20987024 -5.293 . 0000 
Attributes of Branch Choice Equations 
(Mobility Decisi on Level) 
M2 . 5378826074E-01 . 23614003E-02 22.778 . 0000 
M3 -. 1524967920 . 11673722 -1.306 . 1914 
M4 . 1922890548 . 38541840E-01 4.989 . 0000 
M5 -. 1388096203 . 94163724E-01 -1.474 . 1404 
M6 . 1369824723 . 15226157 . 900 . 3683 
M7 . 5100783222 . 13662915 3.733 . 0002 
M10 . 1848158883E-01 . 11421502 . 162 . 8715 
M11 . 2424337052 . 14271682 1.699 . 0894 
M12 -. 1526113069 . 95461677E-01 -1.599 . 1099 
Inclusive Value Parameters 
NOMOVE 1.000000000 ........ (Fixed Parameter) ........ 
MOVEYES . 2735460184 . 43814901E-01 6.243 . 0000 
3. The Results of Model Three-Estimating Subsidy and Rationing Effect 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable ACHOICE 
Weighting variable ONE ý 
Number of observations 52048 
Iterations completed 54 
Log likelihood function -4858.736 
Restricted log likelihood -10584.75 
Chi-squared 11452.04 
Degrees of freedom 47 
Significance level . 0000000 
R2=1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj 




FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model ý 
The model has 2 levels. 
Coefs. for branch level begin with M2 
Number of obs. = 13012, skipped 0 bad obs. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error jb/St. Er. jP[jZj>z] I Mean of Xj 
+---------+--------------+- -------------- -+-------- +---------+----------+ 
Attributes in the Utility Funct ions 
(Tenure Choice Level) 
T1 -6.181569464 1.9282427 -3.206 . 0013 
T2 -. 8917281267 . 13874086 -6.427 . 0000 
T3 -. 5716129017E-02 . 63759370E-02 -. 897 . 3700 
T4 -. 4377715575E-01 . 76674742E-02 -5.709 . 0000 
T7 . 2967973149 . 92495454E-01 3.209 . 0013 
T8 . 1837427883 . 10643077 1.726 . 0843 
T9 -. 2509497223 . 23670791 -1.060 . 2891 
T10 -. 3229861554 . 26605508 -1.214 . 2248 
T11 -. 3806758672 . 23265761 -1.636 . 1018 
T12 . 3032005972 . 24803416 1.222 . 2216 
T13 -1.631241395 . 22285642 -7.320 . 0000 
T14 -1.938373986 . 27306641 -7.099 . 0000 
T15 -1.118861525 . 34034141 -3.287 . 0010 
T16 -2.522832268 . 56004348 -4.505 . 0000 
T17 . 9253162639 . 40672592 2.275 . 0229 
T18 . 9669213919 . 43943446 2.200 . 0278 
T19 -1.149503253 . 26350984 -4.362 . 0000 
T20 -. 3014604211 . 26317593 -1.145 . 2520 
T21 1.481085498 . 21654987 6.839 . 0000 
T22 . 2393949770 . 26801364 . 893 . 3717 
T23 . 6262853498 . 24212639 2.587 . 0097 
T24 1.130792309 . 24177622 4.677 . 0000 
T25 -1.509891353 . 18645981 -8.098 . 0000 
T26 -. 2041385183 . 24438830 -. 835 . 4035 
T27 -. 5240649361 . 20309529 -2.580 . 0099 
T28 -. 9236818606 . 21848527 -4.228 . 0000 
T29 -1.115874516 . 41039724 -2.719 . 0065 
T30 -. 5254827294E-01 . 32154379 -. 163 . 8702 
T31 -1.705191690 . 28079089 -6.073 . 0000 
T32 . 9975211399 . 26740476 3.730 . 0002 
T33 1.348130759 . 34020464 3.963 . 0001 
T34 -. 3351544054 . 53770764 -. 623 . 5331 
T35 -. 1850419847 . 50349397E-01 -3.675 . 0002 
T36 -. 4962249358 . 22057632 -2.250 . 0245 
T37 1.036824643 . 17545783 5.909 . 0000 T38 1.140670431 . 20174580 5.654 . 0000 T39 . 7184567404 . 25526884 2.815 . 0049 
Attributes of Bra nch Choice Equations 
(Mobility Decision Level) 
M2 . 5065495350E-01 . 24490453E-02 20.684 . 0000 
M3 . 1102321302 . 11787338 . 935 . 3497 
M4 . 2245971463 . 39175298E-01 5.733 . 0000 M5 -. 1248819858 . 98427222E-01 -1.269 . 2045 M6 . 2173577943 . 16599858 1.309 . 1904 M7 -. 5128515789E-01 . 13085181 -. 392 . 6951 M10 . 4417264874E-01 . 11499636 . 384 . 7009 Mil . 2859884510 . 15076375 1.897 . 0578 M12 -. 1414474463 . 98539858E-01 -1.435 . 1512 Inclusive Value P arameters 
NOMOVE 1.000000000 . ....... (Fixed Parameter) ........ MOVEYES . 3347962275 . 43631050E-01 7.673 . 0000 
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Variable Definition 
T1 : Constant 
T2 : Lntcos-Log user cost by tenures 
Lnatcost-Log net user cost by tenures 
T3 : Agebsoc-Age of the household head interacted with social renting 
T4 : Agehprv-Age of the household head interacted with private renting 
T7 Ndepsoc-Number of dependent children interacted with social renting 
T8 : Ndepprv-Number of dependent children interacted with private renting 
T9 : Marrysoc-Marital status of the household head interacted with social renting 
T10: Marryprv-Marital status of the household head interacted with private renting 
Ti 1: Malesoc-Male household head interacted with social renting 
T 12: Maleprv-Male household head interacted with private renting 
T13: Fullsoc-Household head in full time work interacted with social renting 
T14: Fullprv-Household head in full time work interacted with private renting 
T15: Partsoc-Household head in part time work interacted with social renting 
T16: Partprv-Household head in part time work interacted with 
T17: Unempsoc-Household head in unemployment interacted with social renting 
T18: Unempprv-Household head in unemployment interacted with private renting 
T19: Pvownsoc-Previous tenure were owner-occupation interacted with social renting 
T20: Pvownprv-Previous tenure is owner-occupation interacted with private renting 
T2 1: Pvsocsoc-Previous tenure is social renting interacted with social renting 
T22: Pvsocprv-Previous tenure is social renting interacted with private renting 
T23: Pvprvsoc-Previous tenure is private renting interacted with social renting 
T24: Pvprvprv-Previous tenure is private renting interacted with private renting 
T25: Houssoc-Household living in house interacted with social renting 
T26: Housprv-Household living in house interacted with private renting 
T27: Urbansoc-Household living in urban area interacted with social renting 
T28: Urbanprv-Household living in urban area interacted with private renting 
T29: Afownsoc-Household living in neighbourhood predominated by affluent owners interacted with 
social renting 
T30: Afownprv-Household living in neighbourhood predominated by affluent owners interacted with 
private renting 
T3 1: Pvctysoc-Household living in neighbourhood predominated by inner city private tenants 
interacted with social renting 
T32: Pvctyprv-Household living in neighbourhood predominated by inner city private tenants 
interacted with private renting 
T33: Pocnlsoc-Household living in neighbourhood predominated by the poorest council tenants 
interacted with social renting 
T34: Pocnlprv-Household living in neighbourhood predominated by the poorest council tenants 
interacted with private renting 
T35: Lnincosc-Log household long term income interacted with social renting 
T36: Lnincprv-Log household long term income interacted with private renting 
T37: Mratsoc-Mortgage rationing interacted with social renting 
T38: Mratprv-Mortgage rationing interacted with private renting 
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T39: Sratprv-Social housing rationing interacted with private renting 
M2 : Ageheads-Age of the household head interacted with stay 
M3 : Marrys-Marital status of the household head interacted with stay 
M4 : Ndepchs-Number of dependent children interacted with stay 
M5 Males-Male household head interacted with stay 
M6 : Unemps-Household head in unemployment interacted with stay 
M7 : Lnincs-Log household long term income interacted with stay 
M10: Affowns-Household in neighbourhood predominated by affluent owners interacted with stay 
M11: Porcnl-Household in neighbourhood predominated by the poorest council tenants interacted 
with stay 
M12: Pvcitys-Household in neighbourhood predominated by inner city private tenants interacted with 
stay 
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APPENDIX III Appendix to Chapter Seven 
A. 7.1 Limdep Programme of the Simulation Results of the NMNL Mobility and 
Tenure Choice Model 
1. The Simulation Results of the Change in the User Cost (Change in Income Tax 
Rate) 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable ACHOICE 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 52048 
Iterations completed 75 
Log likelihood function -4899.514 
Restricted log likelihood -10584.75 
Chi-squared 11370.48 
Degrees of freedom 44 
Significance level . 0000000 
R2=1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj 
No coefficients -10584.7536 . 53712 . 53659 
Constants only -5991.4232 . 18225 . 18132 
At start values -18038.4622 . 72839 . 72808 
Response data are given as ind. choice. ý 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
----------------------------------------------- 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
The model ha s2 levels. 
Coefs. for b ranch level begin with M2 
Number of ob s. = 13012, skipped 0 bad obs. 
+------------- ------------------------- -------+ 
+---------+--------------+-- --------------+--------+- --------+----------+ 
Variable I Coefficient IS tandard Error lb/St. Er. IP (IZI>z] I Mean of XI 
+---------+--------------+-- --------------+--------+- --------+----------+ 
Attributes in the Utility Functions 
(Tenure Choice Level) 
Ti -9.180816900 1.8641276 -4.925 . 0000 
T2 -. 1808371070 . 15482210 -2.042 . 0408 
T3 -. 1076580423E-01 . 63590565E-02 -1.693 . 0905 
T4 -. 5435099530E-01 . 74087827E-02 -7.336 . 0000 
T7 . 3074662724 . 94560757E-01 
3.252 . 0011 
T8 . 1669533915 . 10563016 1.581 . 
1140 
T9 -. 7640698791 . 22334586 -3.421 . 0006 
T10 -. 6320416444 . 25001437 -2.528 . 0115 
Til -. 4111520615 . 23174524 -1.774 . 0760 
T12 . 3710912402 . 24284702 1.528 . 1265 
T13 -1.760397652 . 22806456 -7.719 . 0000 
T14 -1.615935217 . 25078060 -6.444 . 0000 
T15 -1.224152681 . 35915162 -3.408 . 0007 
T16 -2.250021198 . 55773476 -4.034 . 0001 
T17 . 7552406387 . 40856411 
1.849 . 0645 
T18 . 6554388472 . 43068303 1.522 . 1280 
T19 -1.128616004 . 26838415 -4.205 . 0000 
T20 -. 1621707194 . 26177856 -. 619 . 5356 
T21 1.588357507 . 22293323 7.125 . 0000 
T22 . 3195990551 . 26988904 
1.184 . 2363 
T23 . 6953434978 . 24913584 
2.791 . 0053 
T24 1.223685592 . 24333753 5.029 . 0000 
T25 -1.502874046 . 19119978 -7.860 . 0000 
T26 -. 1135648127 . 24488904 -. 464 . 6428 
T27 -. 4574963825 . 20885354 -2.191 . 0285 
T28 -. 8595830494 . 21928977 -3.920 . 0001 
T29 -1.091536567 . 41524092 -2.629 . 0086 
T30 . 4193246937E-01 . 31791677 . 
132 . 8951 
274 
T31 -1.602446848 . 27929457 -5.737 . 0000 
T32 1.125618627 . 26311503 4.278 . 0000 
T33 1.487371374 . 33651167 4.420 . 0000 
T34 -. 2383465084 . 53270158 -. 447 . 6546 
'T35 -. 2959666855 . 49143291E-01 -6.023 . 0000 
T36 -. 7190538067 . 21823064 -3.295 . 0010 
Attributes of Branch Choice Equations 
(Mobility Decision Level) 
M2 . 5560003564E-01 . 23371793E-02 23.789 . 0000 
M3 -. 1851614225 . 11707819 -1.582 . 1138 
M4 . 1908977910 . 38170306E-01 5.001 . 0000 
M5 -. 1474959542 . 93047884E-01 -1.585 . 1129 
M6 . 9789495456E-01 . 14782342 . 662 . 5078 
M7 . 6197683186 . 13535880 4.579 . 0000 
M10 . 1224119057E-01 . 11391884 . 107 . 9144 
M11 . 3183133761 . 14133228 2.252 . 0243 
M12 -. 1784462199 . 94286308E-01 -1.893 . 0584 
Inclusive value Pa rameters 
NOMOVE 1.000000000 .. ...... (Fixed Parameter) ........ 
MOVEYES . 2566781032 . 43318332E-01 5.925 . 0000 
2. Simulation Results of the Change in the Net User Cost (Change in Income Tax 
Rate) 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable ACHOICE 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 52048 
Iterations completed 76 
Log likelihood function -4897.270 
Restricted log likelihood -10584.75 
Chi-squared 11374.97 
Degrees of freedom 44 
Significance level . 0000000 
R2-1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj 
No coefficients -10584.7536 . 53733 . 53681 
Constants only -5991.4232 . 18262 . 18170 
At start values -18038.4622 . 72851 . 72820 
Response data are given as ind. choice. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
The model has 2 levels. 
Coefa. for branch level begin with M2 
Number of obs. - 13012, skipped 0 bad oba. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error lb/St. Er. IPEIZI>zj I Mean of X1 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Attributes in the Utility Functions 
(Tenure Choice Level) 
T1 -10.42669010 1.8837176 -5.535 . 0000 
T2 -. 2895485592 . 12040969 -2.405 . 0162 
T3 -. 1068102626E-01 . 63254247E-02 -1.689 . 0913 
T4 -. 5463466065E-01 . 73886014E-02 -7.394 . 0000 
T7 . 3083383559 . 94244770E-01 3.272 . 0011 
T8 . 1752781708 . 10570318 1.658 . 0973 
T9 -. 7446898570 . 22242433 -3.348 . 0008 
T10 -. 5532769891 . 25130873 -2.202 . 0277 
T11 -. 4104114237 . 23098136 -1.777 . 0756 
T12 . 3730337945 . 24304870 1.535 . 1248 




































-1.592014259 . 24902154 -6.393 
-1.209780748 . 35429434 -3.415 
-2.227954657 . 55678952 -4.001 
. 7597925053 . 40735382 1.865 
. 6700571257 . 43027753 1.557 
-1.119257072 . 26628406 -4.203 
-. 1426328252 . 26065433 -. 547 
1.577209022 . 22048754 7.153 
. 3093161955 . 26838711 1.153 
. 6948256247 . 24674103 2.816 
1.222081816 . 24179952 5.054 
-1.504664313 . 18918338 -7.953 
-. 1113482713 . 24379862 -. 457 
-. 4462359908 . 20654582 -2.160 
-. 8503276443 . 21831671 -3.895 
-1.090285981 . 41340487 -2.637 
. 5195165174E-01 . 31796256 . 163 
-1.618867372 . 27729688 -5.838 
1.100719827 . 26275091 4.189 
1.461221685 . 33632988 4.345 
-. 2796075648 . 53370073 -. 524 
-. 2827821517 . 49049775E-01 -5.765 
-. 8604563284 . 22033077 -3.905 
Attributes of Branch Choice Equations 
(Mobility Decision Level) 
. 5552164387E-01 . 23584199E-02 23.542 
-. 1919820392 . 11606866 -1.654 
. 1867219789 . 38935925E-01 4.796 
-. 1459168058 . 94130488E-01 -1.550 
. 1020732023 . 15220665 . 671 
. 6408412354 . 14284749 4.486 
. 3832434934E-01 . 11442875 . 335 
. 3096103490 . 14317174 2.163 
-. 1509708424 . 96017968E-01 -1.572 
Inclusive Value Pa rameters 
1.000000000 .. ...... (Fixed Parameter 


































6.022 . 0000 
3. Simulation Results of the Change in Mortgage Rationing Criteria 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable ACHOICE 
weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 52048 
Iterations completed 58 
Log likelihood function -4826.890 
Restricted log likelihood -10584.75 
Chi-squared 11515.73 
Degrees of freedom 47 
Significance level . 0000000 
R2-1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj 
No coefficients -10584.7536 . 54398 . 54343 Constants only -5991.4232 . 19437 . 19340 At start values -18038.4622 . 73241 . 73209 Response data are given as ind. choice. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML: Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
The model has 2 levels. 
Coefa. for branch level begin with M2 




Variable I Coefficient I Standard Error Ib/St. Er. jP[IZj>z] I Mean of X1 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Attributes in the Utility Functions 
(Tenure Choice Level) 
T1 -6.151051062 1.8836195 -3.266 . 0011 
T2 -. 8853039139 . 13799907 -6.415 . 0000 
T3 . 2890046868E-03 . 67115379E-02 . 043 . 9657 
T4 -. 3691060049E-01 . 79283337E-02 -4.656 . 0000 
T7 . 3370448152 . 97069471E-01 3.472 . 0005 
T8 . 2163295699 . 10918744 1.981 . 0476 
T9 -. 2680706920 . 23573847 -1.137 . 2555 
T10 -. 4735688218 . 25983336 -1.823 . 0684 
T11 -. 3579348633 . 24002685 -1.491 . 1359 
T12 . 3382297507 . 25127254 1.346 . 1783 
T13 -1.742733460 . 23537779 -7.404 . 0000 
T14 -2.117348702 . 28326004 -7.475 . 0000 
T15 -1.118731301 . 35900394 -3.116 . 0018 
T16 -2.568702646 . 56647459 -4.535 . 0000 
T17 . 9503230436 . 42442855 2.239 . 0252 
T18 1.004205345 . 45350330 2.214 . 0268 
T19 -1.163319982 . 27369312 -4.250 . 0000 
T20 -. 2735696851 . 26683549 -1.025 . 3053 
T21 1.540199585 . 22745648 6.771 . 0000 
T22 . 2888985084 . 
27580108 1.047 . 2949 
T23 . 6133848350 . 24998839 2.454 . 0141 
T24 1.101544402 . 24754508 4.450 . 0000 
T25 -1.585783754 . 19722463 -8.040 . 0000 
T26 -. 2487798836 . 24895702 -. 999 . 3177 
T27 -. 6515989042 . 21552772 -3.023 . 0025 
T28 -1.041488998 . 22596025 -4.609 . 0000 
T29 -1.070070345 . 42646259 -2.509 . 0121 
T30 . 3799604065E-01 . 32817957 . 116 . 9078 
T31 -1.768260476 . 28952005 -6.108 . 0000 
T32 . 9499544722 . 27200999 3.492 . 0005 
T33 1.395567258 . 35435050 3.938 . 0001 
T34 -. 3036953116 . 54416266 -. 558 . 5768 
T35 -. 9093458302E-01 . 53662507E-01 -1.695 . 0902 
T36 -. 5668497827 . 21651100 -2.618 . 0088 
T37 1.856364895 . 21275677 8.725 . 0000 
T38 1.707445432 . 25572325 6.677 . 0000 
T39 . 7861062595 . 25923930 3.032 . 0024 
Attributes of Branch Choice Equations 
(Mobility Decisi on Level) 
M2 . 5138780785E-01 . 24343515E-02 21.109 . 0000 
M3 . 1268957050 . 11706368 1.084 . 2784 
M4 . 2270153827 . 38799917E-01 5.851 . 0000 
M5 -. 1083284715 . 96455338E-01 -1.123 . 2614 
M6 . 2045091755 . 15961160 1.281 . 2001 
M7 -. 6088072760E-01 . 13337963 -. 456 . 6481 
M10 . 4814844496E-01 . 11450391 . 420 . 6741 
M11 . 2486665960 . 14556239 1.708 . 0876 
M12 -. 1557465927 . 96904874E-01 -1.607 . 1080 
Inclusive Value Parameters 
NOMOVE 1.000000000 ........ (Fixed Parameter) ........ 
MOVEYES . 3007583196 . 39393675E-01 7.635 . 0000 
277 
A. 7.2 The McClements' Equivalence Scales 
Married couple 1.00 
Single adult (householder) 0.55 
2'd adult (non-household) 0.45 
3' adult (non-householder) 0.45 
4' adult (non-householder) 0.40 
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Table A. 7.3.2 Equivalent Household Income by Tenures and by Income Quintiles in 
Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 (Average Weekly income £) 
Quintile Outright Mortgaged Social Private 
Owners Owners Tenants Tenants 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 97.43 149.27 83.02 45.42 
2nd 151.82 241.99 128.14 105.93 
3`d 205.06 309.88 159.86 162.03 
4th 287.56 389.00 188.33 282.50 
Top 595.12 652.32 278.99 505.95 
Total Avg. 265.67 346.86 167.15 215.40 
Dundee 
Bottom 90.41 90.71 82.61 39.37 
2°' 155.68 170.44 126.60 100.38 
3rd 219.51 248.15 153.60 119.53 
4`h 321.63 315.57 189.22 234.43 
Top 583.62 490.53 302.64 413.93 
Total Avg. 269.99 261.39 170.13 184.61 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 88.83 135.18 87.32 45.55 
2°d 139.81 232.13 136.02 100.84 
3'd 192.15 313.44 166.61 149.42 
4th 279.24 404.20 200.37 228.21 
Top 563.52 734.05 288.53 432.13 
Total Avg. 251.22 362.52 175.56 189.57 
Glasgow 
Bottom 76.46 103.46 77.55 46.39 
2°d 126.82 196.53 118.21 111.02 
3rd 173.18 267.04 148.73 164.19 
4th 244.47 365.78 185.57 207.34 
Top 493.96 603.48 285.46 405.47 
Total Avg. 220.66 306.62 162.98 185.36 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table A. 7.3.3 Equivalent Household Income Ranges in Scotland, 1996 






Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
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Table A. 7.3.4 Equivalent Household Income Ranges in Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 

























Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
A. 7.4 Annex Tables to Tenure Polarisation in Scotland and in Four Cities, 1996 
Table A. 7.4.1 Tenure Distributions within Income Quintiles in Scotland 1996 














Bottom 24 14 44 8 10 100 
2°d 17 17 50 9 7 100 
3'd 15 29 41 9 6 100 
4th 16 50 22 6 7 100 
Top 19 66 7 2 5 100 
Total 18 35 33 7 7 100 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
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Table A. 7.4.2 Tenure Distributions within Income Quintile in Four Cities of Scotland 
1996 (Percentage of households) 
Income Outright Mortgaged Social HA Private Total 
Quintile Owners Owners Tenants Tenants Tenants 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 16 10 54 4 16 100 
2nd 13 9 63 8 8 100 
3`d 21 33 40 3 3 100 
4`h 9 59 23 3 5 100 
Top 17 70 2 2 9 100 
Dundee 
Bottom 10 23 41 12 14 100 
2nd 10 22 43 20 5 100 
3'd 9 20 54 12 5 100 
4`h 14 47 22 7 10 100 
Top 19 55 16 4 5 100 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 28 14 16 14 28 100 
2°d 25 18 29 17 11 100 
3`d 23 29 25 12 10 100 
4th 19 55 9 6 10 100 
Top 21 69 2 2 6 100 
Glasgow 
Bottom 12 13 49 17 9 100 
2nd 9 9 52 25 5 100 
3rd 12 14 44 23 7 100 
4t' 9 30 32 21 7 100 
Top 13 58 12 13 5 100 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
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A. 7.5 Annex Tables to Housing Subsidies to Households in Different Tenures in 
Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 
Table A. 7.5.1 Housing Subsidies to Owners in Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 
(Weekly ±, ) 
% of Econ. % of MIRAS % of Total 
Income Mean Economic Sub. To Mean Average to Mean Sub. To Mean 
Quintile Income Subsidies Income MIRAS' Income Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 90.24 15.25 16.9% 3.61 4.0% 20.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (30) (24) (10) 
2nd 151.90 17.41 11.5% 4.27 2.8% 14.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (25) (16) (5) 
3rd 205.85 15.48 7.5% 3.88 1.9% 9.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (62) (39) (25) 
4th 291.54 12.78 4.4% 4.64 1.6% 6.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (79) (55) (54) 
Top 531.24 14.56 2.7% 5.00 0.9% 3.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (101) (66) (67) 
Total Avg 323.08 14.56 4.5% 4.60 1.4% 5.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (297) (200) (161) 
Dundee 
Bottom 76.75 14.21 18.5% 3.50 4.6% 23.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (31) (19) (18) 
2nd 133.44 14.00 10.5% 3.45 2.6% 13.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (30) (25) (18) 
3rd 183.53 13.53 7.4% 3.58 1.9% 9.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (27) (23) (17) 
4th 253.27 14.53 5.7% 3.95 1.6% 7.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (57) (38) (32) 
Top 444.26 14.91 3.4% 4.85 1.1% 4.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (69) (52) (42) 
Total Avg 263.68 14.39 5.5% 4.06 1.5% 7.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (214) (157) (127) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 92.54 15.99 17.3% 4.55 4.9% 22.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (108) (75) (27) 
2nd 152.24 15.45 10.1% 4.10 2.7% 12.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (111) (83) (34) 
3rd 210.18 14.72 7.0% 4.17 2.0% 9.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (136) (101) (54) 
4th 303.91 13.37 4.4% 4.68 1.5% 5.9% 
(No. ofobs. ) (192) (138) (111) 
Top 583.17 14.05 2.4% 5.13 0.9% 3.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (231) (171) (146) 
Total Avg 319.46 14.47 4.5% 4.72 1.5% 6.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (778) (568) (372) 
Glasgow 
Bottom 77.88 13.83 17.8% 3.81 4.9% 22.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (97) (69) (37) 
2nd 125.78 14.33 11.4% 3.22 2.6% 14.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (70) (49) (22) 
3rd 169.68 13.97 8.2% 3.75 2.2% 10.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (102) (77) (42) 
4th 235.24 11.37 4.8% 4.19 1.8% 6.6% 
(No. ofobs. ) (154) (109) (94) 
Top 455.81 10.68 2.3% 5.01 1.1% 3.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (277) (193) (190) 
Total Avg 280.22 12.19 4.4% 4.45 1.6% 5.9% 
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(No. of obs. ) 1 (700) (497) (385) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table A. 7.5.2 Housing Subsidies to Renters in Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 
(Weekl t) 
% of Econ. % of HB % of Total 
Income Mean Economic Sub. To Mean Average to Mean Sub. To Mean 
Quintile Income Subsidies Income HB Income Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 89.03 15.12 17.0% 31.72 35.6% 52.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (86) (71) (34) 
2nd 152.89 15.37 10.1% 23.82 15.6% 25.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (91) (75) (39) 
3rd 201.33 16.89 8.4% 26.62 13.2% 21.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (54) (43) (19) 
4th 282.09 12.70 4.5% 40.88 14.5% 19.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (37) (27) (12) 
Top 466.10 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (14) (7) (0) 
Total Avg 175.19 14.96 8.5% 28.88 16.5% 25.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (282) (223) (104) 
Dundee 
Bottom 81.10 7.89 9.7% 31.44 38.8% 48.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (63) (50) (33) 
2nd 135.10 6.86 5.1% 34.56 25.6% 30.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (64) (48) (47) 
3rd 157.84 6.81 4.3% 31.44 19.9% 24.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (66) (55) (43) 
4th 246.94 8.59 3.5% 34.15 13.8% 17.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (37) (27) (13) 
Top 382.06 5.79 1.5% 34.14 8.9% 10.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (24) (19) (8) 
Total Avg 172.24 7.24 4.2% 32.85 19.1% 23.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (254) (199) (144) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 83.73 3.82 4.6% 34.49 41.2% 45.8% 
(No. ofobs. ) (150) (123) (52) 
2nd 151.60 5.50 3.6% 31.67 20.9% 24.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (148) (131) (97) 
3rd 205.63 2.58 1.3% 38.79 18.9% 20.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (122) (107) (83) 
4th 287.63 1.55 0.5% 42.70 14.8% 15.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (66) (53) (24) 
Top 495.36 1.11 0.2% 36.00 7.3% 7.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (27) (25) (2) 
Total Avg 180.20 3.59 2.0% 35.59 19.7% 21.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (513) (439) (258) 
Glasgow 
Bottom 78.27 8.79 11.2% 28.93 37.0% 48.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (294) (249) (193) 
2nd 127.87 8.64 6.8% 29.94 23.4% 30.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (322) (261) (242) 
3rd 168.31 7.39 4.4% 30.27 18.0% 22.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (288) (241) (224) 
4th 226.50 6.41 2.8% 33.22 14.7% 17.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (238) (202) (144) 
Top 361.85 6.34 1.8% 36.62 10.1% 1 1.9% 
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(No. of obs. ) (113) (96) (59) 
Total Avg 165.30 7.75 4.7% 30.80 18.6% 23.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (1255) (1049) (862) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table A. 7.5.3 Housing Subsidies to Outright Owners in Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 
(Weekly £) 
% of Econ. 
Income Mean Economic Sub. To Mean 
Quintile Income Subsidies Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 97.43 17.55 18.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (18) (15) 
2nd 148.22 20.48 13.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (15) (11) 
3rd 208.11 21.47 10.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (24) (16) 
4th 288.25 18.08 6.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (10) (8) 
Top 562.98 21.86 3.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (20) (17) 
Total Avg 265.67 20.12 7.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (87) (67) 
Dundee 
Bottom 81.71 24.19 29.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (9) (7) 
2nd 128.84 18.46 14.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (9) (8) 
3rd 188.81 17.65 9.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (8) (7) 
4th 241.54 25.31 10.5% 
(No. ofobs. ) (13) (12) 
Top 491.33 21.91 4.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (18) (17) 
Total Avg 269.99 21.90 8.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (57) (51) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 93.52 18.48 19.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (72) (53) 
2nd 150.22 18.83 12.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (65) (54) 
3rd 209.85 19.72 9.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (60) (55) 
4th 300.71 21.77 7.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (50) (41) 
Top 583.22 25.11 4.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (54) (44) 
Total Avg 251.22 20.56 8.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (301) (247) 
Glasgow 
Bottom 77.79 16.60 21.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (45) (37) 
2nd 124.85 16.61 13.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (36) (30) 
3rd 170.24 18.21 10.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (47) (40) 
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4th 229.86 17.84 7.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (36) (32) 
Top 454.32 19.47 4.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (51) (38) 
Total Avg 220.66 17.81 8.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (215) (177) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table A. 7.5.4 Housing Subsidies to Mortgaged Owners in Four Cities of Scotland, 
1996 (Weekly £) 
% of Econ. % of MIRAS % of Total 
Income Mean Economic Sub. To Mean Average to Mean Sub. To Mean 
Quintile Income Subsidies Income MIRAS Income Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 79.47 11.41 14.4% 3.61 4.5% 18.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (12) (9) (10) 
2nd 157.42 10.65 6.8% 4.27 2.7% 9.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (10) (5) (5) 
3rd 204.43 1132 5.5% 3.88 1.9% 7.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (38) (23) (25) 
4th 292.02 11.88 4.1% 4.64 1.6% 5.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (69) (47) (54) 
Top 523.40 12.03 2.3% 5.00 1.0% 3.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (81) (49) (67) 
Total Avg 346.86 11.76 3.4% 4.60 1.3% 4.7% 
(No. ofobs. ) (210) (133) (161) 
Dundee 
Bottom 74.73 8.39 11.2% 3.50 4.7% 15.9% 
(No. ofobs. ) (22) (12) (18) 
2nd 135.41 11.91 8.8% 3.45 2.6% 11.3% 
(No. ofobs. ) (21) (17) (18) - 3rd 181.31 11.73 6.5% 3.58 2.07/6 8.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (19) (16) (17) 
4th 256.74 9.56 3.7% 3.95 1.5% 5.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (44) (26) (32) 
Top 427.65 11.51 2.7% 4.85 1.1% 3.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (51) (35) (42) 
Total Avg 261.39 10.78 4.1% 4.06 1.6% 5.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (157) (106) (127) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 90.59 9.99 11.0% 4.55 5.0% 16.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (36) (22) (27) 
- 2nd 155.11 9.16 5.9% 4.10 2.67/9 8.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (46) (29) (34) 
3rd 210.43 8.75 4.2% 4.17 2.0% 6.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (76) (46) (54) 
4th 305.03 9.82 3.2% 4.68 1.5% 4.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (142) (97) (111) 
Top 583.16 10.22 1.8% 5.13 0.9% 2.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (177) (127) (146) 
Total Avg 362.52 9.78 2.7% 4.72 1.3% 4.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (477) (321) (372) 
Glasgow 
Bottom 77.96 10.63 13.6% 3.81 4.9% 18.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (52) (32) (37) 
2nd 126.77 12.63 10.0% 3.22 2.5% 12.5% 
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(No. of obs. ) (34) (19) (22) 
3rd 169.21 12.20 7.2% 3.75 2.2% 9.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (55) (37) (42) 
4th 236.88 9.39 4.0% 4.19 1.8% 5.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (118) (77) (94) 
Top 456.15 8.68 1.9% 5.01 1.1% 3.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (226) (155) (190) 
Total Avg 306.62 8.52 2.8% 4.45 1.5% 4.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (485) (320) (385) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table A. 7.5.5 Housing Subsidies to Social Tenants in Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 
(Weekly £) 
% of Econ. % of HB % of Total 
Income Mean Economic Sub. To Mean Average to Mean Sub. To Mean 
Quintile Income Subsidies Income HB Income Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 93.78 19.18 20.5% 24.92 26.6% 47.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (68) (56) (33) 
2nd 153.53 17.20 11.2% 21.90 14.3% 25.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (82) (67) (38) 
3rd 199.34 18.15 9.1% 26.62 13.4% 22.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (50) (40) (19) 
4th 281.46 14.14 5.0% 28.99 10.3% 15.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (31) (24) (9) 
Top 405.34 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (4) (0) (0) 
Total Avg 167.15 17.82 10.7% 24.46 14.6% 25.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (235) (187) (99) 
Dundee 
Bottom 86.78 10.39 12.0% 31.44 36.2% 48.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (50) (38) (33) 
2nd 135.30 6.48 4.8% 33.30 24.6% 29.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (59) (45) (46) 
3rd 177.52 7.35 4.1% 28.67 16.2% 20.3% 
(No. ofobs. ) (61) (51) (39) 
4th 246.05 11.04 4.5% 17.72 7.2% 11.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (28) (21) (8) 
Top 362.01 7.34 2.0% 37.31 10.3% 12.3% 
(No. ofobs. ) (19) (15) (7) 
Total Avg 170.13 8.25 4.8% 30.76 18.1% 22.9% 
(No. ofobs. ) (217) (170) (133) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 90.64 7.04 7.8% 31.75 35.0% 42.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (77) (61) (43) 
2nd 151.17 5.28 3.5% 31.23 20.7% 24.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (119) (106) (88) 
3rd 204.10 2.39 1.2% 34.69 17.0% 18.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (97) (85) (72) 
4th 285.83 2.35 0.8% 33.50 11.7% 12.5% 
(No. ofobs. ) (40) (35) (17) 
Top 401.68 3.07 0.8% 36.00 9.0% 9.7% 
(No. ofobs. ) (10) (9) (2) 
Total Avg 175.56 4.40 2.5% 32.67 18.6% 21.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (343) (296) (222) 
Glasgow 
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Bottom 80.92 9.83 12.1% 28.26 34.9% 47.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (257) (214) (182) 
2nd 127.75 9.11 7.1% 29.71 23.3% 30.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (302) (247) (234) 
3rd 167.83 7.85 4.7% 28.68 17.1% 21.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (261) (217) (209) 
4th 226.70 7.19 3.2% 31.21 13.8% 16.9% 
(No. ofobs. ) (211) (176) (131) 
Top 344.06 7.69 2.2% 34.27 10.0% 12.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (94) (78) (57) 
Total Avg 162.98 8.50 5.2% 29.68 18.2% 23.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (1125) (932) (813) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table A. 7.5.6 Housing Subsidies to Private Tenants in Four Cities of Scotland, 1996 
(Weekly £) 
% of Econ. % of HB % of Total 
Income Mean Economic Sub. To Mean Average to Mean Sub. To Mean 
Quintile - Income Subsidies Income HB Income Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom 71.09 0.00 0.0% 256.00 360.1% 360.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (18) (15) (1) 
2nd 147.03 0.00 0.0% 96.69 65.8% 65.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (9) (8) (1) 
3rd 226.29 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (4) (3) (0) 
4th 285.33 1.17 0.4% 76.55 26.8% 27.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (6) (3) (3) 
Top 490.41 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (10) (7) (0) 
Total Avg 215.40 0.10 0.0% 116.64 54.2% 54.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (47) (36) (5) 
Dundee 
Bottom 59.26 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (13) (12) (0) 
2nd 132.74 12.52 9.4% 92.31 69.5% 79.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (5) (3) (1) 
3rd 171.57 0.00 0.0% 58.38 34.0% 34.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (5) (4) (4) 
4th 249.70 0.00 0.0% 60.43 24.2% 24.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (9) (6) (5) 
Top 458.24 0.00 0.0% 12.00 2.6% 2.6% 
(No. ofobs. ) (5) (4) (1) 
Total Avg 184.61 1.30 0.7% 58.18 31.5% 32.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (37) (29) (11) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 76.45 0.65 0.9% 47.59 62.3% 63.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (73) (62) (9) 
2nd 153.38 6.21 4.0% 35.99 23.5% 27.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (29) (25) (9) 
3rd 211.58 3.31 1.6% 65.57 31.0% 32.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (25) (22) (11) 
4th 290.39 0.00 0.0% 65.04 22.4% 22.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (26) (18) (7) 
Top 550.47 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (17) (16) (0) 
Total Avg 189.57 1.91 1.0% 53.58 28.3% 29.3% 
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(No. of obs. ) (170) (143) (36) 
Glasgow 
Bottom 59.80 2.47 4.1% 39.90 66.7% 70.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (37) (35) (11) 
2nd 129.62 0.36 0.3% 36.59 28.2% 28.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (20) (14) (8) 
3rd 172.97 3.26 1.9% 52.39 30.3% 32.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (27) (24) (15) 
4th 224.95 1.14 0.5% 53.50 23.8% 243% 
(No. of obs. ) (27) (26) (13) 
Top 449.88 0.49 0.1% 103.85 23.1% 23.2% 
(No. ofobs. ) (19) (18) (2) 
Total Avg 185.36 1.78 1.0% 49.40 26.7% 27.6% 
(No. of obs. ) (130) (117) (49) 
Source: 1996 Scottish House Condition Survey (own analysis) 
Table A. 7.5.7 Housing Subsidies to Private Regulated Tenants in Four Cities of 
4cntland_ 1996 (Weekly £) 
% of Econ. % of HB % of Total 
Income Mean Economic Sub. To Mean Average to Mean Sub. To Mean 
Quintile Income Subsidies Income HB Income Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
2nd - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
3rd - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
4th 254.55 3.52 1.4% 30.00 11.8% 13.2% 
(No. ofobs. ) (1) (1) (1) 
Top - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
Total Avg 254.55 3.52 1.4% 30.00 11.8% 13.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (1) (1) (1) 
Dundee 
Bottom - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
2nd 137.20 37.56 27.4% 0.00 0.0% 27.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (1) (1) (0) 
3rd - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
4th - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
Top - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
Total Avg 137.20 37.56 27.4% 0.00 0.0% 27.4% 
(No. of obs. ) (1) (1) (0) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom 112.15 9.93 8.9% 18.89 16.8% 25.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (4) (4) (2) 
2nd 152.39 17.78 11.7% 26.55 17.4% 29.1% 
(No. of obs. ) (9) (9) (5) 
3rd 225.44 18.23 8.1% 9.23 4.1% 12.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (4) (4) (1) 
4th - - - - - 
(No. of obs. ) 
Top - - - - - 
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(No. of obs. ) 
Total Avg 160.11 16.03 10.0% 22.47 14.0% 24.0% 
(No. of obs. ) (17) (17) (8) 
Glasgow 
Bottom 57.41 17.27 30.1% 26.10 45.5% 75.5% 
(No. of obs. ) (5) (5) (2) 
2nd 130.42 5.06 3.9% 5.81 4.5% 8.3% 
(No. of obs. ) (1) (1) (1) 
3rd 168.48 15.66 9.3% 38.08 22.6% 31.9% 
(No. of obs. ) (5) (5) (2) 
4th 200.33 14.77 7.4% 12.70. 6.3% 13.7% 
(No. of obs. ) (2) (2) (1) 
Top 390.81 2.95 0.8% 0.00 0.0% 0.8% 
(No. of obs. ) (3) (3) (0) 
Total Avg 177.10 13.00 7.3% 24.48 13.8% 21.2% 
(No. of obs. ) (16) (16) (6) 
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